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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 940708-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is defendant Jason Thomas Genovesi's second appeal 
of his conviction for manslaughter, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), entered upon a 
jury verdict by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The State identifies two issues, either of which is 
dispositive of this appeal: 
I. Did the Trial Court Properly Deny Genovesi#s 
Constitutional Challenges to Two Searches of his Home, therefore 
Properly Holding that the Evidence Obtained During those Searches 
Was Admissible at Genovesi's Homicide Trial? This issue includes 
subissues of waiver, exigent circumstances, consent to search, 
and scope of consent. At least some "measure of deference" is 
due to the trial court on each of these subissues. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994). 
II. Was the Evidence Obtained During Two Searches of 
Genovesi's Home Harmless in Its Impact at Trial, So That Even If 
that Evidence Was Improperly Admitted, Genovesi's Conviction 
Should be Affirmed? When an appellate court assesses harm caused 
by an alleged trial court error, it necessarily does so de novo, 
taking care, however, to select the proper analytical standard 
for harmless error. See State v. Villarreal, P.2d , 256 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (Utah 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are 
practically identical. The former provision reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, pertinent to the 
State's waiver argument in Point One of this brief, is copied in 
appendix III. Other pertinent legal provisions will be set forth 
as needed in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Upon Genovesi's first appeal, State v. Genovesi, 871 
P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1994) (amended opinion) ("Genovesi I") 
(copied in appendix I of this brief), this Court remanded the 
2 
case, instructing the trial court to enter more thorough findings 
of fact and conclusions of law addressing Genovesi's argument 
that police officers illegally searched his home, and that the 
evidence thus obtained should have been excluded from his trial. 
On 20 October 1994, the trial court entered those findings and 
conclusions (copied in appendix II of this brief), again denying 
Genovesi's motion to suppress. This second appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Home Searches 
The State's account of the challenged home searches 
tracks the trial court's post-remand findings of fact (R. 965-
71). To those findings, we add a few record-supported details, 
as follows: 
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, emergency medical 
personnel responded to a "911" call from a home shared by 
Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two children from a previous 
marriage (R. 423-24, 496, 966). Genovesi, who made the call, had 
been at home, tending the children, while Mrs. Genovesi was at 
work (R. 424-25) . The medical workers found Genovesi kneeling 
over his two-year-old stepson, Gavin Adams. Gavin appeared to be 
dead--no pulse, his pupils "fixed and dilated," skin cold, and 
his neck broken (R. 497-501, 550-54, 966-67). Nevertheless, 
resuscitation efforts were begun. 
Police also responded to the Genovesi emergency, 
arriving while the medical personnel were working on Gavin (R. 
502-03, 516-18, 561-63, 967). Officer Kendra Herlin, among the 
3 
first to arrive, observed the resuscitation efforts and spoke 
briefly to Genovesi and to the medical personnel. Based upon the 
information thus obtained, Officer Herlin secured the premises as 
a possible crime scene (R. 518-22). 
Officer Kenneth Patrick arrived after the medical 
personnel removed Gavin, but while other police officers were 
still at the Genovesi home (R. 522-23, 713-14, 967). Patrick 
performed a cursory home search, seizing a wash cloth that had 
apparently been used in attending to Gavin, and taking some 
photographs of the home's interior (R. 242, 245, 249, 968). 
Officer Patrick spoke briefly with Genovesi, and then drove him 
to the sheriff's office for further interviewing (R. 249, 715-21, 
968). After the interview, Patrick arrested Genovesi for child 
abuse (R. 10, 249, 968) . 
The resuscitation efforts failed, and Gavin Adams was 
pronounced dead shortly after arrival at a nearby hospital (R. 
586). The next day, March 21, investigating Gavin's death as a 
possible homicide, Officer Patrick telephoned Lisa Genovesi.1 
He asked permission to re-enter the Genovesi home, to take 
measurements and to search for evidence. Patrick restated those 
intentions at least once, if not twice (R. 242-44, 969). He did 
not threaten Mrs. Genovesi or intimate that he had authority to 
search the home without permission (R. 244, 969). 
xWhen this case went to trial, Lisa Genovesi had resumed her 
previous last name, Adams (R. 423). She is referred to as "Mrs. 
Genovesi" in this brief solely for purposes of clarity. 
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Mrs. Genovesi, who was staying elsewhere in the 
aftermath of Gavin's death, agreed to the search. One of her 
friends met Officer Patrick at her home with the house key, to 
permit his entry (R. 244-45) . Inside the home, Patrick, assisted 
by another officer, took measurements and more photographs--
particularly of a bunk bed from which, according to Genovesi, 
Gavin had fallen the previous day. 
In the children's bedroom that contained the bunk bed, 
the officers observed a dent in a wall, with a piece of hair 
stuck to it; they seized and preserved the hair (R. 685-86) . The 
officers also cut away and seized the dented wall section, as 
well as a section of carpet and padding from the bedroom floor 
(R. 245-46, 684-88). 
Meanwhile, Gavin Adams' autopsy confirmed that he had 
died of severe head and neck injuries. Accordingly, the charge 
against Genovesi was upgraded from child abuse to murder (R. 6-
8), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1994) (formerly second 
degree murder). 
Motion to Suppress 
Before trial, Genovesi moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained from his home (R. 30, 41-50). Following an evidentiary 
hearing (R. 238-62), the trial court denied the motion. That 
denial, which addressed only the second, March 21 home search, 
was based upon the trial court's determination that Mrs. Genovesi 
consented to that search (R. 112-13). 
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Trial 
Genovesi's trial spanned three days (R. 404-915). In 
exhaustive detail, the medical examiner who had autopsied Gavin 
Adams described her findings (R. 572-680 (copied in appendix V of 
this brief). The examiner opined that Gavin had not died from an 
accidental fall, as theorized by the defense. Gavin's fractured 
skull and broken neck, she testified, had been caused by his 
head's collision against a flat, immobile surface (R. 605-06, 
619). The force required to produce those injuries was far 
greater than a bunk bed fall would produce; the absence of 
associated arm, leg, or rib fractures was also inconsistent with 
the accident theory (R. 625-32). Therefore, the examiner opined, 
Gavin had died by homicide (R. 587-88, 624-35) . This evidence 
was emphasized by the prosecution (R. 861-63, 871, 900). 
The medical examiner also placed the time that Gavin 
was injured at five to six hours before death--that is, several 
hours before Genovesi placed his "911" call (R. 618, 623). This 
was consistent with the emergency medical workers' observations 
that Gavin appeared to be dead when they arrived at the Genovesi 
home, just minutes after the "911" call (R. 547, 552). It was 
inconsistent with Genovesi's story, told to his wife the next 
day, that he had "heard a thump," found Gavin fallen by the bunk 
bed, and "immediately" made the "911" call (R. 440). 
The "911" call, recorded on tape, was replayed at 
trial: during that call, Genovesi reported that Gavin had fallen 
from the bunk bed while playing with his older brother (R. 53 0, 
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855, 892) .2 However, Genovesi gave differing stories to the 
responding medical personnel and police: To some, he reported 
that Gavin had fallen from "a crib," not the bunk bed (R. 497, 
511-12, 520, 537, 565). The crib was located in a different room 
than the bunk bed (R. 565-67). Genovesi had also told the 
medical responders that the older brother had been with him, 
rather than playing with Gavin, when Gavin allegedly fell (R. 
520, 716-17). Genovesi's inconsistent accounts of the "when, 
where and how" of Gavin's injuries, along with the medical 
evidence contradicting Genovesi's accounts, were also highlighted 
by the prosecution (R. 855-56, 860, 867). 
A State's expert witness testified that the hair, found 
in the dented section of the children's bedroom wall during the 
second search, "could have come" from Gavin's scalp (R. 703-04). 
However, because the hair included no scalp tissue for DNA 
comparison, a more certain conclusion was not possible (R. 708). 
The prosecutor acknowledged uncertainty on this question, and on 
the question whether the wall dent had been made by someone 
striking Gavin's head against the wall (R. 904-06). 
The wash cloth, taken from the Genovesi home on March 
20, the day of the emergency call, was not offered into evidence. 
Numerous photographs of the home's interior were admitted, 
without differentiation between those taken on March 20, and 
those taken March 21, during the search permitted by Mrs. 
2The "911" tape is included with the record on this second 
appeal (State's Exh. 30). 
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Genovesi (State's exhibits 5-29, R. 294). The photos showed 
several of the home's rooms, as well as the bunk bed and the crib 
variously described by Genovesi as the site of Gavin Adams' 
"accident." They did not show the injured Gavin, nor anything 
clearly connected to the resuscitation efforts. 
The dented wall section and piece of carpet, seized 
during the March 21 search, were admitted into evidence (R. 690-
93). The prosecution did not stress these items in support of 
its homicide theory. The defense, however, did use the wall and 
carpet sections, calling expert witnesses to testify about tests 
they had performed on them, attempting to show that Gavin Adam's 
death could have been caused by a fall from the bunk bed to the 
carpetd floor below (R. 391-96, 780-803, 815-28).3 
Evidently not satisfied that the elements of murder 
were proven, the jury found Genovesi guilty of manslaughter. 
Genovesi's first appeal followed. 
First Appeal 
In Genovesi I, Genovesi argued that Officer Patrick 
improperly searched his home on both March 20 and 21, 1992; 
therefore the evidence obtained during those searches should have 
been suppressed. He further argued that the trial court's 
written ruling denying his motion to suppress was too "sketchy" 
3The defense was a bit more detailed than described in the 
main text of this brief: Genovesi actually tried to show that 
Gavin's purported bunkbead fall compounded injuries suffered in a 
bathtub fall several days earlier (R. 416, 469-71, 890) . 
References in this brief to "a fall," as the defense theory of 
death, are intended to encompass both claimed mishaps. 
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to permit "meaningful review" on appeal (Oenovesi I, No. 920803-
CA, Br. of Appellant at 14) .4 Therefore, he requested a remand 
"for further findings and conclusions." Alternatively, he urged 
this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress (id. at 44). 
The State responded that even if "both searches of 
Genovesi's home were improper, [so that] all evidence obtained 
during those searches should have been suppressed," the failure 
to do so was harmless {Genovesi I, Br. of Appellee at 20-26). 
The State so argued under the strict, "harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt" standard. However, we reserved the prerogative of future 
argument that the more verdict-favoring, "reasonable likelihood" 
test for harm should apply to error of the type alleged by 
Genovesi (id. at 20 & n.7). 
The State also argued that despite the trial court's 
spartan written ruling, the record permitted affirmance, for the 
most part, of the denial of Genovesi's motion to suppress 
(Genovesi I, Br. of Appellee at 26-40). However, we could not 
justify seizure of the wall and carpet pieces under Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search. Conceding that those 
items should have been suppressed, we argued that the trial 
court's refusal to suppress them was harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt (id. at 40-41). 
4Genovesi also mounted a jury selection argument that this 
Court rejected as meritless. Genovesi I, 871 P.2d at 549 n.3. 
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In a divided opinion, this Court granted Genovesi's 
remand request, and directed the trial court to enter more 
detailed written findings and conclusions on the motion to 
suppress. In particular, the Court requested specific rulings on 
the March 20 and March 21 searches, as well as a trial court 
response to Genovesi's independent, state constitition-based 
argument. Genovesi I, 871 P.2d at 551-52. Judge Bench, 
dissenting, challenged the majority's failure to address the 
State's harmless error argument. Were that argument to prevail, 
Judge Bench observed, "it would not matter what the trial court 
may find or conclude about the search of the home." Id. at 552 
(Bench, J., dissenting). 
Ruling on Remand 
Upon remand, no further evidentiary hearing was 
requested by the parties. Instead, the trial court reviewed the 
already-existing record, plus the transcript of Genovesi's 
preliminary hearing (R. 963, 967). The court then entered 
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law dealing with the 
home searches (R. 965-78 (appendix II)). 
The court ruled that Genovesi's motion to suppress did 
not challenge the first search; therefore, such challenge was 
waived (R. 966, 971-72). Alternatively addressing the merits, 
the trial court determined that the first search was proper 
incident to Genovesi's "911" call, and well within the scope of 
the exigency presented by that call. The court also ruled that 
the first search was proper incident to Genovesi's arrest, 
10 
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^v^.tution. The court also perceived "no pressing 
need' analyze the case 
than under the fourth amendment to the United States 
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Constitution. The court deemed Genovesi's argument for "Miranda-
type" warnings prior to search consent to be unpersuasive, 
because Mrs. Genovesi, when she consented, was under none of the 
"inherently coercive" circumstances that prompted the rule of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (R. 977). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
Genovesi's manslaughter conviction should be affirmed 
because the evidence obtained during the home searches was 
correctly admitted. Genovesi affirmatively waived any challenge 
to the March 20 search, which was also proper, and duly limited 
in scope, to the exigencies presented at that time. Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was voluntary, as 
determined by the trial court's post-remand application of the 
pertinent analysis; in particular, the consent was not obtained 
through coercive police misconduct. That analysis includes no 
state constitutional requirement that a search request include 
express notice of the right to refuse consent. 
Objective "scope-of-consent" analysis suggests that 
Mrs. Genovesi's search consent did not authorize Officer Patrick 
to cut the pieces of wall and carpet away from the home. 
However, on remand the trial court accurately noted Genovesi's 
failure to demand suppression of the wall and carpet pieces under 
scope-of-consent analysis. Having thus waived this question in 
the trial court, Genovesi makes no effort to prove "plain error" 
on appeal. Nor could he prove plain error: even assuming scope-
12 
of-consent er: . ! Genovesi could not prove that such error was 
eit: her "palpabie" o± * re judicial i n its impact at trial. 
II 
The conviction can also be affirmed on the basis of 
,i f this Court assumes that **- t*: -,„: 
should have suppressed aJl ol evidence 
home. Because x ,usionary remedy ~ itself 
is Genoves: burden 
that . . \>-. crroneou. ^re to gran* • . 
a reasonable likelihooc J :ncre favorable tria. ui rone 
* lihood exists. 
The alleged error was o,^. harmless under the sti: ict 
"harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard for constitutional 
^ ~
:
 ^ asiun upoii uiie 
State .- exi .supreme Court recent Willarreal opinion 
provides a benchmark for harmless error under this standard. 
Comparison oi: Lhi L\ case v ,i, l.h Vi I Ja,ri ea.l rt nit i rms that t he home 
search fruits in th'is case were trivial in their trial impact, 
other, independent evidence overwhelmingly proved 
Genovesi's gui ] t 
search fruits was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
Genovesi desires reversal of his manslaughter 
ontending that both warrantless searches of his home 
were unconstitutional. "T'lhei el ui e, lie ei t/giues: , I:.he exclusionary 
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remedy for violations of the federal Constitution's fourth 
amendment and the Utah Constitution's article I, section 14 
should apply. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that exclusionary remedy applies for federal and state 
violations, respectively). He seeks a new trial, at which the 
home search evidence should be suppressed.5 
As we did in Genovesi's first appeal, the State 
advances two grounds for affirmance of Genovesi's conviction. In 
conformity with this Court's concern about the disposition of 
Genovesi's motion to suppress, the State argues in Point One of 
this brief that the trial court's post-remand findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, again denying Genovesi's motion, should 
be affirmed. Then, mindful of the principle that constitutional 
issues ought not be addressed absent a need to do so, see State 
v. Thuirman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993), and of Judge Bench's 
dissent in Genovesi's original appeal, we argue in Point Two that 
any error in denying Genovesi's motion to suppress was harmless 
in its impact at his trial. Under either Point One or Point Two, 
Genovesi's manslaughter conviction should be affirmed. 
5The State infers that Genovesi requests a new trial, even 
though in his "Conclusion and Precise Relief Requested," Genovesi 
only states, "This Court should reverse the district court's 
decision refusing to suppress the evidence seized from Genovesi" 
(Br. of Appellant at 41). 
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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED GENOVESI#S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING 
THE HOME SEARCHES 
Based upon • ..- i : . ^ > \.i* .si remand findings of 
: affirm the denial. 
c r -enoves: . ' ^r suppress. As . . • *. State briefly 
addresse-" ,;- standard \J appellate review. We then turn to the 
pOSt 1 € J l..,1 JLS 1 «.i]lL» 
A. Standard of Review: Due Diligence Commands 
Appellate Deference. 
A s d: r-v •: * \ - :- ( 
detailed,
 tost-remand findings 
again deny: 
+-ur. *--^i ,^^ ,,-^ 4- entered 
^ -ind -onclusion: . - , ;~ 
det ei 
distr, 
phone, there 
* - Hi: u: t b, ra/ findings, Genovesi 
at the-1 detail excruciating detail. 
, .anf at 1 rieiK1^ wuppor Ls the 
finding t . Genovesi inadequately challenged 
evidence ±s nevertheless "flawed"); 
. . ." V "requested search conaeuL hy 
/idence : . * "exhibited no show of 
Thi •>**- nr»t indulge Genovesi s niggling aL Lack 
upcr ::>-J .1; - i indings and conclusions. The Wyoming 
cue matter nicely: "It h? e not been our 
his appea i " ^ a quest toi error anr cherec D 
demonstrate superior erudition and omniscience,11 Roderia-
Static, 8SR P '\ 8 (Wye 1 t: inq 1 John&iMi " II ted 
States, 318 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). The trial court in this case has entered carefully 
crafted findings of fact and conclusions of law, addressing every 
aspect of Genovesi's motion to suppress. To encourage such 
trial-level diligence, appellate courts should support it with an 
extra measure of deference on appeal. 
The trial court's findings and conclusions also 
demonstrate procedural and substantive matters in which deference 
is due. Procedurally, the court declined to address certain 
arguments that, it found, Genovesi had not timely and clearly 
advanced in support of his motion to suppress. E.g., R. 971-72 
(challenge to March 20 search waived); R. 976 (no separate 
11
 scope-of-consent" challenge to items seized during March 21) ; R. 
976-77 (lack of separate state constitutional analysis in 
original motion to suppress). Those decisions were proper. This 
Court has acknowledged the pressure under which trial courts must 
operate. See State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 
1991). To function under that pressure, a trial court needs 
discretion to disregard arguments, even meritorious ones, that it 
deems tardily or inadequately presented. Absent clear abuse, 
this Court should honor that discretion. 
On substance, deference to the trial court is 
appropriate because the fourth amendment and article I, section 
14 of the Utah constitution, at bottom, only forbid 
"unreasonable" searches. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) 
(quoted in State v. Higgins, 847 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1992)). 
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This is so notwi thstanding considerable recent debate about 
standards of appellate review, e.g., State i Thurman, 846 P.2d 
:i 2"3t-J 12(;fJ ' 73 (Utal i 1 993) (approi; i ng bifurcated "fact-law" 
appellate review) , State v, Penat 86 9 f • 2d 932, 93' ; ' 3 9 (Utah 
1994) (approving a "measure of discretion" for trial court 
dele: .nihil inn ill M i in 11- H" i „ i I ifnu* Fif /"jause of the unique 
facts presented in any given "search and seizure" case,"the 
bottom.-! ine question commonly is; was the challenged police 
coi Kiliict i e asonab 3 e *?" 
That ;s \" - question i n th:r ~?r~ rpu° ^ i a ! court, 
upon evaluation - v ~ -* evidence . «> z :hr. Officer 
P a t r i c k, a s e a i: <:: h e s 
reasonably r.zs : *::<: conclusion a presumptively 
reasonable uiai couv w:: -ii th i s C - : • ! - *v~i* irn 
simply because ^ mi * , .- See Stale »\ P.!*: hardson, B43 
P.2d Jtah Ap:. (Bench, P. J., concurring) 
^gainst unlimited appellate "substitution of 
judgment nstead, the trial c....r. sideie-d 
C W ^ J ^ S : ; : should be affirmed unless :.i learly unreasonable. 
°1L was rhf State's triai C O U i L warden u^ prove the 
reasonableness : e home searches, because neither search was 
warrant-supported. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 
1984) . Because the State successfully carried that burden, 
Genovesi must bear the appellate burden of proving error in the 
trial court's ruling. State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
1982) ("The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to 
upset the judgment"), 
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B. The Motion to Suppress Was Correctly Denied. 
As just stated, the trial court's post-remand findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are quite detailed; this Court may 
choose to affirm the trial court's judgment simply upon its own 
reading of those findings and conclusions. The State addresses 
the portions of those findings and conclusions upon which some 
elaboration may be appropriate. 
1. The March 20 Search. 
Waiver 
Genovesi concedes that his written motion to suppress 
did not challenge the March 20, 1992 home search (Br. of 
Appellant at 9). That concession is correct because, as the 
trial court found, Genovesi's supporting memorandum stated: "The 
search that was conducted in this case took place one day after 
the alleged homicide" (R. 44, 966)--that is, on March 21. That 
memorandum focuses exclusively on the March 21 search--even 
reciting that on the previous day, police officers merely 
"arrived and secured the residence" (R. 41). 
Genovesi would excuse the absence of a written 
challenge to the March 20 search because when he moved to 
suppress the home search fruits, he "could not have known the 
details of the searches"--i.e., that searches occurred on both 
March 20 and March 21 (Br. of Appellant at 9). That assertion is 
inaccurate. In fact, at Genovesi's preliminary hearing, held 
before Genovesi moved to suppress, his counsel specifically 
inquired about the March 20 search, confirming that neither a 
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warrant nor express consent then existed ,¥n 7 0rC cn ) 
Thus Genovesi * hrough counsel, was w ••-•" • aware o: r:.*::. 
home searches when . . ., 
the record thus indicates << conscious waive ot anv challenge t-n 
the P larch 20 sear en. And r.^ - t1:1.1 -•- -* •* • • -: - required .._ 
consider that challenge when Geno.--
argument of his ~'\ : ~r ? quoted ' r* .-. . - , , .\* 
,1"nstead, undeT II -. -L* vJ->; emu. - (copie<-* ir-
appendix III ot I..hi3 brief), Genovesi was c 1 
cause why he had not. challenged that search :. ** ; f~ m::. 
Under these circumfitances the tiiai cuuii •' • -^  tl y 
ruled that Genovesi lfs challenge to the March 20 search was wai v ed 
..
 f
 observed that h contrary : " :\J would 
•;...._ , ,.
 WXJLlLen motion, 
challenging .-•:.. searci "** ^h** 5?*-ate on 
...-••-
 c, r-) defend the Marc = searcK e? ;-i W-\ . y 
(proponent : r(..rr amendment-based motic. suppress must give 
prosecut ---• •» - : f , : ^  •::.;• - specie ir challenged conduct) 
raise new legal issues . iotion, Stat- * . ohnson, 
821 P,2d 11S0, IH..1. (Utah .1991), I.he trial court had discretion 
t n r r 1 - |,ir;I| (jenove^ 'i I -id wniveJ I us bo. .1 at • d rwr-i I i/h • 3 
,. March 2 •* e search. As already explained, such discretion 
essential rderly management of crowded trial court 
dockets, and . 
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Genovesi has no plausible argument that the trial court 
abused its discretion by ruling that his challenge to the March 
20 home search was waived. Therefore, in order for this Court to 
review that search, a "plain error" analysis would be required. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. But Genovesi does not analyze the 
trial court's admission of the March 20 home search fruits for 
plain error--i.e., error, obviousness, and prejudice, as required 
of him under State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
This Court should not undertake that analysis for him. See, 
e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (appellate 
court is "not simply a dumping ground"); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) ("This court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal"). 
Instead, it should uphold the waiver ruling.7 
Reasonableness 
The trial court alternatively upheld the March 20 
search on the merits (R. 972). So ruling, the court believed 
Officer Patrick's description of that search as "very 
preliminary, cursory" (R. 248, 968). The court reasonably 
distinguished that search from the exhaustive, four-day, 
nonconsensual warrantless search that the federal Supreme Court 
7Even if Genovesi attempted a plain error analysis of the 
March 20 search, this Court should not entertain it. As already 
recited, Genovesi's written motion to suppress effectively invited 
the trial court to regard the March 20 police activity as proper--
merely "securing" the home (R. 41) . While plain error analysis can 
overcome waiver by default, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922-26 (Utah App. 1991), it ought not be invoked to overcome 
"invited error," committed by Genovesi in his written motion. See 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App. 1992). 
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condemned iu iW; - * . * • 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (R . 973 74)--
t he case r e 1 i e d «± * 2 - - * ~* - Ji -' • T* 1€ t:: ] ^  a -' c ou:,:: t: a 1 s (= • 
observed that the March 20 search was proper incident tc 
(,;-: -)ves] ' s arrest, under Rawlings v. Kentucky, 44 8 U.S. 98, 111 
(1980) , based n^on probable cause to a •• ion: lent 
officers arrivec . home and discovered Gavin Adams' severe 
- appeal , Genovesi challenges neither of 
these determinations. 
Indeec authority cit> : Genovesi supports the 
3 - another way. In 
State - Laroccc • . -* r .-.a -JI . . ,.'uai ;.-... plurality opinion), 
i
 re ;jrav Supreme Cour= sraued that under th^ Utah Constitution, 
' •  - rema i n 
permissible : orevent the destruct . ;. ~vidence 4 P. 2d 
.-• (quoted v «• of Appellor briefly entering 
•-novesd , 
IT Karor o. ;.e s.te o: oa\ M: Aua^.t- purported "fall " police 
ft?-•'*-:?. preserve- * >• sc^v^ at existed closely e to 
<..- . ight 
well have accused them discover preserve 
exculpatory evidence w** L;**^ further, alternative ground, State 
8The Mincey search was not cursory: " [T]he entire apartment 
was searched, photographed, and diagrammed. The officers opened 
drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected their contents; they 
emptied clothing pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the 
walls and floors; they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed 
them for examination. Every item in the apartment was closely 
examined and inventoried, and 200 to 300 objects were seized. In 
short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an exhaustive and 
intrusive search." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389 
v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), the trial court properly 
admitted the fruits of the March 20 search.9 
2. The March 21 Search. 
Voluntary Consent 
The trial court's post-remand findings and conclusions 
also justify its denial of Genovesi's motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained during the second search, on March 21. The 
court acknowledged Genovesi's concession that his wife was 
authorized to consent to that search (R. 975, citing United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)); accord State v. 
Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991). Turning to the 
question whether Mrs. Genovesi's consent was voluntary, the trial 
court performed the inquiry prescribed in State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), and State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
App. 1990). Whittenback and Webb help guide the "totality of 
circumstances" search consent inquiry--an inquiry that, as 
explained in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27 
(1973), is derived from the law of confessions. 
None of the trial court findings under that inquiry is 
clearly erroneous. The court found that in seeking consent, 
Officer Patrick explained his intentions to Mrs. Genovesi at 
9Further, the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 do 
not compel minimalist police investigations. "The reasonableness 
of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or 
invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' 
means." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). Thus 
even if the March 20 police entry into Genovesi's home could have 
been even less intrusive than it was, such criticism forms no 
ground to suppress the evidence thereby obtained. 
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least twice, making no clain of authority 'to search the home 
without consent (R. 242-44, 969) . Those findings are supported 
by the following testimony: 
Q [prosecutor]: Now, would you indicate to us what you 
asked her and what she responded? 
A [Officer Patrick]: I asked her for permission to go 
back into the house to take measurements and search for 
evidence. She replied that would be all right. I verified 
again that's what I was asking and made sure that that was 
okay with her and she told me again that it was. And then I 
verified a third time, I believe, and again she said that 
was fine, she had no problems with it. 
Q: Did you ever at any time indicate to her that she 
didn't have to give you permission? 
A: I don't believe I did. 
Q: Did you ever indicate to her in any way that she 
had to give you permission? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you ever indicate to her in any way that as a 
police officer you had a right to go into the house? 
A: No. 
Q: Was there ever any question in your mind that the 
consent that was given was freely and voluntarily given? 
Mr. Metos [defense counsel]: I'll object. That's 
a conclusion. 
Judge Young: Sustained. 
Q: How were you able to get in [to the home]? 
A: She had left the keys with another friend, [], who 
met us at the residence. 
Q: Then Mrs. Genovesi told you about the key? 
A: Yes, she did. 
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(R. 243-45). Thus Genovesi is flatly wrong in asserting that 
"[n]othing in the record points to the voluntariness of Mrs. 
Genovesi's alleged consent" (Br. of Appellant at 16). 
The foregoing testimony, as determined by the trial 
court, demonstrates no "claim of authority" by Officer Patrick, 
nor "exhibition of force," nor "deception or trick," factors 
under Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106 (R. 970). The testimony also 
demonstrates a "mere request to search," and Mrs. Genovesi's full 
cooperation with Officer Patrick, see id. The Webb factors, 790 
P.2d at 82, are also satisfied: Officer Patrick's uncontested 
testimony shows that Mrs. Genovesi's consent was "unequivocal, 
specific, and freely and intelligently given," and "without 
duress or coercion, express or implied." Also in light of Webb, 
id., the trial court found that the presumption against waiver of 
Mrs. Genovesi's constitutional rights was overcome (R. 975-76). 
Genovesi argues that the trial court's consent ruling 
is flawed because the evidence does not specifically address 
every voluntariness factor listed in Whittenback and Webb. He 
complains, for example, that there is "no evidence . . . 
supporting the court's finding that Patrick exhibited no show of 
force, or that Mrs. Genovesi fully and voluntarily cooperated 
with Patrick's request" (Br. of Appellant at 13). However, it 
was not necessary to expressly address every factor. As already 
explained, the Whittenback and Webb factors merely guide the 
overarching, "totality of the circumstances" analysis. Those 
factors are not all critical to a voluntary consent ruling. To 
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the contrary, the importance of various factors varies from case 
to case: factors critical in one case may be irrelevant in 
another. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (describing voluntary 
confession cases, and observing that "none of them turned on the 
presence or absence of a single controlling criterion"); cf. 
State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993) (under 
"totality" approach to search warrants, significance of various 
factors "differs on a case-by-case basis"). 
So it is in this case. Genovesi's complaint that there 
is "no evidence" that Officer Patrick "exhibited no show of 
force" to Mrs. Genovesi is irrelevant given the officer's clear, 
careful request, unaccompanied by any claim of authority. And 
because Patrick sought consent by telephone, it can be reasonably 
inferred that no "show of force" was possible, much less 
attempted. Similarly, the trial court inferred Mrs. Genovesi's 
full cooperation with Officer Patrick from the fact that she 
directed him to the person who had the home key, facilitating his 
entry (R. 245, 969-70). Those inferences, backed up by the 
express, uncontested testimony supporting the other Whittenback 
and Webb factors, were proper. 
Genovesi also argues that because his wife was grief-
stricken at the time she granted the search consent, she could 
not have done so voluntarily. He correctly observes that the 
characteristics of the person from whom consent is sought can be 
a factor in the voluntariness analysis (Br. of Appellant at 26). 
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. However, and also consistent 
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with the law of confessions, those characteristics are irrelevant 
to voluntariness analysis when there is no coercive police 
misconduct in obtaining consent. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 159-67 (1986); see State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 226-28 
(Utah 1989) (police coercion found; remanding to analyze 
voluntariness in light of defendant's characteristics). Thus the 
trial court correctly ruled that because Officer Patrick's 
consent request was wholly non-coercive, any influence that. Mrs. 
Genovesi's grief may have had in granting consent had no legal 
impact upon its voluntariness (R. 970). 
Along these lines, the trial court concluded that Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent to the home search was voluntary. That 
ruling, based upon analysis within the legally-prescribed "field 
of inquiry," Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522 (Bench, P.J., 
concurring), should be affirmed. 
Consent Under Article I, Section 14 
The trial court correctly perceived "no pressing need" 
to analyze Mrs. Genovesi's search consent differently under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution than prescribed 
under the fourth amendment in Schneckloth, Whittenback, and Webb 
(R. 977). Although these federal and state constitutional search 
and seizure provisions are virtually identical in text, Genovesi 
urges a divergent analysis of the consent question under the 
state provision. He argues that a "Miranda-type warning," 
advising a person of his or her right to refuse, and the 
consequences of granting consent, should be given whenever a 
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search consent is sought (Br. of Appellant at 23-24) . That 
argument was rejected for fourth amendment purposes in 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246-48. 
Nevertheless, Genovesi invites this Court to make the 
"Miranda-type warning" a "sine qua non" for finding voluntary 
search consent under article I, section 14 (Br. of Appellant at 
26) . In State v. Contrel, P.2d , 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 
(Utah App. 1994), this Court declined that invitation; it should 
again do so in this case. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
explained, state law departures from federal search and seizure 
law "may be an appropriate method for insulating this state's 
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given 
the fourth amendment by the federal courts." State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988). However, Genovesi does not 
demonstrate any inconsistency in the fourth amendment "totality 
of the circumstances" approach to analyzing the voluntariness of 
a search consent--an approach that both Utah appellate courts 
have embraced. See Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106 ("the 
prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse consent . . . " ) ; State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 
137 (Utah App. 1991). 
Other state appellate courts overwhelmingly maintain 
the "totality of the circumstances" approach, wherein a "Miranda-
type" warning helps, but is not required, to prove voluntary 
search consent. E.g., People v. Hayhurst, 571 P.2d 721, 724 n.4 
(Colo. 1977); State v. Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho 
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1980); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont. 1982); State v. 
Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 
154, 169 (Alaska 1979); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Ark. 
1911); State v. Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1979); State v. 
Rodgers, 349 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Wis. 1984). 
Against this widespread adherence to the "totality" 
approach, Genovesi advances only State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 
67 (N.J. 1975), and Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983). 
But neither the New Jersey nor the Mississippi courts in those 
cases endorsed the Miranda-type warning requirement advocated by 
Genovesi; rather, they only held that knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is required. See Longstreet v. State, 592 So. 2d 
16, 19 (Miss. 1991) (reaffirming and explaining Penick). 
Evidently, no state requires the warning proposed by Genovesi 
(Br. of Appellant at 24 n. 16). The rule Genovesi proposes, 
therefore, is unprecedented. 
Genovesi also invokes "Utah's unique history" as a 
basis to depart from the "totality of circumstances" approach to 
search consent (Br. of Appellant at 30-33). In Singleton, 854 
P.2d at 1022, this Court rejected a similar argument, advanced to 
support more intrusive review of search warrant affidavits. 
Genovesi's argument in this case also should be rejected. He 
reports that Utah's white settlers, because they practiced 
slavery and polygamy, often found themselves in conflict with 
federal authorities (Br. of Appellant at 30-31); they resented 
intrusive federal efforts to stem those practices. 
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It seems fanciful to justify expanded search and 
seizure protections on the rationale that Utah settlers ran into 
trouble for practices that are now both widely disapproved and 
constitutionally forbidden, U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII (slavery 
prohibited); UTAH CONST. ART. Ill, para. 1 ("polygamous or plural 
marriages are forever prohibited"). And the Utah Constitution's 
framers, despite their supposed resentment against intrusive 
federal searches, drafted article I, section 14 to be essentially 
identical to the federal fourth amendment. By proceeding in that 
manner, the framers showed, if anything, an intention to construe 
federal and state search and seizure limits in like fashion. 
Consistent with the foregoing authority and history, 
the trial court correctly found "no pressing need" to depart from 
settled fourth amendment principles, and apply a "Miranda-type" 
warning requirement for search consent under the Utah 
constitution. The court accurately observed that the coercive 
concerns that justify the "Miranda" rule were absent in this 
case, because Mrs. Genovesi was neither in custody nor accused of 
any crime at the time Officer Patrick sought the consent (R. 976-
77) . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966) 
(describing coercive features of custodial interrogation). That 
observation is precisely in line with the federal Supreme Court's 
reasons, in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246-48, for rejecting a 
Miranda-type warning requirement for search consents. 
Genovesi's state constitution-based argument would 
extend, to law governing consensual searches, policy concerns 
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that have never been a part of that law. See American Fork City 
v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), State v. McCtunber, 
622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980), and State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 
1324, 1325 (Utah 1976) (all holding that Utah's constitutional 
self-incrimination provision, Art. I § 12, does not bar physical 
evidence, but only coerced testimony or statements). Such 
extension would be inappropriate. This Court should hold that 
Mrs. Genovesi's consent to the March 21 search was voluntary 
under both the federal and Utah constitutions. 
Scope of Consent 
The final question is whether the March 21 search was 
conducted within the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's consent. The 
standard for assessing scope of consent "is that of objective 
reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect 
[or any person from whom consent is sought]?" Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Accord State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 
705 (Utah App. 1992). Mrs. Genovesi's consent, objectively 
viewed, permitted the taking of photographs and measurements, and 
seizing the piece of hair found in the bedroom wall dent: no 
reasonable person, contemplating Officer Patrick's request "to 
take measurements and search for evidence" (R. 243), would object 
to those actions. Accord Genovesi I, 871 P.2d at 551 n.6. 
However, it is difficult to justify, within Mrs. 
Genovesi's consent, the cutting away and seizure of the wall and 
carpet sections. The State conceded as much during Genovesi's 
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first appeal {Genovesi I, No. 920803-CA, Br, of Appellee at 39-
40). On remand, the trial court found that Mrs. Genovesi's 
consent "did not specifically state that Officer Patrick could 
cut out a section of wall and carpet" (R. 971). However, the 
court then held that any bid to suppress the piece of wall and 
carpet under a scope-of-consent theory was waived by default: 
[T]he piece of wall and carpet arguably did 
not fall within the scope of Mrs. Genovesi's 
consent. However, defendant has not sought 
suppression of those items separately. Nor has 
defendant offered any evidence to persuade this 
Court that, had she been asked, Mrs. Genovesi 
would have withheld her consent with respect to 
these items. Because this is, at bottom, 
defendant's motion, this Court, under [City of 
Xenia v.] Wallace, supra, declines to order 
suppression of the piece of wall and carpet on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. 
(R. 976 (emphasis added)). 
The trial court's waiver ruling is correct. Genovesi 
moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the March 21 home 
search, based only upon a "no consent" theory. He did not 
alternatively move to suppress only the wall and carpet pieces 
under a "scope-of-consent" theory. His supporting memorandum 
mentioned scope-of-consent, but did not explain how (or if) such 
analysis might apply (R. 41-52, 49 (copied in appendix IV of this 
brief)). In oral argument of his motion, Genovesi touched upon 
scope-of-consent, but again, without articulating it as a 
distinct analysis (R. 236-62, 256-57 (also copied in appendix 
IV)). Under these circumstances, the trial court was not 
required to address scope-of-consent sua sponte, and order 
suppression, under that theory, only of the wall and carpet 
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sections. The court was only obliged to rule (as it did, 
correctly) on the "no consent" theory that Genovesi fully 
articulated and argued. 
Because of the trial-level waiver of the scope-of-
consent question, this Court can only review the trial court's 
admission of the wall and carpet sections for "plain error." But 
just as he fails to undertake plain error analysis of the March 
20 search, Genovesi makes no effort to establish the plain error 
components of error, obviousness, and prejudice, Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1208-09, with respect to admission of the wall and carpet 
sections seized on March 21. Once more, therefore, this Court 
should hold that Genovesi has waived any appellate claim of plain 
error on this point, for failure to brief it. Once more, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's waiver ruling.10 
10Genovesi could not prevail under plain error. Under a "plain 
error" scope-of-consent argument, the State would agree that it was 
error to not suppress the wall and carpet pieces. A reasonable 
person probably would not comprehend Mrs. Genovesi's consent to 
authorize the cutting away and seizure of the wall and carpet 
pieces. The trial court so recognized (R. 976). 
However, we would not concede that such error was obvious. 
This is an unusual case because not all of the challenged March 21 
search evidence falls within a scope-of-consent challenge. The 
trial court understandably focused upon the "no consent" theory 
that did encompass all that evidence. It did not "palpably" err by 
failing to re-analyze the wall and carpet pieces, by themselves, 
under a scope-of-consent theory. 
Most critically, the State would argue that Genovesi cannot 
show prejudice by admission of the wall and carpet sections. The 
defense, not the State, relied heavily on those items, attempting 
to show that Gavin Adams died by an accidental fall (R. 761, 780-
803, 895-99). This suggests "invited error." And as explained in 
Point Two of this brief, it was the medical testimony, unrelated to 
any search and seizure problem, that overwhelmed the defense's 
"accident" theory. Therefore, suppression of the wall and carpet 
sections would create no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
verdict for Genovesi. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
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On the whole, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of Genovesi's motion to suppress, as spelled out 
above and in the trial court's post-remand findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On this basis, Genovesi's manslaughter 
conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM OENOVESI#S HOME 
WAS HARMLESS IN ITS IMPACT UPON THE 
MANSLAUGHTER VERDICT; THEREFORE, GENOVESI'S 
CONVICTION MUST BE AFFIRMED 
As explained in Point One, the trial court correctly 
denied Genovesi's motion to suppress. But even if this Court 
rejects the trial court's judgment on that issue, Genovesi's 
conviction should be affirmed because any error in admitting the 
fruits of the two home searches was harmless. 
Trial errors that are non-constitutional in nature do 
not require reversal of a criminal conviction unless the 
defendant proves that the error(s) caused harm, i.e., that absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
trial verdict. E.g., State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 
1989); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). However, federal constitutional 
error generally compels appellate reversal unless the government 
proves that the error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. 
E.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) .X1 As 
follows, the "reasonable likelihood" standard for harmless error 
lxIt remains undecided what harmlessness standard applies to 
state constitutional error. State v. Villarreal, P.2d , 256 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 31 n. 4 (Utah 1995). 
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should apply to error of the type alleged by Genovesi. However, 
the State prevails even if the strict "harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt" standard is held to apply. 
A. Genovesi's Conviction Should be Affirmed Because 
He Proves No Reasonable Likelihood of a More 
Favorable Result Had the Evidence Been Suppressed. 
The United States Supreme Court has apparently assumed 
that the "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard for 
constitutional error applies to erroneous failures to grant, the 
fourth amendment exclusionary remedy. See Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (conviction upheld when admission of 
illegally seized evidence was harmless beyond reasonable doubt); 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (conviction 
reversed when illegally seized evidence was "plainly damaging" to 
the defense, but citing Chapman); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 
85, 86-87, 88, 91 (1963) (conviction reversed when illegally 
seized evidence was "obviously" incriminating or "clearly" 
prejudicial, but stating that "[t]he question is whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction"). See also Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 n.8 (1964) (reversing when 
illegally seized evidence "almost certainly" affected the 
verdict, but quoting Fahy standard). However, in no case has the 
Court critically analyzed that assumption. Nor does it appear 
that the Utah Supreme Court has analyzed it. 
The question of which harmless error standard applies, 
therefore, is an open one. The State submits that erroneous 
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failure to grant the exclusionary remedy for illegally seized 
evidence should be assessed under the "reasonable likelihood" 
standard, requiring the defendant to prove, on appeal, that such 
error harmed the trial defense. Our position is supported by the 
federal Supreme Court's observation that the fourth amendment 
exclusionary remedy "is not a personal constitutional right." 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (citing authority); 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1976). Thus a 
trial court's erroneous denial of that remedy does not, by 
itself, abridge a constitutional right. 
Further, unlike the denial of personal rights that are 
supported by constitutional text--such as, for example, sixth 
amendment confrontation rights, erroneous denial of the fourth 
amendment exclusionary remedy does not impair a criminal trial's 
truthseeking function or fairness. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 
490; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) ("There 
is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair 
criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth 
Amendment"). In fact, non-constitutional error is often more apt 
to threaten a trial's reliability: admission of unfairly 
prejudicial evidence, testimony without foundation, and hearsay, 
Utah R. Evid. 403, 602, 701-06, 801-06, present ready examples of 
such error. But such errors, under Verde and universally 
accepted authority, require reversal of trial verdicts only under 
the "reasonable likelihood" test for actual harm. This Court, 
therefore, can and should hold that unless Genovesi demonstrates 
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actual harm from the denial of his suppression motion, he wins no 
appellate relief.12 
In neither of his briefs to this Court has Genovesi 
shown any likelihood of a more favorable trial verdict had the 
home search evidence been suppressed. Indeed, it is telling that 
even in this, his second appeal, Genovesi does not specifically 
ask that his conviction be reversed: he only requests reversal 
of "the district court's decision refusing to suppress the 
evidence seized" from him (Br. of Appellant at 41). That limited 
request suggests Genovesi's tacit (and accurate) admission that 
had the home search evidence been suppressed, he still would have 
been convicted of manslaughter. In any event, for lack of any 
reason to believe that the denial of Genovesi's suppression 
motion resulted in an unreliable trial verdict, this Court should 
affirm Genovesi's conviction. 
B. Genovesi's Conviction Should Also be Affirmed 
Because Any Error in Denying his Motion to 
Suppress Was Harmless Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Even if this Court rejects the "reasonable likelihood" 
standard, any error in denying Genovesi's motion to suppress also 
was harmless under the strict "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. 
12This harmless error standard would not unduly burden most 
criminal defendants. In most convictions appealed on search and 
seizure grounds, the challenged evidence is a major component of 
the prosecution, and highly harmful to the defense. See, e.g., 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988) (suppression of 
evidence may bar prosecution entirely). Even such cases as Bumper 
and Fahy, while espousing a "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" 
standard, reversed convictions because the erroneously admitted 
evidence was "plainly" harmful. Thus it is typically easy for 
defendants to make the necessary showing. 
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Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), reviewing erroneous 
denial of trial confrontation rights, outlines the analysis that 
the State must satisfy. The challenged evidence is first 
examined for its importance to the prosecution. The strength of 
the State's case, independent from that evidence, is then 
examined. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. In State v. Scandrett, 
24 Utah 2d 202, 208, 468 P.2d 639, 643 (1970), dealing with the 
admissibility of an accused's statements to police, the Utah 
Supreme Court approved a substantially identical "harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt" analysis. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion sets a helpful 
benchmark for finding harmless error under this analysis. In 
State v. Villarreal, P.2d , 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 
1995), the supreme court held that constitutional confrontation 
rules were violated by the trial court's admission of a co-
perpetrator's out-of-court account of the crimes alleged against 
the defendant. Villarreal, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. The court 
then observed that the co-perpetrator's statement only affected 
one of the several charges against the defendant (rape); with 
respect to that charge, the statement was "not critical." Id. at 
30. The State's other evidence was the testimony of the 
thirteen-years-old victim, who was "highly intoxicated" and 
"incoherent" at the time of the crimes, and the defendant's own 
unsigned, poorly commemorated confession. Id. at 27, 30. The 
supreme court found that independent evidence, despite those 
arguable flaws, to be "so overwhelming that the violations of 
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[the defendant's] right to confront his accuser were harmless 
beyond reasonable doubt." Id. at 30. 
By comparison with Villarreal, this Court can 
confidently find that any error in failing to suppress the fruits 
of the home searches in this case was harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt. Per Van Arsdall and Scandrett, the State assesses the 
challenged evidence, then the independent evidence. 
1. Trivial Impact of the Challenged Evidence. 
Because the wash cloth seized during the March 20 
search was not offered into evidence, it obviously had no impact 
upon Genovesi's manslaughter verdict. The impact of the interior 
photographs and measurements, the hair taken from the dented 
bedroom wall, and the pieces of wall and carpet removed from the 
home during the March 21 search remains to be assessed. 
The impact of that evidence, to use the term applied in 
Villarreal, was "not critical;" instead, it was trivial. The 
photographs show the bunk bed from which, according to Genovesi, 
Gavin Adams fell (State's exhibits 24-27, admitted at R. 452). 
Some show the dented wall (State's 27 and 28, admitted at R. 
452). Other photos apparently show the front room where the 
emergency workers found Gavin Adams, the crib alternatively 
identified by Genovesi as the site of Gavin's "fall," and other 
parts of the home (e.g., State's 3, 5, 10, 16, 18, admitted at R. 
429, 442, 446). One photo shows the children's bedroom after 
Officer Patrick seized the pieces of wall and carpet (State's 40, 
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admitted at R. 689). Those photos were not important or even 
very helpful to the prosecution.13 
The home measurements were also insignificant. They 
simply gave the bunk bed's height, and pinpointed the dent's 
location in the bedroom wall (R. 741, 692-92A) . The bed's exact 
height was not needed to evaluate Genovesi's theory that Gavin 
Adams died by falling from the upper bunk; general awareness of 
the approximate height of bunk beds clearly allowed the jury to 
reject that theory. The dent's precise location was also a 
trivial matter--particularly given the prosecution's concession 
that it was "almost certain" that Gavin Adams' head had not been 
struck at that location (R. 863, 904-06), 
Consistent with that concession, the prosecution also 
agreed that the origin of the hair fiber taken from the dented 
wall was not certain; it may or may not have been Gavin's hair 
(R. 905). Thus the hair too was unimportant, and had no 
meaningful impact upon the verdict. 
The pieces of wall and carpet were also unhelpful to 
the State's case. Again, the prosecution conceded that Gavin 
Adams had not been battered against the wall. The carpet was 
heavily utilized by Genovesi, not the State: the defense 
vigorously argued that Gavin Adams had died by falling from the 
13Nor were the photos unfairly prejudicial to the defense; they 
do not show the injured Gavin Adams, nor anything remotely 
"inflammatory." 
It may become evident to this Court that Genovesi might have 
more appropriately moved to exclude much of the home search 
evidence on grounds of irrelevance, cumulativeness, or waste of 
time, Utah R. Evid. 401-403. He made no such motion. 
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bunk bed to the thinly-carpeted, concrete floor below (R. 761, 
780-803, 895-99). Thus if anything, the allegedly erroneous 
admission of the carpet aided the defense. The failure of that 
defense does not compel a finding of reversible harm. Cf. State 
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991) (unsuccessful strategy 
does not compel ruling of counsel ineffectiveness). Overall, the 
evidence that Genovesi claims should have been suppressed had no 
real impact upon the manslaughter verdict. 
2. Overwhelming Independent Evidence. 
In contrast, independent, properly admitted State's 
evidence overwhelmingly proved Genovesi's guilt. The medical 
examiner's testimony, by itself, soundly defeated the defense 
theory that Gavin Adams died from an accidental fall. Gavin's 
injuries, the examiner testified, were too severe and distinctive 
to support that theory (R. 587-89) . Reviewing medical studies, 
the examiner explained that such injuries do not occur from falls 
of the type theorized by the defense: only falls from at least 
three stories' height cause such severe injuries (R. 624-35). 
Without doubt, the jury found that evidence compelling.14 
Inconsistencies in Genovesi's accounts of Gavin's 
purported "fall" also doomed his defense. His "911" call 
suggested a fresh accident: instead, Gavin appeared dead beyond 
resuscitation to the responding medical personnel (R. 498). The 
14At Genovesi's sentencing, the trial court expressed the same 
view of the evidence, while disapproving Genovesi's denial of 
responsibility in light of the medical testimony. Viewing that 
testimony as compelling, the court did not review the evidence that 
Genovesi alleges was illegally seized (R. 934-36). 
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medical examiner determined that Gavin was injured several hours 
before Genovesi placed the emergency call (R. 613, 623).15 
Genovesi himself gave varying reports about where and how Gavin's 
"fall" occurred (R. 497, 511-12, 520, 530, 537, 565-67, 855, 
892). Those inconsistencies powerfully showed that criminal 
battering, not accident, caused Gavin's injuries. 
Any doubt that this evidence overwhelmingly supported 
the manslaughter verdict vanishes when compared to the evidence 
that was independent from the confrontation clause error in 
Villarreal. The victim-witness testimony in that case was not 
ideally reliable, owing to the victim's extreme intoxication when 
the crimes were committed. Additionally, the defendant's own 
confession in Villarreal was open to attack on a theory that it 
had never occurred, or was involuntary. Nevertheless, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that evidence "overwhelming." In this case, 
the evidence independent from the Genovesi home searches, 
unattended by any such suggestions of unreliability, is more 
overwhelming than the independent evidence in Villarreal. 
In sum, the evidence in thi§ case compels the 
conclusion that any error in admitting the home search fruits at 
Genovesi's trial was harmless beyond Reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, Genovesi's manslaughter conviction must be affirmed. 
15Thus while the fatal injuries were too old to be consistent 
with Genovesi's M911,f claim of a recent fall, they were also too 
recent to support his trial defense suggestion (footnote 3 of this 
brief) that a bathtub fall, several days before Gavin died had 
contributed to the "accidental" death (R. 633, 890, 1048-53). 
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CONCLUSION 
As a matter of search and seizure reasonableness and 
reasonable trial court procedure, Genovesi's motion to suppress 
the evidence seized from his home was correctly denied. But even 
if it should have been suppressed, that evidence was harmless in 
its impact upon the trial verdict. For either of these reasons, 
Genovesi's manslaughter conviction must be affirmed. 
The State agrees that oral argument of this appeal 
appears appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ * day of February, 1995. 
^ 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1994) 
{"Genovesi I") 
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that she was guilty of the crime of second 
degree murder* 
We affirm the conviction. 
ZIMMERMAN, CJ . and DURHAM, J., 
concur. 
STEWART, Associate C J., concurs in the 
result 
HALL, J.t heard arguments but retired 
before he could act on the opinion. 
<(D ICYKUMIW$Y5TU4> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jason Thomas GENOVESI, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 920803-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 9, 1994. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 
Young, J., of manslaughter, and he appealed. 
On rehearing, the Court of Appeals, Leonard 
H. Russon, J. pro tern., held that trial court's 
findings of fact and order denying defen-
dant's motion to suppress were insufficient to 
allow adequate appellate review, and remand 
was necessary. 
Remanded. 
Bench, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
L Criminal Law *»1134(3) 
Jmy *»33(1.10) 
Criminal defendant's argument on ap-
peal that he was denied his right to jury 
representing fair cross section of community, 
on ground that trial court accidently elimi-
nated from the venire those persons with 
surnames beginning with letters "A" through 
"R" and that persons with surnames begin-
ning with letters at end of alphabet are more 
likely to suffer from condition known as "al-
phabetic neurosis," was, on its face, without 
merit and Court of Appeals would not ad-
dress i t 
2. Criminal Law e»1158(l) 
Although Court of Appeals generally 
grants substantial deference to trial court's 
findings of fact, it does so only when findings 
disclose steps by which ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached 
3. Criminal Law *»1086.1 
Trial court must specify its findings on 
record when resolution of factual issues is 
necessary to disposition of motion. Rules 
CrimJProc, Rule 12(c). 
4. Criminal Law *»394.6(5) 
Since issues presented in search and 
seizure cases are highly fact sensitive, trial 
court's findings of fact must be sufficiently 
detailed to allow Court of Appeals to mean-
ingfully review trial court's decision on mo-
tion to suppress. 
5. Criminal Law O1086.1 
Trial court's conclusions of law roust be 
sufficient to allow for adequate appellate re-
view. 
6. Criminal Law *»3M.6(5), 1181.5(7) 
Trial court's failure to make detailed 
factual findings concerning search of man-
slaughter defendant's home and its failure to 
make conclusions of law as to whether war-
rantless search was justified because of exi-
gent circumstances, or some other exception 
to warrant requirements of Fourth Amend-
ment and State Constitution, precluded ade-
quate appellate review of order denying de-
fendant's motion to suppress and required 
remand for entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. U.S.C A ConstAroend. 
4; Const Art 1, § 14. 
7. Criminal Law *»394.6(5) 
Searches and Seizures <*»180 
Trial court's factual finding that police 
officer believed, prior to beginning warrant-
less search of manslaughter defendant's 
home, that he had obtained permission from 
548 Utah 871 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
defendant's wife to do so was irrelevant to 
factual determination that wife consented to 
search. UJ5.C.A. ConsLAmend 4; Const 
Art 1, § 14. 
8. Searches and Seizures *»186 
Trial court's factual finding that man-
slaughter defendant's wife gave police officer 
permission to go to their residence to search 
for and collect evidence pertinent to death of 
her son was supported by evidence, even 
though officer asked for permission only to 
take measurements and search for evidence; 
since scope of one's consent under Fourth 
Amendment is determined by what reason-
able person would understand exchange be-
tween officer and person from whom consent 
is sought to mean, it would be absurd to hold 
that officer who found evidence could not 
remove that evidence merely because he 
asked only to search for it not to take it 
UJ5.CA ConsLAmend. 4. 
9. Criminal Law *»394.6(5), 1181.5(7) 
Trial court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law were insufficient to allow for 
adequate appellate review of its order deny-
ing manslaughter defendant's motion to sup-
press, and remand was necessary, where, 
although trial court found that defendant's 
wife consented to search of their residence, 
court failed to make any conclusions of law 
regarding voluntariness of wife's consent 
ILS.CA ConsLAmend. 4; Const Art 1, 
§ 14. 
Bradley P. Rich, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant 
Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., David B. 
Thompson and J. Kevin Murphy, Asst Attys. 
Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., and 
RUSSON,1 J. Pro Tern. 
1. Utah Supreme Court Justice Leonard H. Rus-
ton was appointed judge pro tempore of the Utah 
Court of Appeals for purposes of the State's peti-
tion for rehearing in this matter inasmuch as he 
was the author of the previous opinion prior to 
his appointment to the Utah Supreme Court 
AMENDED OPINION UPON 
REHEARING2 
LEONARD H. RUSSON, Justice Pro 
Tern.: 
Jason Thomas Genovesi appeals his convic-
tion of manslaughter, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990). We remand for further findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
FACTS 
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, par-
amedics responded to an emergency "911" 
call from a residence in Kearns, Utah, where 
Jason Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two 
minor children from a former marriage, Jus-
tin and Gavin Adams, lived. Jason Genovesi, 
who had been at home taking care of the 
children while his wife was at work, had 
made the call to report an injury to Gavin 
Adams, age two. When the paramedics ar-
rived, they found Jason Genovesi kneeling 
over Gavin Adams, who appeared to have a 
broken neck. Resuscitation efforts were un-
dertaken, but failed, and Gavin Adams was 
pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at a 
nearby hospital 
Soon after the paramedics had left the 
Genovesi residence to take the child to the 
hospital, Deputy Kenneth R. Patrick of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office arrived at 
the home. Following a cursory search, Dep-
uty Patrick took some photographs of the 
home's interior and asked Jason Genovesi to 
accompany him to a local police station for 
questioning. After interviewing Jason Geno-
vesi, Deputy Patrick arrested him for child 
abuse. 
The next day, March 21, Deputy Patrick 
contacted Lisa Genovesi and requested per-
mission to go into the Genovesi home in 
order to "take measurements and search for 
evidence." According to Deputy Patrick's 
testimony, he repeated this request three 
times, and each time she agreed. During 
2. This amended opinion replaces the opinion in 
Case No. 920803-CA issued on February 11, 
1994. 
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this search, the officers took additional pho-
tographs, particularly of a bunk bed from 
which, according to Jason Genovesi, Gavin 
Adams had fallen, causing his fatal injuries. 
Additionally, the officers cut out and re-
moved a section of a plasterboard wall with a 
head-shaped dent in it, a hair that was af-
fixed to the dent in the wall, and a section of 
carpet At no point did the officers procure 
a search warrant for the home. 
Three days later, Jason Genovesi was 
charged by information with manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-4-206 (1990). He then filed 
a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as 
a result of the above searches of his home on 
the ground that those searches violated his 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Following a hearing at which 
Deputy Patrick testified to the above events, 
Genovesi's motion was denied Genovesi was 
subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of 
manslaughter. 
[1] Genovesi appeals, arguing that (1) 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
supporting the trial court's order denying his 
motion to suppress are insufficient to permit 
adequate appellate review and, therefore, re-
quire remand; (2) Lisa Genovesi's consent to 
search the home was invalid under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution; and (3) there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless 
entry of the Genovesi home.1 The State 
responds that (1) the trial court's order 
denying Jason Genovesi's motion to suppress 
v sufficient to allow this court to adequately 
renew the trial court's determination that 
the evidence in question did not require sup-
3. Genovesi also argues on appeal that he was 
denied his right to a jury representing a fair 
cross-section of the community because the trial 
court accidently eliminated from the venire per* 
sons with surnames beginning with the letters 
"A" through "R." Specifically, he argues that 
persons with surnames beginning with the letters 
at the end of the alphabet are more likely to 
suffer from a condition known as "alphabetic 
neurosis/' a term which he fails to define in his 
brief. Since this issue is, on its face, without 
pression; (2) both searches were valid under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution; and (3) even if the trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress the evi-
dence obtained in the searches, such error 
was harmless. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Jason Genovesi challenges the sufficiency 
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
underlying the trial court's order denying his 
motion to suppress. a[W]hen assessing a 
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 
we "will not disturb the factual findings un-
derlying the ruling unless they are clearly 
erroneous.'" Stale v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 
1015 (Utah App.1993) (quoting State v. Min-
cy, 838 P^d 648, 652 (Utah App.1992), cert 
denied, 843 ?2d 1042 (Utah 1992)). "Find-
ings are clearly erroneous only when they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence 
or when the appellate court is convinced that 
a mistake has been made." State v. Love-
gren, 798 PJ2d 767, 770 (Utah App.1990). 
[2*4] Although we generally grant sub-
stantial deference to the trial court's findings 
of fact, we do so only when the findings 
u
 'disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" State v. Marshall 791 PJ2d 880, 
882 n. 1 (Utah App.) (quoting Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 ?2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)), 
cert denied, 800 ?2& 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Moreover, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(c) requires the trial court to specify its 
findings on the record when resolution of 
factual issues is necessary to the disposition 
merit, we do not address it See State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 19S9) (appellate 
court need not address every argument, issue or 
claim raised on appeal); see also State v. Jones, 
783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate 
court will not engage in "unnecessary verbiage" 
to address meritless arguments), affd, 808 P.2d 
1056 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 
1217, 1228 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993). 
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of a motion.4 James, 868 ?2d at 1014-15; 
Marshall 791 P.2d at 882. Since the issues 
presented in search and seizure cases are 
highly fact sensitive, see, e.g., Lovegren, 798 
PJ2d at 770; Marshall, 791 ?2d at 881, the 
findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed 
to allow this court to meaningfully review the 
trial court's decision. James, 868 P.2d at 
1015; Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 770. 
[5] Likewise, the trial court's conclusions 
of law must also be sufficient to allow for 
adequate appellate review. State v. Pharris, 
846 P.2d 454,465 (Utah App.) (requiring trial 
courts to record sufficient conclusions of law 
on all evidence relevant to its decision in 
order to facilitate appellate review), cert de-
nied, 857 ?2d 948 (Utah 1993); see also 
State v. Arroyo, 796 PJM 684, 687 (Utah 
1990) (holding that case must be reversed 
and remanded when trial court's findings and 
conclusions are insufficient to support trial 
court's findings or court of appeals's conclu-
sions as to consent); Marshall, 791 ?2d at 
889-90 (reversing and remanding for a fur-
ther hearing on the issue of consent); State 
ft Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah App.1988) 
(reversing and remanding "for the trial court 
to make sufficient findings of fact and conclu-
sions on the issue of consent"). 
Turning to the case at bar, we note that 
the trial court made no oral findings of fact, 
and its written ruling on Jason Genovesi's 
motion to suppress consists merely of the 
following findings of fact and order: 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evi-
dence acquired by a search of defendant's 
residence came on regularly for hearing 
the 19th day of August 1992. The court 
heard the testimony of Kenneth Patrick, 
considered the arguments of counsel, and 
finds that: 
1. Officer Patrick believed, prior to be-
ginning the search of defendant's resi-
dence, that he had obtained permission 
from defendant's wife to do so. 
4. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) pro-
vides, with our emphasis: "A motion made be-
fore trial shall be determined before trial unless 
the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the 
court shall state its findings on the record," 
2. The law in Utah allows one spouse 
to consent to the search of property owned 
or used jointly with the other spouse. 
8. Lisa Genovesi, the wife of defendant, 
did tell Kenneth Patrick, in a 21 March 
1992 telephone conversation, that he could 
go to defendant's and her residence to 
search for and collect evidence pertinent to 
the death of Gavin Adams. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
therefore DENIED. 
The trial court's findings and order are 
insufficient in numerous respects, both with 
regard to the search that occurred on March 
20, during which photographs were taken, 
and the March 21 search, during which more 
photographs were taken and physical evi-
dence was removed from the Genovesi home. 
[6] As to the March 20 search, the trial 
court's findings of fact are inadequate inas-
much as the court failed to even address that 
search in its ruling, much less make detailed 
factual findings concerning the search. The 
trial court's ruling on Genovesi's motion to 
suppress is further deficient as to the March 
20 search because it failed to make any con-
clusions of law whatsoever as to whether the 
warrantless search was justified because of 
exigent circumstances or some other excep-
tion to the warrant requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Accordingly, the trial 
court's ruling on Genovesi's motion to sup-
press requires remand for entry of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law as to the March 
20 search. 
[7-9] As to the March 21 search, which 
the court did attempt to address in its find-
ings and order, the trial court's ruling is also 
insufficient The trial court's first finding, 
that Deputy Patrick believed he had permis-
sion to search, is irrelevant to the factual 
determination that Lisa Genovesi consented 
to the March 21 search.6 The trial court's 
S. This finding is likely also irrelevant to any 
conclusion regarding the voluntariness of Lisa 
Genovesi's consent While it is true that whether 
consent i% voluntary depends on the totality of 
the circumstances, including the characteristics 
of the one from whom consent is being sought 
and the details of the police conduct Arroyo, 796 
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second "finding of fact," that one's spouse 
may consent to the search of jointly owned 
property, is actually a conclusion of law and 
does not belong in the findings. Thus, the 
only proper finding of fact in the trial court's 
ruling is its third finding, which states that 
Lisa Genovesi gave Deputy Patrick permis-
sion "to search for and collect evidence perti-
nent to the death of Gavin Adams."1 
However, even though the trial court prop-
erly found that Lisa Genovesi consented to 
the March 22 search, it failed to make any 
conclusions of law regarding the voluntari-
ness of that consent In cases involving the 
voluntariness of consent, both the Utah Su-
preme Court and this court have emphasized 
the need for sufficient conclusions of law. 
See, e.g.t Arroyo, 796 ?2d at 687; Marshall 
791 ?2d at 889-90; Sierra. 754 ?2d at 981. 
Thus, the lack of any conclusions of law 
whatsoever on the voluntariness of Lisa Ge-
novesfs consent also requires remand. 
In State v. Thurman, 846 ?2& 1256 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Supreme Court announced 
that the trial court's ultimate determination 
whether consent was voluntary or involun-
tary is a conclusion of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Id at 1271. In determining 
whether the requisite voluntariness exists, 
the trial court must examine M the totality of 
all the surrounding circumstances—both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details 
of police conduct" Arroyo, 796 ?2d at 689 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218,226,93 S.Ct 2041,2047,36 L.Ed.2d 
854 (1973)); accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1262-63. Moreover, u[t]he prosecution bears 
the burden of proving that the defendant's 
consent was voluntary." Thurman, 846 P.2d 
at 1263. 
Furthermore, the supreme court has enu-
merated certain factors to be considered in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances 
P.2d at 689, the State has not cited us to, and we 
have been unable to find, any cases holding that 
the police officer's mental state is a factor in this 
analysis. 
6. Jason Genovesi asserts on appeal that the trial 
court's third finding is unsupported by the evi-
dence, insofar as Deputy Patrick asked for per* 
mission to take measurements and search for 
evidence, not to remove any evidence. However, 
since the scope of one's consent under the 
surrounding consent, which include: "(1) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition 
of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to 
search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the 
[residence]; and (5) the absence of deception 
or trick on the part of the officer." State v. 
WhittenbacK 621 ?2d 103,106 (Utah 1980). 
Additionally, this court has recently stated: 
In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) 
there must be clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was unequivocal, specific, 
and freely and intelligently given; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or im-
plied; and (3) the courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. 
Stale v. Harmon, 864 PJ2d 1037,1040 (Utah 
App.1993). Accordingly, on remand, the 
court should consider the above factors and 
make proper findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as to the voluntariness of Lisa Genove-
si's consent 
As a final matter, we address Jason Geno-
vesi's argument that the trial court failed to 
address his independent state constitutional 
analysis, which was properly raised and ar-
gued before that court, or to explain why it 
did not address that argument At the hear-
ing on his motion to suppress, Genovesi ar-
gued that not only was Lisa Genovesi's con-
sent involuntary under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, but 
it was also invalid under article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. However, the trial 
court made no mention of this independent 
state constitutional analysis in its ruling on 
Genovesi's motion to suppress. Accordingly, 
since this matter must be remanded due to 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution is determined by what a reasonable person 
would understand the exchange between the offi-
cer and the one from whom consent is sought to 
mean, State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah 
App.1992), it would be absurd to hold that an 
officer who finds evidence as the result of an 
otherwise constitutional search cannot remove 
that evidence merely because he asked to search 
for it, not to take it 
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the insufficient findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law underlying the trial court's order 
denying Genovesi's motion to suppress, the 
trial court is further instructed to address 
this matter on remand.7 
Because we conclude that the trial court's 
order denying Genovesi's motion to suppress 
was insufficient, we do not reach the other 
issues raised by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact and order 
denying Jason Genovesi's motion to suppress 
are insufficient to allow adequate appellate 
review. Accordingly, we remand this matter 
to the trial court to: (1) make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law regarding the March 
20 search; (2) make additional findings of 
fact and conclusions of law concerning the 
March 21 search; and (3) address Genovesi's 
independent state constitutional analysis, or 
give its reasons for not addressing the same. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent This case should 
not be remanded for findings and conclusions 
(as to the validity of the search of the home) 
unless we can definitively hold that the evi-
dence obtained therefrom was prejudicial to 
the defendant 
The State urges us to assume, for the sake 
of argument "that both searches of Genove-
si's home were improper, and that all evi-
dence obtained during those searches should 
have been suppressed." The State contends 
that any error in denying the motion to 
suppress was harmless because other inde-
pendent evidence overwhelmingly established 
defendant's guilt Based on this argument it 
would not matter what the trial court may 
find or conclude about the search of the 
home. See, e.g.t State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 
2d 202,468 ?2& 639 (1970) (affirming convic-
tion for second-degree murder where guilt 
was shown by untainted evidence so over-
whelming that there was no likelihood of 
different result). 
7. The matter of the photographs also merits com-
ment A good deal of confusion has arisen con-
cerning which photographs were taken during 
I dissent because the main opinion fails to 
address a potentially dispositive issue. 
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Elaine B. WEIS and The Department 
of Financial Institutions of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 920703-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 11, 1994. 
Former owners of defunct thrift institu-
tion brought breach of contract and civil 
rights actions against Department of Finan-
cial Institutions which took over thrift The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
mer F. Wilkinson, Jn granted summary judg-
ment dismissing owners' actions, and owners 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, As-
sociate PJ., held that (1) owners did not 
reasonably rely upon representation by De-
partment that it had no information which 
would indicate any reasonable probability of 
significant error in balance sheet for thrift 
for purposes of owners' breach of contract 
claim; (2) owners alleged facts which stated 
claim for breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; and (3) Department's 
summary seizure of thrift did not violate 
owners' procedural due process rights. 
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and 
remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred in result 
which search. The parties would be well advised 
to resolve this difficulty on remand in order to 
clarify this matter for the trial court. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 921900681FS 
Judge David S. Young 
This Court, having previously heard and denied 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, has now been directed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals to enter additional findings of fact 
and conclusions of law addressing the following: (1) the March 
20, 1992 search of defendant's home; (2) the March 21, 1992 
search of defendant's home; and (3) defendant's independent state 
constitutional analysis of the searches. State v. Genovesif No. 
920803-CA, Amended Opinion on Rehearing, slip op. at 8 (Utah App. 
3/9/94). 
In accord with the court of appeals1 directions, this 
Court now enters the following: 
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FINDINGS QF FACT 
March 20, 1992 Search(es) 
1. Defendant's written motion to suppress evidence, 
filed in this Court on May 28, 1992, did not challenge the(se) 
warrantless March 20, 1992 search(es). His supporting 
memorandum, filed August 3, 1992, refers only to one search, 
stating: "The search that was conducted in this case took place 
one day after the alleged homicide" (R. 44). At the start of the 
August 19, 1992 hearing of his motion to suppress, defendant did 
not object to the State's assertion that the challenged search 
was the one that took place a day or two after the alleged crime 
(R. 239) . Defendant orally mounted a separate objection to a 
March 20 search only after testimony had been taken at the 
hearing of his motion to suppress (R. 253-54). 
2. The alleged homicide was committed on March 20, 
1992, On that day, defendant Jason Genovesi placed a "911" call, 
seeking assistance for his two-year-old stepson, Gavin Adams. 
Gavin, defendant reported, had suffered an accidental fall in the 
home that defendant shared with his wife, Lisa Genovesi. 
3. Emergency workers, including paramedics, who 
responded to defendant's "911" call found defendant kneeling over 
the unconscious Gavin Adams in a front room of the Genovesi home. 
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4. The paramedics, after examining Gavin, concluded on 
the basis of their medical and first aid training and experience, 
that Gavin was probably dead of severe head and neck injuries. 
Nevertheless, they began resuscitation efforts as they were 
trained to do. These efforts, though fruitless, ended only after 
Gavin's arrival at a hospital, where Gavin was officially 
pronounced dead. The Court finds that the emergency workers had 
ample reason to believe that Gavin's injuries, because of their 
unusual severity, were not caused by an accidental, in-home fall, 
as reported to them by defendant. 
5. Sheriff's officers arrived at the Genovesi home 
before the emergency workers removed Gavin to the hospital. The 
Court finds that the emergency workers communicated their 
conclusions about Gavin's injuries to after-arriving sheriff's 
officers. 
6. Sheriff's detective Kenneth Patrick arrived at the 
home after Gavin was removed, but before the earlier-arriving 
officers had departed. This information is gleaned from 
testimony at the hearing of the motion to suppress (R. 240-41), 
but also from the transcript of the earlier preliminary hearing 
(T. 4/30/92 at 70-73, 75-76), provided by the prosecution upon 
the court of appeals remand of this case. This information is 
also confirmed by the later trial transcript (R. 516-18, 561-63). 
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7. Upon his arrival, Officer Patrick performed a "very 
preliminary, cursory" search of the Genovesi home. Besides 
inspecting the front room where emergency workers found defendant 
and Gavin Adams, Officer Patrick entered two other rooms that, as 
variously related by defendant, had supposedly been the site of 
Gavin's purported accident. During this search, Officer Patrick 
took some photographs, and also seized a washcloth that had 
apparently been used in attending to Gavin (R. 245,249). 
8. While at the Genovesi home on March 20, Officer 
Patrick also interviewed defendant about the purported accident. 
This interview was continued at the sheriff's office. After the 
interview, Officer Patrick arrested defendant for child abuse. 
March 21 Search 
9. Defendant's written motion to suppress evidence 
challenged a warrantless March 21, 1992 search. This motion 
asserts a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the 
identically-worded Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Neither his motion nor his supporting memorandum, 
however, makes any discernible argument that the analysis should 
proceed differently under the federal and state provisions. The 
supporting memorandum cites United States Supreme Court cases and 
Tenth Circuit United States Court of Appeals cases, based upon 
the Fourth Amendment only. Two Utah cases are cited, neither of 
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which is claimed to be based on a separate, distinctive 
interpretation of Article I, section 14. This Court denied 
defendant's request to file a supplemental memorandum, separately 
briefing the state constitution question, after the hearing of 
defendant's motion to suppress (R. 262). 
10. On March 21, Officer Patrick telephoned 
defendant's wife, Lisa Genovesi, and asked Mrs. Genovesi for 
permission to again enter the Genovesi home, in order to take 
measurements and to search for evidence. He explained these 
intentions at least twice. 
11. Officer Patrick made no claim to Mrs. Genovesi 
that he had authority to conduct the search without her consent 
(R. 244). 
12. Officer Patrick did not exhibit any force, or 
threaten Mrs. Genovesi in any way, in seeking permission to 
conduct the search. 
13. Mrs. Genovesi was neither in custody nor charged 
with any crime when permission to search was sought. Nor can the 
Court find any other coercive features in Officer Patrick's 
request for permission to search the Genovesi home/ therefore, 
the Court finds that only a mere request to search was made. 
14. Mrs. Genovesi was staying with a friend when 
Officer Patrick called her. She arranged for another friend to 
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meet Officer Patrick at the Genovesi home with the key to the 
home (R. 244-45) . Based upon these facts, the Court finds that 
Mrs. Genovesi voluntarily and fully cooperated with Officer 
Patrickfs request. 
15. The Court finds nothing in the evidence that 
suggests, in any way, that Officer Patrick resorted to deception 
or trick in order to obtain permission from Mrs. Genovesi to 
search the Genovesi home on March 21. 
16. Officer Patrickfs testimony about the manner in 
which he requested and received permission to search the home on 
March 21 was clear and positive, containing no suggestion of 
improper coercion on his part. Further, the Court observes that 
defendant produced no evidence suggesting that the permission to 
search was coerced from Mrs. Genovesi. 
17. If there was any duress involved, the Court finds 
that this was not the product of any conduct by Officer Patrick. 
Rather, it was Mrs. Genovesi1s understandable grief over the 
death of her son. No duress or coercion, express or implied, was 
exerted by Officer Patrick. 
18. On the foregoing evidence, this Court is convinced 
that any presumption against the waiver of Mrs. Genovesi!s right 
to be free from unreasonable, warrantless searches, has been 
overcome. 
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19. Pursuant to the permission obtained from Mrs. 
Genovesi, Officer Patrick searched the Genovesi home on March 21. 
At that time, he (a) took photographs; (b) took measurements of 
room dimensions, the height of a bunk bed from which, according 
to defendant, Gavin had fallen, and the height of a dent in a 
wall in the bedroom where Gavin supposedly fell; (c) seized a 
hair found within the just-mentioned dent; (d) cut away and 
seized the portion of the wall containing the dent; and (e) cut 
away and seized a piece of floor carpeting and pad where Gavin 
supposedly fell from the bunk bed (R. 245-46). The consent given 
by Mrs. Genovesi evidently did not specifically state that 
Officer Patrick could cut out a section of wall and carpet (R. 
251-52) . 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, this Court 
now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
March 20, 1992 Search 
1. Because defendant did not challenge the March 20 
search in his written motion to suppress, the propriety of that 
search is not properly before this Court. Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(b)(2) (motions concerning admissibility of evidence "may be 
raised prior to trial bv written motion" (emphasis added)). 
Defendant never showed cause to allow such challenge without 
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specifying it in writing. As further support for this 
conclusion, this Court endorses the approach of the Ohio Supreme 
Court, set forth in City of Xenia v. Wallace. 37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 
524 N.E. 2d 889 (1988), which requires the defendant in a Fourth 
Amendment-based motion to suppress to show that a warrantless 
search was made, and otherwise specify the grounds for 
suppression, thereby giving the State fair notice as to what 
evidence it must put on in response, and also alerting the trial 
court to the issue (s) it must decide. Wallace. 524 N.E. 2d at 
892 (construing Ohio's criminal motion rule which is similar to 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12, and also citing State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 
656 (Utah 1985)). Accordingly, under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d), any 
challenge to the March 20 search is waived, and all evidence 
obtained during that search is admitted. 
2. Although the ruling of this Court with regard to 
the March 20 search is waiver, the unusual circumstances posed by 
the court of appeals1 remand of this case, and the possibility 
that the court of appeals may reject the waiver ruling, impels 
the Court to comment upon the merits of defendant's untimely 
challenge to the March 20 search. 
3. Were it to reach the merits, this Court would be 
unpersuaded by defendant's reliance upon Mincey v. Arizona. 437 
U.S. 385 (1978). Defendant's "911" call in this case operated as 
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an unequivocal consent--indeed a request--for emergency workers, 
including the police, to enter his home on March 20. His call 
also clearly gave officers cause to believe that Gavin Adams was 
lfin need of immediate aid," id. at 392, justifying the 
warrantless entry. These considerations also distinguish this 
case from State V, Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988), and 
State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987), also relied upon by 
defendant, which involved nonconsensual dwelling entries. 
4. Once police learned the dire nature of Gavin's 
injuries, there was probable cause to arrest defendant for child 
abuse. That information would normally be passed from officer to 
officer at the scene, such that even the later-arriving Officer 
Patrick would have such probable cause. State v. Nielsen. 727 
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah App. 1986) (presumption that officers convey 
information truthfully to one another); cf. State v. Roth. 827 
P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992) (police may rely on "flyer or 
bulletinfl). It was therefore permissible, incident to 
defendants arrest, to perform a limited search of the premises, 
even if done before formally announcing the arrest. Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). 
5. Mincey would not compel a conclusion that the 
search performed incident to this defendant's arrest, or incident 
to the "911" call, exceeded its permissible limits. Mincey 
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involved an exhaustive, four-day warrantless search, well after 
dissipation of the emergency that authorized the initial entry, 
437 U.S. at 389. This case involves Officer Patrick's entry into 
the Genovesi home's front room and two other rooms, each 
identified as the site of Gavin's "accident," to perform a 
cursory inspection and take photos, a far less-intrusive action 
than in Mincey. That cursory inspection was necessary to find 
and preserve any pertinent evidence while it was fresh, and the 
scene undisturbed. And the scope of an "incident-to-arrest" 
search is, as the court of appeals has observed, somewhat 
generously defined. State V, Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-85 
(Utah App. 1991). Finally, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that the reasonableness of officer actions is not measured 
strictly against the possibility that they might have used "less 
intrusive" measures. Illinois v. Lafayette. 462 U.S. 640, 647 
(1983). Under all this authority, this Court would conclude, had 
the question been properly presented to it, that Officer 
Patrick's March 20 search was reasonably circumscribed in its 
scope, appropriate to the circumstances, and that all evidence 
obtained during that search is admissible. 
March 21, 1992 Search 
6. This Court agrees with defendant's contention that 
no "exigent circumstances" existed to justify the March 21 
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search, properly challenged in this Court. For his part, 
defendant concedes that Mrs. Genovesi had authority to consent to 
the search. United States v, Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
Therefore, admissibility of the evidence obtained on March 21 
depends upon the Statefs argument that the search was conducted 
pursuant to Mrs. Genovesi1s valid, voluntary consent. 
7. This Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 10 through 18, 
under the analyses set forth in State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 
103, 106 (Utah 1980), and State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
App. 1990), lead this Court to conclude that Mrs. Genovesi's 
consent to the March 21 home search was freely and voluntarily 
given. The Court particularly notes the absence of any claim of 
authority by Officer Patrick, his mere telephoned and clearly 
explained request to search, the absence of any deception or 
trick to obtain the consent, and Mrs. Genovesi's complete 
cooperation, under Whittenback. The Webb factors, quoted in 
State V. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993) in the 
court of appeals1 opinion in this case, appear to overlap with 
the Whittenback factors. Of the non-overlapping factors, this 
Court again finds Officer Patrick's uncontested testimony to be 
sufficiently clear and unequivocal such that the presumption 
against waiver of constitutional rights, set forth in Webbr has 
been overcome. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the March 
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21 search was conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent, and was 
therefore proper under the Fourth Amendment. 
8. Although seized during a consensual search, the 
piece of wall and carpeting arguably did not fall within the 
scope of Mrs. Genovesi's consent. However, defendant has not 
sought suppression of these items separately. Nor has defendant 
offered any evidence to persuade this Court that, had she been 
asked, Mrs. Genovesi would have withheld her consent with respect 
to these items. Because this is, at bottom, defendant's motion, 
this Court, under Wallace, supra. declines to order suppression 
of the piece of wall and carpet on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
9. This Court now addresses defendantf s purported 
"separate analysis" under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Defendant's motion to suppress only "nominally 
alludes" to Article I, section 14, and the court of appeals has 
specifically held that this is not sufficient to trigger a 
separate analysis. State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 
1990). Defendant offered a supplemental memorandum, purportedly 
containing the required analysis, only after the hearing on his 
motion to suppress. This Court, in its discretion to manage its 
own docket, properly declined that offer. Nor would different 
analysis be appropriate under the facts of this case: the 
challenged search consent was not sought from defendant himself, 
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who, it might be inferred, could have felt under particular 
coercion as a result of his arrest, Cf. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 
U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring "Miranda warnings" as a means to 
offset the "inherently coercive" nature of police custody). 
Instead, defendant's wife, not a suspect in the crime, and not in 
custody, gave the consent. This Court therefore concludes that 
there is no pressing need to analyze this case differently under 
the Utah Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment, and 
therefore declines to do so. Accordingly, all evidence seized 
during the March 21 consent-authorized search is admissible. 
10. The Court now concludes that because the evidence 
seized during both the March 20 and March 21, 1992 searches is 
admissible, it is unnecessary to determine which photographs were 
taken on which of those days: all the photographs are 
admissible. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, the court now enters the following: 
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AND ORDER DENYING 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied 
DATED this _2^1 day of AprilTl994. 
BY THE COURT:'" 
Approved as to form: 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
Attorney for Defendant 
DAVID S. TK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress was mailed to Bradley P. Rich, 
Attorney for Defendant Jason Thomas Genovesi, at 175 East 400 
South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the J27U day of 
April, 1994. 
BRADLEY P. RICH #2730 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
r.*c 
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JN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, 
Defendant 
) OBJECTION TO STATE'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER AND REQUEST 
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No. 921900681 FS 
Judge David S. Young 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Jason Thomas Genovesi, by and through his 
attorney of record, Bradley P. Rich, and objects to the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order denying defendant's motion to suppress, for the reasons set 
forth herein. 
1. Defendant objects to the characterization which is contained in 
paragraphs one and nine of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order 
which purports to bifurcate the defendant's motion in a manner to separate the federal and 
state constitutional claims, which is contrary to the motion itself and to the proceedings 
held in the court. 
U0G60 
2. Defendant claims that a general motion to suppress is sufficient to 
raise claims under both the federal constitution and the constitution of the State of Utah 
under Article 1, Section 14. 
3. Defendant objects to paragraph eight of the conclusions of law, in that 
proposed conclusions of law is in direct contradiction to the facts adduced at the hearing. 
Further, whether or not Mrs. Genovesi would have extended her consent to cover the 
additional items, is not an issue since a consent is only as extensive as the actual granting 
of the consent and cannot presume to have been beyond it if such request for an extension 
had been asked. 
4. Paragraph eight of the conclusions of law, also presents that the 
burden is upon the defendant to show somehow that permission would not have been 
extended had it been requested by the appropriate police agents, which is in fact contrary 
to the law. 
WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the court not approve the proposed 
order bv the court and set the matter for further hearing. 
DATED this ' day of October, 1994. 
BRADLEY P. R^CH 
Attorney for Defendant 
2-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GENOVESI, JASON THOMAS 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 9 2 1 9 0 0 6 8 1 FS 
DATE 10/20/94 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. COPE, JAMES 
D. ATTY. METOS, G. FRED 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND THE 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THERETO. BASED UPON THE COURT'S REVIEW, 
THE COURT ACCEPTS AND ENTERS THIS DATE THE PROPOSED FINDINGS, 
ETC. AND DENIES THE OBJECTIONS, f \ -"•-^ a 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
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APPENDIX III 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 1 6 
determining that there was no valid reason for 
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea merely 
because he expected a lesser sentence than 
that imposed. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The requirement that the court "advise the 
defendant personally that any recommenda-
tion as to sentence is not binding on the court** 
was met when the court specifically explained 
that the state could only recommend, but not 
guarantee, that defendant not be incarcerated. 
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in State v. Mills, 641 P.2d 119 (Utah 
1982); Olsen v. DeLand, 739 P.2d 615 (Utah 
1987); State v. Gentry, 797 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Price, 837 ?2d 578 (Utah 
Ct App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law f 443 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 375 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Plea of guilty or conviction as re-
sulting in loss of privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as to crime in question, 9 A.L.R.3d 990. 
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful 
search and seizure, 20 A.LJL3d 724. 
Enforceability of plea agreement, or plea en-
tered pursuant thereto, with prosecuting attor-
ney involving immunity from prosecution for 
other crimes, 43 A.L.R.3d 281. 
Admissibility of defense communications 
made in connection with plea bargaining, 59 
A.L.R.3d 441. 
Right to withdraw guilty plea in state crimi-
nal proceedings where court refuses to grant 
concession contemplated by plea bargain, 66 
A.L.R.3d 902. 
Defendant's appeal from plea conviction as 
affected by prosecutor's failure or refusal to 
dismiss other pending charges, pursuant to 
plea agreement, until expiration of time for ap-
peal, 86 A.L.R.3d 1262. 
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The follow-
ing shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or infor-
mation other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to 
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any 
time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
state its findings on the record. 
express waiver of right to appeal as part of ne-
gotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864. 
Accused's right to sentencing by same judge 
who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to 
plea bargain, 3 A.LiUth 1181. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding plea bargaining, 8 
A.L.R.4th 660. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding guilty pleas, 10 
A.L.R.4th 8. 
Judge's participation in plea bargaining ne-
gotiations as rendering accused's guilty plea 
involuntary, 10 A.L.R.4th 689. 
Retrial on greater offense following reversal 
of plea-based conviction of lesser offense, 14 
AJLJUth 970. 
Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as 
improper vouching for credibility of witness — 
state cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1229. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepre-
sentation, or failure to advise, of immigration 
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65 
A.L.R.4th 719. 
Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence 
contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently 
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87 
A.L.R.4th 384. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 267 to 
275. 
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(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant 
relief from such waiver. 
(e) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceed-
ings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (g) of this 
rule, which created a good faith exception to 
the exclusion of evidence on the grounds of un-
lawful search and seizure, was expressly ex-
cluded from the 1989 adoption of this rule. 
Subdivision (g) [former $ 77-35-12(g)] and for-
mer §§ 78-16-1 to 78-16-11 substantially com-
prised the Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act; that act was declared unconstitutional in 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), on 
the basis that the good faith exception to the 
ANALYSIS 
Findings of (act. 
Objections to indictment or information. 
Request for discovery. 
Ruling on motion to suppress. 
Severance of counts or defendants. 
Specificity. 
Waiver. 
—Effect of nonenforcement 
—Legality of arrest. 
—Notice requirements. 
—Sufficiency of information. 
Cited. 
Findings of fact 
Subdivision (c) requires the trial court to 
state its findings on the record when factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion. 
Those findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
allow the Court of Appeals the opportunity ad-
equately to review the decision below. State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Objections to indictment or information. 
A defect in a bindover order may be treated 
as a defect in the information; jurisdiction over 
a motion to quash a bindover order fits 
squarely within this rule and Rule 25. The mo-
tion focuses a district court's attention on the 
propriety of its exercise of original jurisdiction, 
requiring a determination of whether it can 
proceed with the case. The motion is not equiv-
alent to an appeal. State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
Even though the district court had jurisdic-
tion to review a bindover order and erred in its 
refusal to review the order, the error was 
harmless because any defect in the order was 
made moot by defendant's later conviction. 
State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992). 
exclusionary rule announced in United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. 
Ed. 2d 677 (1984), can never apply to investi-
gatory stops and searches. Subdivision (g), al-
though not adopted as part of this rule, re-
mained in effect as a statutory provision until 
deleted, effective April 23,1990, by L. 1990, ch. 
15, § 3. 
Rule 9, cited in Subdivision (bX4), was re-
pealed in 1990. For present provisions relating 
to joinder and severance, see § 77-8a-l. 
Request for discovery. 
To show that defense counsel's failure to 
move for formal discovery was ineffective as-
sistance and prejudicial, defendant had to show 
that filing a formal discovery motion would 
have yielded exculpatory information that was 
not supplied under informal discovery pursu-
ant to the prosecutor's "open file policy." Par-
sons v. Barnes, 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1994). 
Ruling on motion to suppress. 
A pretrial ruling on a suppression motion 
generally becomes the law of the case to be 
adhered to by the trial judge; however, to apply 
this general rule in all circumstances would 
prohibit the trial court from correcting its own 
error at trial or even on motion for a new trial. 
State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Severance of counts or defendants. 
When defendant had a due process right to 
the severance of the counts contained in the 
information and separate trials thereon, and 
had not knowingly and voluntarily waived it, 
former statutory waiver provision that all ob-
jections to an information were waived if a mo-
tion to quash was not timely filed could not be 
used to defeat defendant's due process right to 
severance and separate trials where defen-
dant's request for severance and separate trials 
was not untimely under the former statute, but 
was made well in advance of the trial so no 
surprise or unnecessary inconvenience was oc-
casioned for the state or the trial court. State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980). 
Because no pretrial motion for severance of 
defendants was made, defendants waived the 
issue of misjoinder of defendants at trial. State 
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, State v. 
Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). 
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Genovesi's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Suppress 
Transcript: Oral Argument of Motion to Suppress 
G. FRED METOS - 2250 
Attorney for Defendant 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-6474 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
: CaseNo. ^ 2 - l ^ | D O g > | 
JASON GENOVESI, 
: Judge David Young 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 20, 1992, paramedics were dispatched to a residence at 5459 West 
Balsa Avenue in Salt Lake County. The paramedics attended to an injured child, Gavin 
Adams. Sheriff's deputies arrived and secured the residence. In the residence, the 
deputies located a three year old, Justin Adams, and the eighteen year old stepfather 
of the two children, Jason Genovesi. Later that afternoon, Gavin Adams was 
pronounced dead at the Pioneer Valley Memorial Hospital. On March 21, 1992, 
sheriff's deputies re-entered the residence without a search warrant and without 
consent to make a crime scene inspection of the residence. The officers seized hair 
samples, carpet samples and cut out a piece of a wall. Measurements were also 
taken in Gavin Adams' bedroom. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY 
THE SEARCH. 
When a life may be in danger or evidence destroyed, officers may conduct a 
search without taking time to obtain a search warrant. Mincv v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 
385 (1978); State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). In Mincv. narcotics officers 
were attempting to purchase drugs. When the officers attempted to effect an arrest, 
a shootout ensued in which an undercover officer was killed. The officers initially 
entered the premises to locate the gunman and persons who may be injured. 
Detectives then spent four days processing the scene without a warrant. The Court 
held that the police may respond to emergency of life threatening situations without 
a warrant. However, the Court specifically held that " . . . a warrantless search must 
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation'", 437 U.S. at 
393. Similarly, in Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the Court allowed fire 
fighters to make a warrantless entry into a building to suppress a fire and conduct an 
initial investigation after the smoke and steam had cleared. This was justified by what 
was described as a ". . . compelling need for official action [when there is] no time to 
secure a warrant," 436 U.S. at 509. 
In State v. Ashe, supra, the court allowed narcotics officers to enter a residence 
without a warrant, effect an arrest and perform a protective sweep of a residence to 
- 2 -
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prevent the destruction or removal of evidence. In that case, agents were making a 
drug purchase from a woman named Glasser. She was to sell four ounces of cocaine 
for $8,500. The agent gave Glasser $500 to obtain one ounce of cocaine to inspect. 
Glasser was observed by surveillance agents leaving the restaurant where the money 
was received. They then watched her meet with a co-defendant, Cricks. Cricks was 
followed to Ashe's residence then back to a parking lot where he met with Glasser. 
Glasser then provided the cocaine to the officers. Glasser and Cricks were arrested. 
Prior to that time, Glasser stated that the rest of the deal was to take place shortly 
and would be conducted "at the door" of a residence. The officers went to Ashe's 
residence where they observed him moving away from an upstairs window. They 
were not aware of Ashe's existence or location until the transaction was in process. 
The court found that the officers did not have "a realistic opportunity to secure a 
warrant". Consequently, the court held that the warrantless entry fell within the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
Conversely, in State v. Northrup. 256 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988), police 
officers entered and searched the defendant's residence without a warrant. Money 
had been given a co-defendant, he entered the residence and was arrested after 
leaving. He did not have the money at the time of the arrest. The State claimed that 
there were exigent circumstances because they believed that the money may be 
destroyed or removed. The court of appeals recognized that preservation of evidence 
is an exigent circumstance that makes a search imperative. The court also held that 
- 3 -
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the burden of proving such a exigency is on the State. The court found that there 
were no exigent circumstances in Northruo to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. 
The officers knew where and when the drug transaction was to take place. There had 
been two previous transactions at that location. Surveillance units were in place and 
the transaction occurred when the courts were open. The co-defendant was not 
expected back in the residence at the time of he was arrested. 
Similarly in State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987), the Court held that 
the arrest of the defendant outside of his hotel room did not justify a warrantless 
entry and search of the room. In that case, hotel guests reported screaming in the 
defendant's room. The victim of the assault which was charged, was located at the 
manager's apartment naked and bleeding. The defendant stated he had a crazy 
person in his room. The State claimed exigent circumstances justified the search. 
The Court found that none were present since the defendant was outside of the room 
at the time of arrest. 
The search that was conducted in this case took place one day after the alleged 
homicide. There were no exigencies that excused the officers' failure to obtain a 
warrant. All of the persons had been removed from the residence and it had been 
locked and secured. The evidence seized as a result of the search of the defendant's 
residence must be ordered suppressed. 
- 4 -
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS NOT SEARCHED 
PURSUANT TO A VOLUNTARY CONSENT. 
The Supreme Court has given some general tests to determine the voluntariness 
of a consent to search. In Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court 
held that the mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority to search does not 
constitute a voluntary consent. In that case, officers claimed to have a valid warrant 
and the defendant's mother allowed them to search his room. That warrant was later 
found to be invalid. 
Subsequently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court 
rejected the contention that before a consent may be voluntary, the person giving the 
consent must know he has a right to refuse to allow officers to search. The Court 
went on to hold that a consent must be freely and voluntarily given and not the result 
of duress or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances. The Court described some of the factors to 
be considered when applying this totality of the circumstances test. Those include: 
the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in custody, the nature 
of the police questioning, the environment in which the search took place, the 
defendant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent and any other circumstances 
that weigh on the issue of voluntariness. 
- 5 -
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The issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to search has been addressed 
by the Supreme Court in other contexts. The primary issues raised in United States 
v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544 (1980), were whether airport authorities had illegally 
stopped the defendant and if she voluntarily consented to accompany agents to an 
office. The Court found that the authorities acted properly in stopping and asking the 
defendant for identification. The Court went on to find that the defendant had 
consented to go to the Drug Enforcement Administration office. The officers had not 
kept the defendant's airline ticket or identification. The Court found that the 
defendant could reasonably interpret officers' actions to indicate that she did not have 
to accompany them. 
Conversely, in Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983), it was held that a stop 
of an individual based on less than probable cause cannot justify a detention in a small 
room by two police officers. The officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket 
and identification. They also had his luggage brought to the room where he was 
being held. The Court found that such a situation would result in the defendant's 
belief that he was under arrest. Because the defendant had not been informed that 
he was free to board his plane and he actually believed he was being detained, it was 
held that the encounter had lost its consensual nature. The Court went on to hold as 
a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since there was no probable cause to 
arrest, the search was illegal. Thus, the evidence was ordered suppressed. The Court 
then made the following observations about the nature of searches based on consent: 
- 6 -
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. . . where the validity of a search rests on consent, the 
State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent 
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, 
a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere 
submission to a claim of lawful authority. 
460 U.S. at 497. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue in United 
States v. Recalde. 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985). In that case, the defendant had 
been stopped for speeding in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license, 
and the car was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran a NCIC check to 
determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. The check was negative. He then 
requested assistance from a backup officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that 
the defendant was transporting narcotics. The officer returned to the defendant's car 
and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the ticket. When it was 
signed, the officer asked the defendant to step out of the car and requested to inspect 
the trunk. During the inspection, the officer found that there had been tampering with 
the screws in the molding. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany 
him to a nearby town. The defendant agreed to do so. At no time had the officer 
returned the defendant's driver's license, vehicle registration or provided the traffic 
ticket. At the police station the defendant consented to the search of the car. In 
analyzing the issue of whether the trip was made with the defendant's consent, the 
- 7 -
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Tenth Circuit employed a three tier analysis that was later adopted by this court in 
State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990).1 
In determining if there has been duress or coercion in obtaining a consent to 
search, the Supreme Court of Utah has described a number of factors that should be 
considered. In State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated, 
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from 
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was 
voluntary given; however, the prosecution is not required 
to prove that defendant knew of his right to refuse to 
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may 
show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence 
of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the 
vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. [Footnote omitted] 
621 P.2dat 106. 
In State v. Marshall, supra, the court noted that the test for voluntariness must 
be based on the totality of the circumstances of the case. To determine if a consent 
is voluntary, the Utah court then adopted the Tenth Circuit's three part test2: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
*That analysis will be discussed, infra. 
*See: United States v. Recalde. supra. 
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(3) the court indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived. 
791 P.2d at 888. 
With respect to the scope of a search made pursuant to a consent, the court 
in Marshall, also relied on Tenth Circuit cases. On that issue, the court stated, 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, 
the ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the 
specific area agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a 
consent search is limited by the breadth of the actual 
consent itself . . . Any police activity that transcends the 
actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the suspect. 
J£. at 888. 
Although the permission to search the house in this case was obtained from the 
defendant's wife, the same standard of voluntariness applies. Bumper v. North 
Carolina, suora. It is expected that the evidence will show that any consent to the 
search was not clear positive or unequivocal. State v. Marshall, suora. Likewise, it 
is expected that the evidence will show that the consent was not free from duress or 
coercion. Consequently, the evidence seized should be ordered to be suppressed. 
DATED this J L L day of July, 1992. 
^L^z^k 
G. FRED METOS ( 
Attorney for Defendant 
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JUDGE YOUNG: THE NEXT MATTER TO BE DEALT WITH 
IS THE MATTER OF STATE VERSUS JASON THOMAS GENOVESI. THE 
CASE NUMBER IS 92-1900681. 
APPEARANCES, PLEASE? 
MR. METOS: FRED METOS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT,] 
YOUR HONOR. HE IS PRESENT. 
MR. VUYK: TOM VUYK FOR THE STATE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THIS IS YOUR MOTION, MR. METOS. 
MR. METOS: WE HAVE A SERIES OF MOTIONS, YOUR 
HONOR. I THINK THERE'S ONE THAT'S GOING TO REQUIRE SOME 
EVIDENCE AND THE STATE HAS A WITNESS HERE. THAT WOULD BE 
THE SUPPRESSION MOTION. IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO START 
WITH THAT ONE AND THEN WE CAN EXCUSE THE WITNESS. THE 
OTHER'S JUST--WE SORT OF WORKED OUT THAT WE NEED SOME INPUT 
FROM THE COURT ON THEM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU FEEL YOU'VE RESOLVED THE 
ISSUES ON VOIR DIRE? I WILL TELL YOU THAT I WILL NOT ALLOW 
COUNSEL TO DO THE INQUIRIES DIRECTLY OF THE JURORS. I WILL 
DO THE QUESTIONING OF THE JURORS. 
MR. METOS: IF WE COULD BE HEARD ON THAT LATER, 
YOUR HONOR, I THINK MR. VUYK AND I BOTH WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 
SOME INPUT WITH THE COURT ON THAT AND SOME SUGGESTIONS TO 
YOU. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND I'D BE HAPPY TO HAVE THAT, 
000233 
ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE. I WILL ALLOW YOU TO BE HEARD. 
MR. METOS: WE HAVE GOT A SHERIFF'S OFFICER HERE 
AS A WITNESS AND I THINK IF WE CAN GET HIM ON THE WITNESS 
STAND AND THROUGH, HE'S ONLY RELEVANT AS TO THE SUPPRESSION 
ISSUE, DEAL WITH THAT AND THEN WE CAN DEAL WITH THE OTHER 
ONES WITHOUT HAVING TO WASTE HIS TIME. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. FINE. 
MR. VUYK: OKAY. THIS, YOUR HONOR, THIS MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS REGARDS THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISE, THE SECOND 
DAY OR THIRD DAY AFTER THE BODY WAS REMOVED FROM THE HOUSE. 
IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM IN THIS 
MATTER WAS RESIDING AT THE HOUSE AT THE TIME AND THAT SHE 
GAVE PERMISSION TO THE OFFICER FOR HIM TO GO IN. AND WE 
HAVE THAT OFFICER HERE TODAY AND I'D CALL HIM AT THIS TIME. 
OFFICER KEN PATRICK. 
JUDGE YOUNG: COME FORWARD, PLEASE, OFFICER 
PATRICK. 
000233 
1 KENNETH R. PATRICK, 
2 CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, HAVING 
3 BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS 
4 
5 THE CLERK: PLEASE BE SEATED AND STATE YOUR NAME 
6 AND SPELL IT. 
7 THE WITNESS: KENNETH R. PATRICK, P-A-T-R-I-C-K. 
8 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. VUYK: 
11 Q AND WOULD YOU STATE YOUR OCCUPATION, PLEASE? 
12 A DEPUTY SHERIFF, SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
13 Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SO EMPLOYED? 
14 A 11 YEARS. 
15 Q WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT? 
16 A CURRENTLY I'M WORKING THE SEX CRIMES DIVISION. 
17 Q AND WHAT WERE YOU DOING ON THE 21ST DAY OF MARCH--
18 OR WAS IT ABOUT THE 20TH OR 19TH DAY OF MARCH OF THIS YEAR? 
19 A I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATION 
20 SQUAD. 
21 Q AND DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO INVESTIGATE THE 
22 DEATH OF AN INFANT AT THAT TIME—WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT 
23 HOW YOU BECAME INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION IN THE DEATH 
24 OF A CHILD AND WHICH CHILD THAT WAS? 
25 A I WAS NOTIFIED BY MY DISPATCHER TO RESPOND TO 
OOCIMG 
AN ADDRESS OUT IN THE KEARNS AREA TO ASSIST PATROL ON A 
CALL THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED. UPON RESPONDING TO THAT ADDRESS; 
I CONTACTED SERGEANT KENDRA HERLIN WHO ADVISED ME THAT THIS 
WAS A CASE INVOLVING THE DEATH OF A CHILD, OR THE POSSIBLE 
DEATH OF A CHILD, AND THAT THAT CHILD'S NAME WAS ADAM— 
I'M SORRY, I'M NOT REMEMBERING. RIGHT OFF HAND THE NAME 
DOESN'T COME TO ME. IT'S DIFFERENT FROM THE FATHER'S NAME. 
IT'S BRIAN ADAMS. NO, BRIAN ADAMS IS THE BROTHER. 
MR. METOS: BRIAN ADAMS IS THE SHERIFF'S OFFICER. 
NO, THAT'S THE FATHER. 
THE WITNESS: THAT WAS THE BOY'S NAME. IT WAS 
THE FATHER'S NAME. 
MR. METOS: JUSTIN ADAMS. 
THE WITNESS: JUSTIN ADAMS, THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. VUYK: OKAY. JASON ADAMS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S FINE. 
Q (BY MR. VUYK) AND DID YOU, IN FACT, GO TO THAT 
PREMISE AND INVESTIGATE THAT DEATH? 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THE CHILD'S NAME JASON OR JUSTINf 
MR. VUYK: JASON. 
MR. METOS: IT'S GAVIN. GAVIN ADAMS. JASON 
IS THE DEFENDANT AND JUSTIN IS THE OTHER BROTHER. 
Q (BY MR. VUYK) GAVIN. 
A THAT'S RIGHT, GAVIN ADAMS. YES, I DID RESPOND 
TO THAT AND I DID INVESTIGATE THE CASE. 
00G241 
Q ON THE DAYS YOU WENT THERE WAS A SEARCH AND PHOTOSj 
TAKEN AND THINGS DONE AT THAT POINT? 
A THERE WAS A PRELIMINARY SEARCH THAT OCCURRED, 
KIND OF A CURSORY SEARCH THAT OCCURRED, BUT MY ATTENTION 
WAS DRAWN TO THE VICTIM AND THE VICTIM'S BROTHER AND JASON 
GENOVESI . 
Q DID YOU SUBSEQUENTLY GO TO THE HOUSE ON A LATER 
DATE? 
A THE FOLLOWING DAY I RETURNED TO THE HOUSE, YES. 
Q AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE 21ST OF MARCH? 
A I'M NOT EXACTLY SURE OF THE DATE. IT'S IN THE 
TRANSCRIPT. 
Q AND HAD THE BODY BEEN REMOVED AT THAT TIME? 
A IT HAD. 
Q NOW, DID YOU GO THERE WITH PERMISSION? 
A I DID. 
Q HOW DID YOU OBTAIN THAT PERMISSION? 
A I CONTACTED LISA GENOVESI AT HER FRIEND'S HOUSE, 
LENAE PAGE, AND CONTACTED HER BY TELEPHONE AND REQUESTED 
PERMISSION TO GO INTO THE HOUSE AND TAKE MEASUREMENTS AND 
SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE. 
Q NOW, CAN YOU TELL US HER RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
DEFENDANT AND VICTIM IN THIS CASE? 
A SHE WAS THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM AND THE HUSBAND 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
00CC42 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 I 
7 , 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q THE HUSBAND? 
A I WAS LED TO BELIEVE SHE WAS THE HUSBAND OF THE 
DEFENDANT--OR SHE WAS THE WIFE OF THE DEFENDANT. AGAIN, 
I APOLOGIZE. 
Q NOW, COULD YOU INDICATE TO US WHAT THE LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS WERE BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. GENOVESI ON THE DAY 
OF THE OCCURRENCE? 
A THE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS? 
Q WERE THEY LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE? 
A I WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT, YES. 
Q AND WHEN YOU CONTACTED HER ON THE PHONE DO YOU 
RECALL ABOUT WHAT TIME OF THE DAY THAT WAS? 
A IT WAS IN THE AFTERNOON BUT I'M NOT SURE OF THE 
EXACT TIME. 
Q HAD YOU SPOKEN WITH MRS. GENOVESI BEFORE? 
A I HAD. 
Q WERE YOU ABLE TO RECOGNIZE HER VOICE WHEN YOU 
SPOKE WITH HER? 
A I WAS. 
Q NOW, WOULD YOU INDICATE TO US WHAT YOU ASKED 
HER AND WHAT SHE RESPONDED? 
A I ASKED HER FOR PERMISSION TO GO BACK INTO THE 
HOUSE TO TAKE MEASUREMENTS AND SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE. SHE 
REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT. I VERIFIED AGAIN 
THAT'S WHAT I WAS ASKING AND MADE SURE THAT THAT WAS OKAY 
8
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1 WITH HER AND SHE TOLD ME AGAIN THAT IT WAS. AND THEN I 
2 VERTIFIED THAT A THIRD TIME, I BELIEVE, AND AGAIN SHE SAID 
3 THAT WAS FINE, SHE HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH IT. 
4 Q DID YOU EVER AT ANY TIME INDICATE TO HER THAT 
5 SHE DIDN'T HAVE TO GIVE YOU PERMISSION? 
6 A I DON'T BELIEVE I DID. 
7 Q DID YOU EVER AT ANY TIME INDICATE TO HER THAT 
8 SHE HAD TO GIVE YOU PERMISSION? 
9 A NO. 
10 Q DID YOU EVER INDICATE TO HER IN ANY WAY THAT 
11 AS A POLICE OFFICER YOU HAD A RIGHT TO GO INTO THE HOUSE? 
12 A NO. 
13 Q WAS THERE EVER ANY QUESTION IN YOUR MIND THAT 
14 THE CONSENT THAT WAS GIVEN WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN? 
15 MR. METOS: I'LL OBJECT. THAT'S A CONCLUSION. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: SUSTAINED. 
17 Q (BY MR. VUYK) AND AS A RESULT OF THAT WHAT DID 
18 YOU DO AFTER YOU OBTAINED THAT PERMISSION? 
19 A I CONTACTED ANOTHER DETECTIVE FOR SOME ASSISTANCE^ 
20 CONTACTED MY I.D. UNIT FOR SOME ASSISTANCE, THEN RETURNED 
21 TO THE HOME. 
22 Q HOW WERE YOU ABLE TO GET IN? 
23 A SHE HAD LEFT THE KEYS WITH ANOTHER FRIEND, RANDY 
24 BEAGLEY, WHO MET US AT THE RESIDENCE. 
25 Q THEN MRS. GENOVESI TOLD YOU ABOUT THE KEY? 
WQZM 
A 
Q 
VIDUAL--
A 
YES, SHE DID. 
AND DID SHE MAKE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INDI-
NO, I CONTACTED MRS. BEAGLEY AND ASKED HER TO 
MEET ME THERE AT THE RESIDENCE. 1 
Q 
A 
Q 
KEYS CAME 
A 
Q 
AND SHE DID DO THAT? 
SHE DID. 
AND THE INFORMATION YOU RECEIVED REGARDING THE 
FROM MRS. GENOVESI? 
IT DID. 
NOW, WHEN YOU WENT INTO THE HOUSE WHAT DID YOU— 
DID YOU REMOVE ANY ITEMS FROM THE HOUSE? 
A 
WALL, WE 
WE DID. WE RECEIVED A SECTION OF PLASTERBOARD 
REMOVED A HAIR THAT WAS ATTACHED TO THAT WALL, 
AND WE REMOVED A SECTION OF CARPET. 
Q 
A 
WHILE WE 
Q 
A 
THE HOME 
1 Q 
A 
ANYTHING ELSE? 
NOT THAT I RECALL RIGHT OFFHAND. THE DAY BEFORE, 
WERE THERE, WE REMOVED A WASH RAG. 
A WHAT? ! 
A WASH RAG. ON THE ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION OF 
DID THAT—WAS IT USED WHEN YOU SAW THAT? 
IT WAS. IT WAS USED BY THE PARAMEDICS AND BY 
THE FATHER. | 
Q DID YOU ALSO HAVE MEASUREMENTS MADE? 
10 
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1 A WE DID. I DID. 
2 Q DID YOU ALSO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS? 
3 A YES, SIR. 
4 Q AND THAT WAS DONE BY YOUR I.D. UNIT? 
5 A IT WAS. 
6 Q WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THOSE MEASUREMENTS AND 
7 PHOTOGRAPHS? 
8 A TO DETERMINE HOW FAR FROM THE TOP BUNK TO THE 
9 FLOOR, HOW FAR FROM THE BOTTOM BUNK TO THE FLOOR, AND TO 
10 MAKE SURE THAT WE COULD RECONSTRUCT THE POSITION OF THE 
11 WALL THAT WE HAD TAKEN IN ANY RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS THAT 
12 WE MAY NEED. 
13 Q DID YOU CONTACT MRS. GENOVESI AFTER THAT? 
14 A I DID. 
15 Q DID YOU INDICATE TO HER WHAT HAD BEEN DONE? 
16 A I DID NOT, UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY I TALKED TO 
17 HER ABOUT WHAT WE HAD REMOVED FROM THE HOUSE AND WHAT WE 
18 HAD TAKEN. 
19 Q WHAT WAS HER RESPONSE TO THAT? 
20 A SHE CAME TO MY OFFICE AND SHE HAD--SHE HAD KNOW-
21 LEDGE AT THAT POINT THAT I HAD REMOVED A SECTION OF WALL 
22 AND SHE CAME TO MY OFFICE TO INDICATE, TO TELL ME THAT THE 
23 WALLS WERE NOT PERFECT AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DENTS 
24 IN THE WALLS UPON HER MOVING INTO THE HOUSE. 
25 MR. VUYK: THANK YOU. THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
11 
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JUDGE YOUNG: CROSS-EXAMINATION, MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: YES. THANK YOU. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Q AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE INITIAL ENTRY OF THE 
HOUSE WAS AS A RESULT OF AN EMERGENCY CALL; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q PARAMEDICS WERE CALLED AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
THAT THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE WAS SUMMONED. 
A CORRECT. 
Q AND THAT WAS AS A RESULT OF AN INJURY THAT WAS 
RECEIVED BY A YOUNG BOY. 
A CORRECT. 
Q AN INFANT--NOT AN INFANT, A TWO-YEAR-OLD CHILD. 
A TWO YEAR OLD, YES. 
Q THE PARAMEDICS WERE THE FIRST TO ARRIVE AT THE 
SCENE AS FAR AS YOU KNOW. 
A AS FAR AS I KNOW. I WAS NOT AN INITIAL RESPONDER 
SO I COULDN'T TESTIFY AS TO WHO ARRIVED FIRST. 
Q WHEN YOU ARRIVED WERE THE PARAMEDICS STILL THERE? 
A NO, THEY WEREN'T. 
Q THEY HAD LEFT. 
A YES. 
Q THE CHILD HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE HOME? 
12 
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A YES, S I R . 
Q WAS MR. JASON GENOVESI THE DEFENDANT, ST ILL PRE-
SENT? 
A HE WAS. 
Q AT THAT POINT DID YOU MAKE AN INSPECTION OF THE 
HOUSE? 
A A VERY PRELIMINARY, CURSORY TYPE. 
Q WAS THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING I F THERE 
WERE ANY OTHER PERSONS IN THE HOUSE OR HAD THAT ALREADY 
BEEN DETERMINED? 
A THERE WAS ANOTHER PERSON IN THE HOME. THAT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN THE OLDER BROTHER TO G A V I N - - I MEAN J U S T I N . 
Q SO AT THE POINT THAT YOU ARRIVED YOU WERE S A T I S -
FIED THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER PERSONS IN DANGER IN THE HOUSE;) 
IS THAT RIGHT? LET ME BACK UP AND ANALYZE. 
WHERE THE 
FOR 
THAT 
A 
Q 
THIS WASN'T LIKE 
GUNMEN MAY STILL 
CORRECT. 
YOU D I D N ' T HAVE 
: GOING TO THE SCENE OF A 
BE I N THE HOUSE; IS THAT 
TO MAKE A KIND OF SEARCH 
SOMEONE WHO MAY BE ENDANGERING OTHER 
A 
Q 
CORRECT. 
AT THE TIME YOU 
PERSONS? 
SHOOTING 
CORRECT? 
TO LOOK 
ARRIVED, THE EMERGENCY S ITUATION, 
I S , DEALING WITH THE INJURED CHILD, 
PARAMEDICS 
A 
HAD TAKEN HIM TO THE HOSPITAL 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
HAD PASSED, 
i 
THE 
13 
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Q YOU WERE THERE AND YOU WERE DEALING WITH MR. 
JASON GENOVESI; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A 
Q 
CORRECT. 
OTHER OFFICERS WERE THERE LOOKING AROUND THE 
HOUSE, TAKING PICTURES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DID, HAD TAKEN INITIAL PICTURES. THEY WERE 
NOT THERE AT THAT TIME. I DID, HAD NOT RESPONDED UNTIL 
AFTER I 
Q 
TO HAVE 
A 
Q 
TO HAVE 
A 
Q 
HAD LEFT THE HOUSE. 
DO YOU KNOW IF MR. JASON GENOVESI GAVE PERMISSION 
THOSE PICTURES TAKEN? 
I DON'T BELIEVE HE WAS ASKED. 
DO YOU KNOW IF LISA GENOVESI GAVE PERMISSION 
THOSE PARTICULAR PICTURES TAKEN? 
I DON'T BELIEVE SHE WAS ASKED. 
OKAY. THE NEXT DAY—WELL, LET ME BACK UP. 
AFTER THAT INITIAL SEARCH AND THOSE PICTURES 
WERE TAKEN, JASON GENOVESI WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST; IS THAT 
CORRECT 
A 
Q 
? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
ULTIMATELY. THE SAME DAY. YOU CONTACTED LISA 
GENOVESI ON THE 21ST, BY PHONE. 
A 
ING DAY 
Q 
FAR AS 
I'M NOT SURE OF THE DATE, BUT IF IT'S THE FOLLOW-
> YES. 
JASON GENOVESI AT THAT TIME WAS IN CUSTODY AS 
YOU KNEW. 
Ik 
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A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THE CONVERSATIONS YOU HAD WITH HER YOU INDICATED 
—FIRST OF ALL, YOU WENT TO TAKE SOME MEASUREMENTS IN THE 
HOUSE. 
A THAT WAS ONE OF THE THINGS, YES. 
Q YOU ALSO INDICATED YOU WANTED TO LOOK FOR SOME 
EVIDENCE. 
A CORRECT. 
Q DID YOU EVER TELL HER YOU WERE GOING TO TAKE 
OR REMOVE ANYTHING FROM THE HOUSE? 
A I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WAS IN THE CONVERSATION. 
Q AFTER YOU SAW--WAS A TELEPHONE IN THE HOUSE WHEN 
YOU WENT IN? 
A YES. 
Q YOU KNEW WHERE LISA GENOVESI WAS OR WHERE SHE 
WAS STAYING? 
A ON WHICH OCCASION? 
Q WHEN WERE YOU IN THE HOUSE? 
A ORIGINALLY? 
Q NO, THE SECOND TIME. 
A THE SECOND TIME? NO. UPON MY CONVERSATION WITH 
HER SHE WAS LEAVING WHERE SHE WAS STAYING AND SHE WAS GOING 
TO BE STAYING WITH HER PARENTS, WHEREVER THEY WERE GOING 
TO BE. AT THAT POINT IN TIME I'M NOT REALLY SURE I KNEW 
EXACTLY UNTIL THE NEXT DAY WHERE THAT WAS. 
15 
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Q ALL RIGHT. YOU MADE THESE OBSERVATIONS IN THE 
HOUSE; IS THAT RIGHT? ABOUT WITH RESPECT TO THE CARPETING 
AND THE PIECE OF WALL THAT WAS SEIZED? 
A YES. 
Q WELL, LET ME BACK UP. PRIOR TO THIS YOU DIDN'T 
OBTAIN A WARRANT. 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q AND AT NO TIME DID YOU HAVE A WARRANT TO SEARCH 
THE HOUSE. 
A NO, I DIDN'T. 
Q AND THE HOUSE, AS FAR AS YOU KNEW, WAS SECURED 
AGAINST ENTRY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A CORRECT. 
Q IT WAS LOCKED? 
A YES. 
Q AT NO TIME DID YOU SPECIFICALLY ASK EITHER LISA 
GENOVESI OR JASON GENOVESI WHETHER YOU COULD REMOVE THIS 
PIECE OF WALL. 
A NO. 
Q OR THIS PIECE OF CARPET. 
A NO. 
Q AND WHEN YOU TALKED TO HER ON THE PHONE YOU ONLY 
TALKED ABOUT LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE AND TAKING MEASUREMENTS; 
IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THOSE ARE MY WORDS, YES. 
16 
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1 Q JUST TO CLARIFY SOMETHING MR. VUYK TOUCHED UPON. 
2 DID YOU EVER TELL HER THAT SHE DIDN'T HAVE TO LET YOU IN 
3 THE HOUSE? 
4 A NO, I DIDN'T. 
5 Q SO BASICALLY YOU MADE THIS REQUEST, WE'D LIKE 
6 TO GO IN, LOOK FOR EVIDENCE, AND TAKE SOME MEASUREMENTS, 
7 AND SHE SAID YEAH, THAT'S ALL RIGHT. 
8 A CORRECT. 
9 Q. SHE BASICALLY ACCEDED TO YOUR REQUEST TO GO IN; 
10 IS THAT RIGHT? 
11 A CORRECT. 
12 MR. METOS: I BELIEVE THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
13 MR. VUYK: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY STEP DOWN. THANK YOU, 
15 OFFICER. 
16 MR. VUYK: MAY THIS WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
17 MR. METOS: NO OBJECTION. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. YES, THANK 
19 YOU. 
20 HOW DO YOU WISH TO ARGUE THIS, ALL AT ONCE OR— 
21 MR. METOS: I THINK IT'D PROBABLY MAKE MORE SENSE 
2 2
 IF WE TALKED ABOUT THE SEARCH NOW. 
2 3
 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
2 4
 MR. METOS: AND THEN DEALT WITH THE OTHER ISSUES. 
25
 MR. VUYK: YOUR HONOR, THIS BEING HIS MOTION 
17 
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1 TO SUPPRESS I WOULD JUST IMAGINE HE SHOULD GO AHEAD. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
3 MR. METOS: ALL RIGHT. AS I SEE IT, YOUR HONOR, 
4 THERE ARE TWO SEARCHES HERE. ONE, THE DAY THAT THE INJURY 
5 TO THE CHILD IS REPORTED, THE POLICE SHOW UP AND TAKE PIC-
6 TURES AND SEIZE, I BELIEVE, A RAG AS EVIDENCE. 
7 THE SECOND SEARCH OCCURS THE FOLLOWING DAY AFTER 
8 THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LISA GENOVESI. 
9 WITH RESPECT TO THE SEARCH ON THE FIRST DAY I 
10 SUBMIT CONSENT REALLY ISN'T AN ISSUE. THE DETECTIVE TESTI-
11 FIED HE DIDN'T ASK ANYONE'S PERMISSION TO LOOK AROUND, DIDN' 
12 ASK ANYONE'S PERMISSION TO SEIZE ANYTHING. I BELIEVE THAT 
13 SEARCH WOULD HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED BASED ON EXIGENT CIRCUM-
14 STANCES. I'VE SUBMITTED A MEMO ON THIS ISSUE. EXIGENT 
15 CIRCUMSTANCES ESSENTIALLY MEAN THERE IS A COMPELLING NEED 
16 FOR OFFICIAL ACTION WHEN THERE IS NO TIME TO OBTAIN A 
17 WARRANT. THAT'S FROM MICHIGAN V. TYLER, UNITED STATES 
18 SUPREME COURT CASE. OUR SUPREME COURT STATED IN STATE V. 
19 ASHE THAT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES BEING THERE'S NO REALISTIC 
20 OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A WARRANT. 
21 IN THIS SITUATION I'D SUBMIT THE EXIGENT CIRCUM-
22\ STANCES HAD BEEN REMOVED. I MEAN, THERE'S NO QUESTION THE 
23 POLICE WOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO GO IN AND SEE WHAT THE CONDITION 
24 OF THIS CHILD IS, SEE IF THERE ARE ANY OTHER CHILDREN OR 
25 PERSONS IN THE HOUSE WHO ARE IN DANGER OR WHO NEED MEDICAL 
18 
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1 j ATTENTION. BUT WHEN THEY STAY AROUND AND DO CONDUCT WHAT 
2 IS PURELY AN INVESTIGATION AT THAT POINT, I WOULD SUBMIT, 
3 THEY WOULD NEED EITHER A WARRANT OR A CONSENT, AND THEY 
4 HAD NEITHER AT THAT POINT. 
5 AND I SUBMIT THAT THE EVIDENCE SEIZED, THE PIC-
6 TURES TAKEN, THE RAG SEIZED AFTER THE CHILD HAD BEEN REMOVED 
7 FROM THE HOME AND THE EXIGENCY HAD, BASICALLY, BEEN REMOVED, 
8 IS NOTHING MORE THAN A SEARCH VERY SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED 
9 IN MINCY V. ARIZONA, WHICH IS CITED IN MY BRIEF, WHERE 
10 POLICE STAYED AROUND AT THE SCENE OF A HOMICIDE, THAT WAS 
11 A LITTLE BIT MORE EGREGIOUS THAN THIS. THEY STAYED AROUND 
12 FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS TEARING UP CARPET, LOOKING AT SEIZING 
13 EVIDENCE, AND DOING AN EXTREMELY THOROUGH SEARCH WITHOUT 
14 A WARRANT. 
15 THE SITUATION HERE, THOUGH, IS ANALOGOUS TO THE 
16 SITUATION IN MINCY. I THINK THE APPROPRIATE THING WOULD 
17 HAVE BEEN, THEY KNOW THEY'VE GOT A POTENTIAL HOMICIDE, GET 
18 THE PEOPLE OUT OF THE HOUSE, SECURE IT AND SIMPLY OBTAIN 
19 A WARRANT. IT'S NOT LIKE THEY DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO DO THAT, 
20 IT'S NOT LIKE THERE'S ANY DANGER LURKING IN THE HOUSE THAT 
21 WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM DOING THAT, CREATING EXIGENT CIRCUM-j 
22 STANCES. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: IS IT YOUR POSITION, MR. METOS, 
24 THAT PHOTOGRAPHS ARE IN THE SAME CATEGORY? 
25 MR. METOS: I WOULD SUBMIT, THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEt>| 
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WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME CATEGORY. IT'S BASICALLY 
EVIDENCE THAT'S SEIZED AT THE SCENE, OBSERVATIONS THAT ARE 
MADE AT THE SCENE, OR RECORDINGS OF THOSE OBSERVATIONS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULDN'T IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR 
THEM TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE 
SCENE IN RELATION TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THEY ENCOUNTERED 
WHEN THEY ARRIVED THERE? 
MR. METOS: BUT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE EVIDENCE 
WAS. IF THAT HAD HAPPENED, YOUR HONOR, I THINK MY POSITION 
MAY BE DIFFERENT, BUT THAT IS SIMPLY NOT WHAT HAPPENED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOU'RE SAYING IT IS A QUESTION 
OF TIMING. 
MR. METOS: IT IS A QUESTION OF TIMING. AND 
YOU KNOW, IF THEY CAME IN AND WANTED TO TAKE A PICTURE OF 
THIS CHILD LAYING THERE AND THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, CLEARLY 
THAT WOULD PROBABLY--I WOULDN'T SAY CLEARLY--THAT WOULD 
LIKELY FALL UNDER THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION. 
BUT WHEN THEY WAIT AROUND, YOU KNOW, AT THIS POINT THEY 
ARE INVESTIGATING. IT'S NO LONGER REACTING TO AN EMERGENCY 
SITUATION. AND TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION THEY EITHER 
HAVE TO HAVE CONSENT OR A WARRANT TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION 
THAT INVOLVES A SEARCH. AND I SUBMIT THAT THEY HAD NEITHER 
ON THAT FIRST DAY. 
TURNING TO THE SECOND DAY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
ISSUE OF CONSENT, THIS IS A THIRD-PARTY CONSENT, BUT STILL 
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THE CONSENT HAS TO BE VOLUNTARY AND FREE OF, BASICALLY--
VOLUNTARINESS HAS BEEN DEFINED AS BEING FREE OF DURESS OR 
COERCION. IN SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT SAID THAT THE PERSON WHO GIVES THE CONSENT 
NEED NOT BE AWARE OF THE RIGHTS TO REFUSE THAT CONSENT. 
AND THERE'S AN ISSUE THAT I DIDN'T RAISE IN MY MEMO THAT 
I TOLD MR. VUYK I WAS GOING TO RAISE TODAY WITH RESPECT 
TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT I'LL GET TO IN A MINUTE, 
BUT UNDER THE STANDARD VOLUNTARINESS TEST, I SUBMIT, ALL 
WE HAVE HERE IS LISA GENOVESI ACQUIESCING TO THE OFFICER 
SAYING, I'D LIKE TO GO IN AND SEARCH. 
UNDER THE MARSHALL CASE FROM OUR COURT OF APPEALS 
THERE'S A THREE-PART TEST. THAT'S CITED IN MY BRIEF. 
ESSENTIALLY, THE STATE BEARS THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THERE 
IS CLEAR AND POSITIVE TESTIMONY THAT THE CONSENT WAS UNEQUIV 
OCAL AND SPECIFIC, THAT IT WAS DONE WITHOUT DURESS OR COER-
CION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND THE COURT HAS TO 
INDULGE EVERY REASONABLE PRESUMPTION AGAINST WAIVER. ESSEN-
TIALLY, THE LAST PART OF THE TEST IS ANALOGOUS TO THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF THAT IS APPLIED TO A CONSENT SEARCH. 
I'D SUBMIT HERE THAT THE EVIDENCE ISN'T CLEAR 
AND UNEQUIVOCAL. ALL THEY DID IS SAY WE NEED TO LOOK FOR 
SOME EVIDENCE AND TAKE SOME MEASUREMENTS. SHE SAYS, OKAY. 
HE DOESN'T TELL HER WE ARE GOING TO GO IN AND TAKE A PIECE 
OUT OF THE WALL, SEIZE ANYTHING. MAKES NO ATTEMPT TO 
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1 CONTACT HER, TELL THEM THAT WE NEED TO TAKE THIS EVIDENCE 
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SHE IS SIMPLY ACCEDING TO THE REQUEST THAT WAS MADE. AND 
I'D SUBMIT THAT DOESN'T CONSTITUTE A VOLUNTARY CONSENT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IF YOU INDICATE TO SOMEONE THAT 
YOU'RE GOING TO LOOK FOR EVIDENCE AND YOU FIND THAT EVIDENCE, 
CERTAINLY, IMPLICIT IN THE REQUEST TO LOOK IS THE REQUEST 
TO TAKE, WOULDN'T YOU SAY? 
MR. METOS: THAT MAY BE TRUE IN THE USUAL CIRCUM-
STANCES BUT IT'S NOT LIKE I'M LOOKING FOR AN OBJECT THAT 
I CAN PICK UP AND CARRY AWAY. THEY WENT WELL BEYOND THIS 
AND LITERALLY TORE PIECES OUT OF THE HOUSE. AND I'D SUBMIT 
THAT GOES BEYOND SIMPLY SAYING WE'RE GOING TO LOOK FOR 
EVIDENCE AND TAKE SOME MEASUREMENTS. IF YOU'RE TALKING 
ABOUT THINGS LIKE CARPETING AND WALLS, I THINK THAT GOES 
WAY BEYOND THAT, WHICH IS WHAT WAS DONE IN THIS CASE. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
I DIDN'T BRIEF THIS, BUT IF THE COURT WANTS ME TO I COULD 
GET A BRIEF IN IN A FAIRLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. MY POSITION 
IS THAT UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WE HAVE A BROADER 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS' RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 1 SECTION Ik. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS SAID THAT IN STATE V. LOROCCO 
IN DEALING WITH V.I.N. NUMBER INSPECTIONS AND THE COURT 
OF APPEALS HAS SAID THAT IN STATE V. SIMMS IN DEALING WITH 
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ROAD BLOCK STOPS. 
THE POSITION THAT I BELIEVE OUR UTAH CONSTITUTION! 
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REQUIRES IS THAT VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONSENT ALSO REQUIRES 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE, SIMILAR TO WHAT IS REQUIRED; 
UNDER A FIFTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OR A SELF-INCRIMINATION 
ANALYSIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL COURTS THAT HAVE GONE THAT 
DIRECTION. THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT IN LONGSTREET 
V. STATE, FOUND AT 592 S.2D16 AND STATE V. JOHNSON, THE 
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT WENT THAT DIRECTION AT 3^6 AT.2D 66. 
BASICALLY, THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THE POLICY BEHIND WAIVING 
AN IMPORTANT—EXCUSE ME—THE POLICY ARGUMENT IS THAT WHEN 
YOU HAVE A CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT, AND YOU ARE GIVING UP A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, A PERSON SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THEY 
HAVE A RIGHT NOT TO GIVE THAT UP. OTHERWISE, THE OTHER 
POLICY ARGUMENT IS THAT CAN LEAD TO OVER REACHING ON THE 
PART OF THE POLICE AND PUTTING PEOPLE IN A POSITION WHERE 
THEY SIMPLY WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
INFORMATION, WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING. 
THE EVIDENCE ON THAT ISSUE IS CLEAR, THERE WAS 
NO REQUEST--THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT SHE WAS AWARE SHE 
HAD THE RIGHT TO REFUSE, SHE WAS NOT WARNED SHE HAD THE 
RIGHT TO REFUSE, AND UNDER ARTICLE 1 SECTION Ik I'D SUBMIT 
THAT THE EVIDENCE SEIZED ON THE SECOND SEARCH OUGHT TO BE 
SUPPRESSED ALSO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
MR. VUYK? 
MR. VUYK: WITH REFERENCE TO THE ARGUMENT MADE 
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1 BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, YOUR HONOR, I'LL TAKE ONE OR TWO OF 
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THE MATTERS AS INDICATED. HE'S FIRST APPROACHED THE IDEA 
THAT TAKING PICTURES ON THE INITIAL DAY WAS IMPROPER. I 
WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT DURING MOST OF THAT TIME 
THE DEFENDANT WAS PRESENT, THOSE PICTURES WERE NECESSARY 
TO RESPOND TO WHAT HAD BEEN TOLD THE OFFICERS. THEY HAD 
BEEN TOLD A CHILD HAD FALLEN FROM A BED, THEY NEEDED TO 
ASCERTAIN WHETHER, IN FACT, THE DEFENDANT'S STORY WAS TRUE 
AT THAT POINT. THEY TOOK THOSE PICTURES IN ORDER TO SHOW 
WHAT WAS THERE. AND I THINK THAT THAT, THOSE PICTURES, 
DO NOT FALL INTO THE CATEGORY OF A, WHAT I WOULD INDICATE 
AS AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH. THIS WAS DONE DURING A TIME THAT 
THEY HAD AN EMERGENCY THERE. THE FACT THAT THE BOY HAD 
BEEN REMOVED AND WAS ON THE WAY TO THE HOSPITAL, I DON'T 
BELIEVE AT THAT POINT HE HAD BEEN DECLARED DEAD, THEY WERE 
RESPONDING. AND IN AN EFFORT TO GET TO THE FACTS AND TO 
EITHER VERIFY OR CHECK THE DEFENDANT'S STORY THEY HAD TO 
TAKE THOSE PICTURES. AND THEY SHOULD BE AND ARE ADMISSIBLE 
ACCORDING TO WHAT THE SUPREME COURT AND OTHERS HAVE SAID. 
I'D FURTHER INDICATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONSENflT 
GIVEN TOO, BY LISA GENOVESI, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT ON 
THIS OCCASION SHE HAD FULL CONTROL, AS MUCH CONTROL, I 
SHOULD SAY, AS THE DEFENDANT. SHE WAS HIS WIFE, SHE HAD 
JOINT CUSTODY OF THE HOUSE. THAT HAD NOT BEEN RELINQUISHED 
BY EITHER PARTY. WHEN SHE WAS CONTACTED SHE WAS TOLD THAT 
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THERE WOULD BE A SEARCH MADE. AND AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY 
INDICATED, IMPLICIT IN THAT FACT OF A SEARCH WOULD BE THE 
IDEA THAT THEY WOULD REMOVE WHAT THEY FOUND, OR ASCERTAIN 
THAT IT WAS NEEDED. 
THEY ALSO EXPLICITLY TOLD HER THEY WERE GOING 
TO TAKE MEASUREMENTS, THEY WERE GOING TO DO THE OTHER THINGS 
THAT WERE REQUIRED, SAID I HAVE TO LOOK AROUND FOR EVIDENCE, 
I'D LIKE YOUR PERMISSION TO DO THAT. SHE SAID YES. HE 
AGAIN ASKED, IS THERE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT, SHE SAID NO. 
AND WE'LL BE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE TO MAKE SURE THAT WE'RE 
THOROUGH AND WE GOT ALL THE INFORMATION WE NEED. 
AND I THINK THE COURT, OUR APPELLATE COURT IN 
STATE V. CARTER, HAS EXPLICITLY SET FORTH THE REQUIREMENTS 
WHEN, AND A SENSE OF CLAIM OF AUTHORITY. THE OFFICER NEVER 
SAID HE HAD ANY AUTHORITY TO GO IN. 
THE ABSENCE OF FORCE OR COERCION BY THE OFFICER. 
AND THAT, OF COURSE, WAS ALSO NOT PRESENT. IN FACT, HE 
SAID HE, AT NO TIME, TOLD HER HE HAD A RIGHT TO GO IN. 
THIRD, WAS A MERE REQUEST FOR THE SEARCH AND 
THAT'S WHAT HE DID. AND THERE WAS COOPERATION BY THE OWNER 
AND THE ABSENCE OF THE DECEPTION OR TRICK. THERE WAS ABSO-
LUTELY NO INDICATION THAT THIS OFFICER WAS TRICKING MRS. 
GENOVESI INTO ALLOWING THIS SEARCH. AND I THINK THAT THIS 
IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL, SPECIFIC, FREE AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER 
BY MRS. GENOVESI. 
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I SHOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT NOT ONLY 
WAS IT A FREE AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER BUT WHEN THE EVIDENCE 
WAS REMOVED AND TAKEN TO THE POLICE STATION SHE TOOK THE 
TIME TO GO DOWN AND EXPLAIN WHAT SOME OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
THAT THEY FOUND AND, IN FACT, KNEW THAT, DID NOT INDICATE 
THAT THAT WAS A PROBLEM AT ALL AND, IN FACT, GAVE THEM SOME 
RESPONSE AS TO WHY THEY WERE FINDING WHAT THEY FOUND. 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE ATTEMPT TO BROADEN THIS TYPE OF A SEARCH BY QUOTING 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A ROAD BLOCK AND FOR V.I.N. NUMBERS, 
I THINK, IS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE TO EXTEND IT THAT FAR 
IN THIS TYPE OF A SEARCH. AND I'D SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: JUST BRIEFLY BY RESPONSE. WITH 
RESPECT TO THE FIRST SEARCH I THINK MR. VUYK CAN SAY THAT 
THE OFFICERS, WHAT THE OFFICERS WERE DOING WAS TRYING TO 
EITHER VERIFY OR SHOW THAT MR. GENOVESI'S STATEMENT THAT 
HE MADE AT THE SCENE WAS OR WAS NOT TRUE, REALLY IS AN 
INVESTIGATION. IT CAN'T BE CHARACTERIZED AS ANYTHING BUT 
AN INVESTIGATION. IT WAS DONE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, 
WITHOUT PERMISSION AND WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE CARTER CASE, AGAIN, THOSE 
ARE FACTORS TO CONSIDER. I'D SUBMIT THE COURT ALSO HAS 
TO LOOK AT THE MARSHALL CASE AND SEE WHAT THE COURT OF 
APPEALS SAID IN TERMS OF ANALYZING A SEARCH SITUATION AND 
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1 THEN FINALLY LOOK AT WHAT WAS SAID BY THE UNITED STATES 
2 SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS, THAT MERE ACQUIESCENCE IS REALLY 
3 NOT SUFFICIENT. I'D SUBMIT, AT BEST, WHAT WE HAVE IS A 
4 MERE ACQUIESCENCE HERE. 
5 WITH RESPECT TO THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 
6 GRANTED, A ROAD BLOCK SITUATION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE, 
7 A V.I.N. NUMBER IS INAPPLICABLE EXCEPT TO SHOW THE DIRECTION 
8 THE UTAH COURTS ARE TAKING WITH RESPECT TO STATE CONSTITU-
9 TIONAL ANALYSIS. THAT IS, OUR COURTS ARE GIVEN A BROADER 
10 ANALYSIS OR BROADER PROTECTION THAN THE FEDERAL COURTS. 
11 THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE RELATING TO CONSENT SEARCHES AND THE 
12 NEED FOR A KNOWING WAIVER IS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
13 IN THE CASE CALLED STATE V. HEWETT. IT SHOULD BE SET FOR 
14 ORAL ARGUMENT. IT'S MY CASE AND IT SHOULD BE SET FOR ORAL 
15 ARGUMENT IN SEPTEMBER SOME TIME. I DON'T KNOW WHICH DIREC-
16 TION THE COURT IS GOING TO GO ON THAT. OTHER THAN THAT, 
17 YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUBMIT THE SEARCH ISSUE AT THIS POINT. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WILL TAKE 
19 THE ISSUE AS TO THE SEARCH UNDER ADVISEMENT AND RENDER A 
20 MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
21 MR. METOS: DID YOU—I CAN SUBMIT A SHORT BRIEF 
22 ON THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IF YOU WANT ME TO BY 
23 THE END OF THE WEEK AND GIVE MR. VUYK SOME TIME— 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: I DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS TODAY. 
25 MR. METOS: ALL RIGHT. 
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APPENDIX V 
Transcript: Trial Testimony of Medical Examiner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
x a x /yMaist^L 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, 
DEFENDANT. 
CRIMINAL NO. CR-92-190-06S 
TRIAL 
VOLUME II 
r% #% #% 
BE IT REMEMERED THAT ON WEDNESDAY, THE 7TH DAY 
OF OCTOBER, 1992, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
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nUnWSTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
EILEEN M. 
FILED 
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COURT OF APPEALS . 
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DR. MAUREEN FRIKKE, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, HAVING 
BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:j 
THE CLERK: PLEASE BE SEATED AND STATE YOUR NAME 
AND SPELL IT. 
THE WITNESS: MY NAME IS MAUREEN JANE FRIKKE, 
M-A-U-R-E-E-N, FRIKKE, F-R-I-K-K-E. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HORNAK: 
Q DR. FRIKKE, WHAT IS YOUR PROFESSION? 
A I AM A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST. 
Q WHERE ARE YOU CURRENTLY EMPLOYED? 
A AT THE OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
Q WHERE IS THE OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER 
LOCATED? 
A IT'S HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY AT k8 NORTH MEDICAL 
DRIVE. 
Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED AT THE OFFICE 
OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER IN UTAH? 
A JUST OVER A YEAR. I WAS EMPLOYED STARTING AUGUST 
1ST OF LAST YEAR. 
Q WOULD YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY YOUR 
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DUTIES IN THAT OFFICE OR IN THAT POSITION? 
A THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER 
ARE DESCRIBED IN STATE STATUTE. WE BASICALLY INVESTIGATE 
ALL UNATTENDED DEATHS, THAT IS PEOPLE WHO DIE WHO DO NOT 
HAVE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS, WE INVESTIGATE ALL UNNATURAL 
DEATHS, THAT IS ACCIDENTS, SUICIDES, HOMICIDES AND DEATHS 
WHERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE UNCLEAR OR UNDEFINED AT THE 
TIME THE DEATH OCCURRED. THE EXCEPTION IS THAT WE DO NOT, 
BY STATUTE, INVESTIGATE DEATHS INVOLVING MOTOR VEHICLE 
ACCIDENTS. 
Q ARE THERE OTHER MEDICAL EXAMINERS BESIDES YOUR-
SELF IN THAT OFFICE? 
A YES, THERE ARE. 
Q HOW MANY OTHERS ARE THERE? 
A THERE ARE TWO OTHER MEDICAL EXAMINERS, FORENSIC 
PATHOLOGISTS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, WILL YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDU-
CATIONAL BACKGROUND FOR THE JURY UP TO AND INCLUDING YOUR 
MEDICAL DEGREE? 
A CERTAINLY. I HAVE A BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE 
WITH A MAJOR IN ZOOLOGY AND A MINOR IN CHEMISTRY. I EARNED 
THAT DEGREE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. 
I HAVE A DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE, OR PH.D. 
DEGREE, IN EXPERIMENTAL PATHOLOGY. I EARNED THAT DEGREE 
AT WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY WHICH IS IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI. 
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1 Q LET ME STOP YOU THERE FOR A MINUTE. WHEN DID 
2 YOU OBTAIN YOUR BACHELOR DEGREE AND WHEN DID YOU OBTAIN 
3 YOUR PH.D.? 
4 A MY BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE WAS AWARDED IN 1969 
5 AND MY DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE WAS IN 1976. 
6 Q PLEASE CONTINUE. 
7 A I HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HAVING 
8 A DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE, I WAS A BASIC RESEARCH 
9 SCIENTIST FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. I WORKED AT THE OREGON 
10 REGIONAL MEDICAL, OREGON MEDICAL SCHOOL, WHICH IS IN PORT-
11 LAND; I ALSO WORKED AT THE PRIMATE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN 
12 PORTLAND, WHICH IS THE PRIMATE RESEARCH CENTER; I THEN WENT 
13 BACK TO MEDICAL SCHOOL AND EARNED A DOCTOR OF MEDICINE DEGREE 
14 ALSO FROM WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS. 
15 Q WHEN DID YOU OBTAIN YOUR MEDICAL DEGREE? 
16 A I GRADUATED FROM MEDICAL SCHOOL IN 1986. 
17 Q DR. FRIKKE, WHAT POST GRADUATE TRAINING HAVE 
18 YOU RECEIVED SINCE YOU OBTAINED YOUR MEDICAL DEGREE THAT 
19 IS RELATED TO YOUR FIELD? 
20 A I COMPLETED AN INTERNSHIP AND RESIDENCY IN PATH-
21 OLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, WHICH IS IN GAINESVILLE, 
22 AND I'VE COMPLETED A FELLOWSHIP IN FORENSIC PATHOLOGY AT 
23 THE HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER'S OFFICE, WHICH IS 
24 IN MINNEAPOLIS. 
25 Q WILL YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN FOR THE JURY WHAT EXPER-
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IENCE YOU OBTAINED IN YOUR INTERNSHIP AND RESIDENCY FELLOW-
SHIP? 
A OKAY. THE INTERNSHIP AND RESIDENCIES ARE THE 
STANDARD TRAINING PROGRAMS IN PATHOLOGY. THE TRAINING PRO-
GRAM IS DESIGNED TO GENERATE EXPERTISE AND SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE 
IN PATHOLOGY, WHICH IS THE STUDY OF DISEASES ON BODY TISSUES 
AND BODY FLUIDS. THAT TRAINING IS VERY ORIENTED TOWARDS 
MEDICAL DISEASE PROCESSES. 
AS A FELLOW IN FORENSIC PATHOLOGY MY TRAINING 
WAS GEARED SPECIFICALLY TOWARDS LEARNING ABOUT THE AFFECTS 
OF TRAUMA AND UNNATURAL PROCESSES ON THE BODY AND THE BODY 
FLUIDS. 
Q AND APPROXIMATELY HOW LONG WAS YOUR FELLOWSHIP? 
A I WAS A FELLOW FOR 13 MONTHS. 
Q OKAY. IS THE INTERNSHIP AND RESIDENCY REQUIRED 
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN YOUR MEDICAL DEGREE? 
A NO. IN ORDER—MOST STATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
IN ORDER TO GET A MEDICAL DEGREE? 
Q YES. 
A NO. YOU CAN GRADUATE FROM MEDICAL SCHOOL. THAT 
IS A COURSE OF TRAINING THAT IS PRESCRIBED BY THE UNIVERSITY 
IN WHICH YOU ARE A MEDICAL STUDENT. IT HAS NO BEARING ON 
POST-GRADUATE TRAINING. 
Q IN ORDER TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS THE INTERNSHIP 
AND RESIDENCY REQUIRED? 
282 
OOCO'io 
A MOST STATES REQUIRE THAT ONE YEAR OF POST-GRADU-
ATE TRAINING BE OBTAINED BEFORE A LICENSE IS ISSUED TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE IN THAT STATE. 
Q HOW MANY YEARS, OR HOW LONG WAS YOUR POST-GRADUATE) 
TRAINING? 
A MY POST-GRADUATE TRAINING IN PATHOLOGY AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA WAS FOUR YEARS, MY FELLOWSHIP IN 
FORENSIC PATHOLOGY WAS ONE YEAR PLUS ONE MONTH. 
Q WILL YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 
MEANS? 
A FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IS THAT SUB-SPECIALTY WITHIN 
PATHOLOGY IN WHICH WE DEAL WITH INJURIES AND PROCESSES WHICH 
ARE RELEVANT TO THE LAW. 
Q WHAT DOES PATHOLOGY MEAN? 
A PATHOLOGY IS THE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS AND DISEASES! 
ON THE TISSUES OF THE BODY AND THE FLUIDS OF THE BODY. 
Q OKAY. ARE YOU LICENSED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE, 
DR. FRIKKE? 
A YES, I AM. 
Q IN WHAT STATES ARE YOU LICENSED? 
A I'M LICENSED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IN MINNESOTA 
AND IN UTAH. 
Q AND DR. FRIKKE, ARE YOU BOARD CERTIFIED? 
A YES, I AM. 
Q WHAT DOES BOARD CERTIFICATION MEAN? 
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A BOARD CERTIFICATION MEANS THAT THE PHYSICIAN 
HAS COMPLETED A COURSE OF POST-GRADUATE EDUCATION AND THAT 
THAT COURSE OF EDUCATION FULFILLS THE STANDARDS THAT HAVE 
BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE PATRICULAR BOARD. IN MY CASE, THE 
STANDARDS ARE ESTABLISHED BY THE AMERICAN BOARD OF PATHOLOGY,| 
AND THE RESIDENCY PROGRAM IN WHICH I STUDIED, WHICH WAS 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, FULFILLED THE STANDARDS 
DESCRIBED BY THE AMERICAN BOARD OF PATHOLOGY. 
UPON COMPLETING THAT COURSE OF STUDY I MADE APPLI-) 
CATION TO THE AMERICAN BOARD OF PATHOLOGY TO HAVE MY CRE-
DENTIALS REVIEWED AND TO BE ADMITTED FOR EXAMINATION. 
THEN I SAT THEIR EXAMINATIONS AND PASSED THE EXAMS. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, IN YOUR TRAINING AND THE EXPERIENCE 
THAT YOU OBTAINED DID YOU RECEIVE ANY SPECIFIC TRAINING 
AND EXPERIENCE IN THE AREA OF RECOGNITION OF CAUSES OF 
INJURIES IN CHILDREN? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q WILL YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN TO THE JURY WHAT THAT 
SPECIFIC TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE INVOLVED? 
A DURING THE COURSE OF MY INTERNSHIP AND RESIDENCY 
AS A HOSPITAL PATHOLOGIST WE SPECIFICALLY LEARN, WE HAVE 
A LOT, GET A LOT OF EXPERIENCE IN ORDER TO RECOGNIZE THOSE 
KINDS OF ABNORMALITIES WHICH OCCUR IN CHILDREN AS A RESULT 
OF THE DISEASE PROCESSES AND MEDICAL INTERVENTION. WE, 
BY AND LARGE, IN THAT PRACTICE, DEAL WITH CHILDREN WHO HAVE 
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BEEN ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL AND WHO HAVE UNDERGONE TREAT-
MENT OF DIFFERENT SORTS. SO WE SEE THEIR NATURAL DISEASE 
PROCESSES AND WE SEE THE THINGS THAT HAPPEN AND AS A CONSE-
QUENCE OF THEIR MEDICAL TREATMENT. 
DURING MY FELLOWSHIP IN FORENSIC PATHOLOGY WE 
THEN BECOME SKILLED IN RECOGNIZING THOSE INJURIES WHICH HAPPEN 
TO CHILDREN WHICH OCCUR OUTSIDE OF THE HOSPITAL SETTING 
AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE RESULT OF NATURAL DISEASE AND 
NOT NECESSARILY THE RESULT OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES. WE SEE 
THE TRAUMATIC, UNTREATED INJURIES IN THE FORENSIC SETTING. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, HAVE YOU ALSO RECEIVED TRAINING AND 
EXPERIENCE IN BEING ABLE TO DATE CERTAIN TYPES OF INJURIES 
OF FRACTURES, BLEEDING, INJURIES OF THAT NATURE? 
A YES, WE DO. 
Q WHAT DID THAT TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE INVOLVE? 
A THAT TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE COMBINES BOTH, AGAIN; 
THE HOSPITAL SETTING AND THE FORENSIC PRACTICE IN THE HOS-
PITAL SETTING. WE LEARN TO RECOGNIZE AND BECOME EXPERT 
AT DEALING WITH REACTIONS TO DISEASE PROCESSES, INJURIES, 
THAT OCCUR IN PATIENTS WHO ARE IN THE HOSPITAL. IN THE 
FORENSIC SETTING WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DEALING WITH 
INJURIES AND ABNORMALITIES THAT OCCUR OUTSIDE OF THE HOSPITAlj 
SETTING AND, BY AND LARGE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT 
NECESSARILY HAVE A MEDICAL INTERVENTION COUNTERPART TO THEM 
Q DR. FRIKKE, ARE YOU A MEMBER OF ANY PROFESSIONAL 
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SOCIETIES? 
A YES, I AM. 
Q WHAT ARE THOSE? 
A I BELONG TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSO-
CIATION, I AM A MEMBER OF THE UTAH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
I BELONG TO THE COLLEGE OF AMERICAN PATHOLOGISTS, THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGISTS, THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 
OF FORENSIC SCIENCES. 
Q AND DR. FRIKKE, ONCE YOU WERE BOARD CERTIFIED 
HAVE YOU ATTENDED CLASSES AND SEMINARS TO KEEP CURRENT IN 
YOUR FIELD? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY CLASSES OR 5EMINARS 
WILL YOU ATTEND IN A YEAR? 
A DEPENDING UPON THE WORK LOAD WE HAVE IN THE OFF1C 
IN OUR STAFFING LEVEL WE TRY TO GO TO ONE NATIONAL LEVEL 
MEETING A YEAR. ALL OF THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS THAT 
WE BELONG TO HAVE JOURNALS THAT ARE PUBLISHED THAT YOU READ 
AND WE KEEP CURRENT WITH THE LITERATURE BY READING THEIR 
JOURNALS. 
Q AND DR. FRIKKE, HAVE YOU ALSO TAUGHT AND/OR MADE 
PRESENTATIONS IN YOUR PROFESSIONAL FIELD, YOUR FIELD OF 
EXPERTISE, PATHOLOGY? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
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Q AND HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU DO.THAT? 
A WE ARE CONTINUOUSLY IN THE PROCESS OF TEACHING 
IN OUR OFFICE. WE ALWAYS, OR ALMOST ALWAYS, HAVE MEDICAL 
STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL SCHOOL ROTATING 
IN OUR OFFICE, GETTING EXPERIENCE WITH THE DUTIES AND TASKS 
OF THE OFFICERS OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER. ALL OF THE PATH-
OLOGY RESIDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COME AND SPEND 
AT LEAST A MONTH WITH US. OUR OFFICE IS ALWAYS INVOLVED 
IN EDUCATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, PARAMEDICS, 
HOSPITAL PERSONNEL. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, YOU EXPLAINED FOR THE JURY YOUR EDU-
CATION IN THE AREA OF PATHOLOGY. WOULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR 
THEM YOUR WORK EXPERIENCE IN THE AREA OF PATHOLOGY? 
A I HAVE BEEN A FULL TIME FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST 
FOR TWO YEARS AND SEVERAL MONTHS. 
Q WHERE WERE YOU A PATHOLOGIST? WHERE DID YOU 
WORK? 
A THE FIRST YEAR OF THAT I WAS IN MINNEAPOLIS, 
HENNEPIN COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER'S OFFICE. I WAS DEPUTY 
MEDICAL EXAMINER THERE. HERE IN UTAH I'M ASSISTANT MEDICAL 
EXAMINER. 
Q AND WHEN YOU DID YOUR FELLOWSHIP AND RESIDENCY 
INTERNSHIP DID YOU ALSO OBTAIN WORK EXPERIENCE? 
A YES. DURING MY RESIDENCY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
FLORIDA, AS IS HERE, DONE HERE, THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
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I SPENT ONE MONTH WORKING FULL TIME IN THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S 
OFFICE IN JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA. IT IS A VERY LARGE OFFICE; 
A BUSY OFFICE. AND I WAS THERE FULL TIME FOR A MONTH. 
DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF MY RESIDENCY IN FLORIDA I 
SPENT EVERY WEEKEND IN THAT OFFICE, BASICALLY AS A VOLUNTEER, 
TO GAIN EXPERIENCE. 
Q HAVE YOU TESTIFIED IN COURT BEFORE? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q HAVE YOU BEEN QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT TO TESTIFY 
IN COURT? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q WHERE HAVE YOU TESTIFIED IN COURT? 
A IN MINNESOTA I'VE TESTIFIED IN FEDERAL COURT, 
CIRCUIT COURT AND DISTRICT COURT; IN WISCONSIN I TESTIFIED 
IN DISTRICT COURT; IN NORTH DAKOTA I HAVE TESTIFIED IN DIS-
TRICT COURT AND HERE IN UTAH I HAVE TESTIFIED IN BOTH CIRCUIT] 
AND DISTRICT COURT. 
Q APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU TESTIFIED 
AS AN EXPERT IN YOUR FIELD? 
A APPROXIMATELY *t0 TIMES. 
Q EXCUSE ME? 
A <t0. 
Q AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY TIMES HAVE YOU TESTI-
FIED IN UTAH? 
A 15. 
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1
 Q HOW MANY FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU DONE, 
2
 DR. FRIKKE, APPROXIMATELY? 
3
 A AS OF THIS WEEKEND IT WAS 700. 
4
 Q APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY AUTOPSIES OR FORENSIC 
5 EXAMINATIONS HAVE YOU DONE ON CHILDREN? 
6
 A INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE 18 YEARS OF AGE OR LESS I'VE 
7
 DONE APPROXIMATELY 130 FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS. 
8
 Q APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS 
9
 HAVE YOU DONE ON CHILDREN WHERE CHILD ABUSE WAS SUSPECTED 
10
 OR CONFIRMED, OR THE CONFIRMED CAUSE OF DEATH? 
11
 A 16. 
12
 Q APPROXIMATLEY HOW MANY FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS 
HAVE YOU DONE INVOLVING HEAD AND NECK INJURIES? 
14
 | A OF THE 700 THAT I'VE DONE, ABOUT 250 OF THEM 
15
 I HAVE INVOLVED INJURIES TO THE HEAD AND NECK. 
16
 | Q AND OF THOSE 250, APPROXIMATELY, HOW MANY WERE 
17 
18 
19
 I MS. HORNAK: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
20 
23 
24 
25 
CHILDREN? 
A kO. 
HONOR? 
21
 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY, YES. 
2 2
 J Q CBY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, I AM HANDING YOU 
WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 31. DO YOU RECOG-
NIZE THAT? 
A YES, I DO. 
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Q CAN YOU IDENTIFY WHAT THAT IS FOR THE COURT? 
A THIS IS A COPY OF MY CURRICULUM VITAE, MY PUBLI-
CATION BIBLIOGRAPHY AND A LIST OF THE LECTURES AND CONFER-
ENCES THAT I'VE PARTICIPATED IN. 
MS. HORNAK: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE PROVIDED A COPY 
OF THIS TO MR. METOS AND I WOULD ASK THAT IT BE ADMITTED 
INTO COURT AT THIS TIME. I ALSO HAVE A COURTESY COPY FOR 
THE COURT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. METOS, DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. METOS: NOT A REAL STRENUOUS ONE. I THINK--
I DON'T THINK IT ADDS ANYTHING. DR. FRIKKE HAS TESTIFIED 
ABOUT HER QUALIFICATIONS AND HER BACKGROUND. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE EXHIBIT, 
31-S, IS RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 31 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, I BELIEVE YOU STATED 
THAT THIS IS A CURRICULUM VITAE. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THAT 
IS? 
A IT'S BASICALLY A LIST OF MY ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS, 
MY WORK EXPERIENCE, THE PAPERS THAT I PUBLISHED, CONFERENCES 
I'VE ATTENDED, LECTURES THAT I'VE GIVEN. 
Q IS IT SIMILAR TO WHAT SOME OF US WOULD CALL A 
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1 RESUME? 
2
 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
3
 Q ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH AN INJURY CALLED THE CONTRE-] 
4
 COUP INJURY? 
5 A YES, I AM. 
6
 Q WILL YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT THAT IS? 
7
 A THE DEFINITION OF A CONTRECOUP INJURY IS AN INJURY| 
8 THAT OCCURS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF A BODY, FROM THE SIDE 
9 | OPPOSITE FROM WHICH THE FORCE IS ADMINISTERED. IN THE 
FORENSIC MEDICINE CONTEXT THE CONTRECOUP INJURY APPLIES 
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO INJURIES TO THE BRAIN IN WHICH THE 
12
 I BRAIN SUSTAINS INJURIES ON THE SIDE OF THE HEAD OPPOSITE 
13
 FROM WHICH THE FORCE IS ADMINISTERED 
14
 I Q HOW DOES THAT USUALLY HAPPEN? 
A CONTRECOUP INJURIES GENERALLY HAPPEN WHEN A MOVING 
HEAD STRIKES A RELATIVELY IMMOVABLE OBJECT AND THE FORCE 
OF THAT IMPACT IS ABSORBED BY THE RELATIVELY IMMOVABLE OBJECT] 
AND THE HEAD. AND AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THAT ABSORPTION FORCE 
AND SUDDEN DECELLERATION THE BRAIN INSIDE OF THE HEAD IS 
INJURED. AND CLASSICALLY THE INJURY OCCURS TO THE BRAIN, 
ON THE SIDE OF THE BRAIN OPPOSITE OF WHERE THE IMPACT OCCURS. 
2 2
 | Q COULD A CONTRECOUP INJURY CAUSE DEATH? 
2 3
 ' A IT CAN. 
2 4
 | Q WHAT OTHER SYMPTOMS OR INJURIES COULD YOU EXPECT 
2 5
 ' TO SEE FROM A CONTRECOUP INJURY? 
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A THE SYMPTOMS THAT ONE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE DEPEND 
ON WHAT THE INJURY TO THE BRAIN IS. IF THE INJURY TO THE 
BRAIN IS SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE THE PATIENT MAY IMMEDIATELY 
LOSE CONSCIOUSNESS OR MAY LOSE CONSCIOUSNESS AFTER A PERIOD 
OF BEING NORMALLY CONSCIOUS. THERE MAY BE SEIZURES, THERE 
MAY BE ANTERIOR CONCUSSION TYPE ACTIVITY, THE BRAIN CAN 
SWELL, THE BRAIN CAN BLEED. THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCE OF 
A CONTRECOUP INJURY, IF IT IS SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE, IS THAT 
THE PERSON BECOMES UNCONSCIOUS, BECOMES COMMATOSE AND THE 
ULTIMATE INJURY IS TO DIE. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, ON MARCH 21ST OF THIS YEAR, 1992, 
DID YOU PERFORM AN AUTOPSY ON A CHILD NAMED GAVIN ADAMS? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WHERE DID YOU PERFORM THAT AUTOPSY? 
A THAT AUTOPSY WAS PERFORMED AT THE OFFICE OF THE 
MEDICAL EXAMINER HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
Q WHAT TIME WAS IT PERFORMED? 
A THE AUTOPSY WAS BEGUN AT 9:00 O'CLOCK IN THE 
MORNING ON MARCH 21ST. 
Q WHO WAS PRESENT DURING THE AUTOPSY? 
A THE OFFICIAL OBSERVER FROM OUTSIDE OF OUR OFFICE 
WAS DETECTIVE KENNETH PATRICK FROM THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE. 
Q AND IS IT USUALLY COMMON WHEN YOU PERFORM AN 
AUTOPSY TO HAVE A DETECTIVE PRESENT? 
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A IT IS COMMON WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 
ARE SUSPICIOUS OR THOUGHT TO BE UNNATURAL. ON OCCASION WE 
WILL HAVE OFFICIAL OBSERVERS ON NATURAL DEATHS ALSO. 
Q WHEN WAS THE AUTOPSY PERFORMED IN RELATION TO 
WHEN GAVIN WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD? 
A I BEGAN THE AUTOPSY APPROXIMATELY 18 HOURS AFTER 
HE WAS DECLARED DEAD. 
Q I'M SORRY, I COULDN'T HEAR YOU. 
A 18 HOURS AFTER HE WAS DECLARED DEAD. 
Q WHEN WAS HE DECLARED DEAD? 
A 3:00 O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON ON MARCH 20TH. 
Q HOW OLD WAS GAVIN? 
A 
Q 
AUTOPSY, 
A 
Q 
A 
HE WAS TWO YEARS FOUR MONTHS OLD. 
AND WERE YOU ABLE, OR DID YOU, AS PART OF YOUR 
DETERMINE HIS HEIGHT AND WEIGHT? 
YES, I DID. 
WHAT WAS HIS HEIGHT AND WEIGHT? 
GAVIN WAS 33 INCHES TALL AND WEIGHED 26 AND A 
HALF POUNDS. 
Q 
A 
WAS THAT NORMAL FOR HIS AGE? 
GAVIN WAS ON THE SMALL END OF THE NORMAL RANGE 
FOR A CHILD OF HIS AGE. 
Q 
MADE OF 
DR. FRIKKE, BASED UPON THE FINDINGS THAT YOU 
THE AUTOPSY ARE YOU ABLE TO EXPRESS AN OPINION TO 
A REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE DEATH 
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1 OF GAVIN ADAMS? 
2 A YES, I AM. 
3 Q WHAT IS THAT OPINION? 
4 A MY OPINION IS THAT GAVIN DIED AS A CONSEQUENCE 
5 OF BLUNT FORCE INJURIES TO HIS HEAD AND TO HIS NECK. 
6 Q DR. FRIKKE, ARE YOU ABLE TO EXPRESS AN OPINION 
7 TO A REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY AS TO THE MANNER OF DEATH 
8 OF GAVIN ADAMS? 
9 A YES, I AM. 
10 Q WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THAT OPINION? 
11 A THE BASIS FOR MY OPINION IN EXPRESSING A MANNER 
12 OF DEATH IS THE OBSERVATION THAT I MADE AT THE AUTOPSY, 
13 THE EXPERIENCE THAT I'VE HAD IN OBSERVING INDIVIDUALS WHO 
14 HAVE SIMILAR PATTERNS OF INJURIES, THE EXPERIENCE THAT MY 
15 COLLEAGUES HAVE ADDED AND PEOPLE WHO PUBLISH ARTICLES IN 
16 THE LITERATURE ON SIMILAR PATTERNS OF INJURIES. 
17 IT ALSO INVOLVES MY REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL INFOR-
18
 MATION ABOUT GAVIN THAT I'VE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AND INFOR-
19 MATION THAT I OBTAIN FROM WITNESS STATEMENTS AND OBSERVATION^ 
20
 MADE TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WHO ARE ALSO INVESTI-
21
 GATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH. 
22
 Q AND DR. FRIKKE, WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION AS TO THE 
23
 MANNER OF DEATH OF GAVIN ADAMS? 
2A\
 MR. METOS: I'LL OBJECT WITHOUT FURTHER FOUNDATIOfl, 
2 5
 YOUR HONOR. 
M i l ' OOOOb i 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION'S OVERRULED. 
2 A (BY THE WITNESS) IN MY OPINION, GAVIN DIED OF 
3
 THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACTION OF ANOTHER PERSON. THE SHORT 
4
 TERM FOR THAT IS HOMICIDE. 
5 Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, WERE YOU ABLE TO 
6 EXCLUDE NATURAL OR ACCIDENTAL CAUSES OF DEATH? 
7 A I WAS CERTAINLY ABLE TO EXCLUDE NATURAL CAUSES. 
3
 THE CONSTELLATION OF INJURIES THAT GAVIN HAD CANNOT OCCUR 
9
 AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A NATURAL DISEASE PROCESS. MY DECISION, 
10
 MY OPINION THAT HE DIED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACTIONS 
11
 OF ANOTHER PERSON RATHER THAN AN ACCIDENT IS THE SUM TOTAL 
12
 OF ALL THE INFORMATION THAT I HAD CONCERNING THE PATTERN 
13
 OF INJURY THAT HE HAD, IN COMPARISON TO INJURIES THAT HE 
14
 DOES NOT HAVE, AND THAT, TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CIRCUM-
15
 STANCES THAT WERE DESCRIBED AT HIS HOME AND STATEMENTS THAT 
16
 WERE MADE, IN MY OPINION, YES, THAT IT WAS A HOMICIDAL ACT. 
17 Q
 WHAT DID YOU FIRST DO WHEN YOU DID THE AUTOPSY 
18
 ON GAVIN ADAMS? 
19
 A THE FIRST THING THAT WE DO IS DO COMPLETE SKELE-
2 0
 TAL X-RAYS ON A CHILD LIKE THIS. 
21
 I Q AND DID YOU DO THAT ON GAVIN? 
A YES, IT WAS DONE. 22 
2 3
 Q AND DID YOU OBSERVE ANYTHING IN THE SKELETAL 
24 X-RAY? 
25 A WE OBSERVED THE INJURIES TO THE HEAD AND NECK 
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AND WE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY INJURIES TO THE REMAINDER OF 
HIS SKELETAL SYSTEM. 
Q AND DR. FRIKKE, WHAT ELSE DID YOU DO AS PART 
OF AN AUTOPSY? DO YOU USUALLY TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS? WHAT ALL 
DO YOU DO? 
A YES. OUR FORENSIC AUTOPSY EXAMINATION STARTS, 
AFTER WE'VE DONE X " V S , WITH A COMPLETE EXTERNAL EXAMIN-
ATION IN WHICH THE BODY IS WEIGHED, MEASURED, CERTAIN GROWTH 
PARAMETERS ARE MEASURED, HEAD CIRCUMFERENCE, ABDOMINAL CIR-
CUMFERENCE, THAT SORT OF THING. WE COMPLETELY EXAMINE THE 
EXTERNAL SURFACES OF THAT BODY LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF NATURAL 
DEVELOPMENT, UNNATURAL DEVELOPMENT, NATURAL DISEASE PRO-
CESSES AND UNNATURAL PROCESSES, INJURIES AND SO FORTH. 
TO DO THAT WE LOOK AT THEM. WE MAKE DIAGRAMS. WE HAVE 
STANDARD BODY SURFACE DIAGRAMS THAT WE WILL DRAW THOSE 
INJURIES ON IDENTIFYING THEIR SIZE AND THEIR LOCATION ON 
THE BODY. WE ALSO PHOTOGRAPH ALL OF THOSE ABNORMALITIES. 
Q WHEN YOU DID YOUR EXTERNAL EXAMINATION DID YOU 
OBSERVE ANY SIGNS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTION? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WHAT WERE THOSE? 
A GAVIN HAD VERY OBVIOUSLY BEEN THROUGH AT LEAST 
PART OF THE MEDICAL SYSTEM. WHEN WE RECEIVED HIM HIS NECK 
WAS IMMOBILIZED IN A CERVICAL COLLAR. THIS IS A FAIRLY 
ROUTINE MEDICAL PROCEDURE. HE HAD BEEN INTUBATED, A TUBE 
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HAD BEEN PUT THROUGH HIS MOUTH DOWN INTO HIS TRACHEA IN 
ORDER TO ASSIST VENTILLATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HAVING 
BEEN INTUBATED HE HAD A LITTLE SCRAPE OR AN ABRASION ON 
HIS UPPER LIP. THAT'S A VERY COMMON ASSOCIATION WITH INTU-
BATION. 
HE HAD SCRAPES OR ABRASIONS ON THE FRONT OF HIS 
CHEST THAT ARE IN A PARTICULAR PATTERN THAT ARE VERY 
TYPICALLY OBSERVED IN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE HAD CARDIOPUL-
MONARY RESUSCITATION. 
HE HAD EKG ELECTRODES ON HIS CHEST WHERE THEY 
HAD BEEN TRYING TO MONITOR CARDIAC ACTIVITY. 
HE HAD HOSPITAL IDENTIFICATION BANDS ON HIS 
WRISTS. 
HE HAD NEEDLE PUNCTURE MARKS IN THE INSIDE OF 
HIS LEFT ELBOW WHERE THEY HAD TRIED TO START I.V. LINES. 
HE ACTUALLY HAD AN INTRAVENOUS LINE STARTED ON HIS LEFT 
FOREARM. HE HAD AN INTRAVENOUS LINE STARTED IN HIS LEFT 
LEG. THOSE WERE THE DIRECT SIGNS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTION. 
HE DIED IN THE AFTERNOON AND SPENT THE EVENING, 
THE NIGHTTIME HOURS IN OUR MEDICAL EXAMINER'S FACILITY. 
DURING THAT TIME SEVERAL OF HIS INTRAVENOUS LINES HAD BEEN 
UNDERNEATH HIS BODY AND THERE WERE INDENTATIONS ON HIS BACK 
WHERE HAD HAD BEEN LYING ON THOSE LINES. 
Q OTHER THAN THE SIGNS OF MEDICAL INTERVENTION 
DID YOU SEE OTHER EXTERNAL OR OTHER INJURIES IN YOUR EXTERNAli 
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EXAMINATION? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AT THIS TIME, DR. FRIKKE, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK 
YOU TO STEP DOWN TO THE EASEL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO 32-S, 
MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: NO OBJECTION FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PUR-
POSES, ILLUSTRATIVE OF HER TESTIMONY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. IT MAY BE PUBLISHED 
TO THE JURY AND YOU MAY USE IT AS YOU WISH. 
MS. HORNAK*. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 32 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, I'M GOING TO ASK 
YOU TO MAYBE STAND OVER HERE WHERE I AM AND USE THE POINTER. 
AND STARTING WITH THE HEAD, IF YOU COULD EXPLAIN THE EXTER-
NAL INJURIES THAT YOU OBSERVED ON GAVIN. 
A OKAY. THIS IS A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF AN INFANT'S 
BODY. THIS DIAGRAM IS ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME LENGTH AS 
GAVIN WAS. ACTUALLY, I THINK THERE'S PROBABLY A QUARTER 
OR HALF AN INCH DIFFERENCE IN THIS AND WHAT GAVIN'S ACTUAL 
BODY LENGTH WAS. 
AND WHAT I SAW ON GAVIN'S EXTERNAL EXAMINATION 
IS A NUMBER OF CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS. CONTUSIONS ARE 
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 BRUISES; ABRASIONS ARE SCRAPES. AND I'VE PUT THOSE ON THE 
2
 DIAGRAM USING BLUE FOR CONTUSIONS AND RED FOR ABRASIONS. 
3
 STARTING AT THE TOP OF THE HEAD AND GOING DOWN 
4
 TO THE FEET. ON GAVIN'S RIGHT SCALP BEHIND THE HAIRLINE, 
5
 | JUST SLIGHTLY BEHIND IT, HE HAD A BRIGHT BLUE, REDDISH BLUE 
CONTUSION. IT SHOWED THROUGH THE SURFACE OF THE SCALP AND 
YOU COULD SEE IT THROUGH HIS HAIR. 
8
 I ON HIS LEFT FOREHEAD, AND THIS WAS RIGHT AT HIS 
9
 | HAIRLINE, IT WOULD BE RIGHT HERE, YOU KNOW, JUST ANTERIOR 
TO THE HAIRLINE, WAS SORT OF A DUMBBELL SHAPED CONTUSION, 
11
 | A BRUISE. THIS ONE WAS STARTING TO SHOW YELLOW BROWN 
12
 I CHANGES. MY OPINION WAS THIS INJURY WAS A LITTLE OLDER. 
IT HAD PROBABLY BEEN THERE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. 
14
 I ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRIDGE OF GAVIN'S NOSE 
15
 I WAS A VERY PALE BLUE BRUISE, CONTUSION. ESTIMATING THE 
AGE ON THIS IS, I THOUGHT IT WAS A FAIRLY RECENT BRUISE, 
IT WAS CERTAINLY LESS OLD THAN THE ONE ON THE FOREHEAD. 
ON THE LEFT SIDE OF GAVIN'S NOSE WERE TWO TINY 
LITTLE SCRAPINGS. WE CALL 'EM CONCAVE ABRASIONS OR PINHEAD 
SIZE OR BIGGER THAN THAT. THAT WAS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF 
HIS NOSE. 
ON HIS UPPER LIP WAS A VERY REGULAR SEMI-CIRCULAR 
ABRASION. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE AGE OF ABRASIONS, 
IT WAS DRIED. IT DID NOT HAVE A SCAB ON IT. VERY SUPER-
FICIAL ABRASION. WHEN YOU SCRAPE YOURSELF YOU DON'T FORM 
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SCABS SO I REALLY DON'T HAVE AN OPINION AS TO HOW LONG THAT 
ABRASION HAD BEEN ON HIS UPPER LIP. 
ON HIS LOWER LIP, ON THE RED SURFACE OF THE LIP 
WAS A BRUISE THAT WAS SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF AGING. IT WAS 
STILL RED. IT'S HARD TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW OLD THAT ONE WAS. 
WHEN I LOOKED INSIDE OF GAVIN'S MOUTH TO EXAMINE 
THE MUCOSAL SURFACES ON THE INSIDE OF HIS MOUTH, ON THE 
INSIDE OF THE UPPER LIP IN THE GAP BETWEEN WHERE HIS 
INCISORS WERE AND HIS FIRST CUSPID TOOTH, THERE WAS A BLIS-
TER, A VERY ACUTE BRUISE, COLLECTION OF BLOOD UNDERNEATH 
THE SURFACE OF THE MUCOSA OF THE MOUTH. 
ON THE FRONT OF THE LEFT SIDE OF GAVIN'S NECK, 
WHICH WOULD BE RIGHT ABOUT HERE, WAS A SCRAPE, AN ABRASION. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, LET ME STOP YOU THERE FOR A MINUTE. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY OPINION AS TO WHAT THE CAUSE OF THOSE INJUR-
IES ON GAVIN'S HEAD AND NECK COULD HAVE BEEN? 
A THESE INJURIES COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY ANYTHING 
HITTING HIM OR HIM HITTING ANYTHING ELSE. THERE WERE NO 
PATTERNS THAT I COULD SEE THAT WERE DISTINCTIVE THAT WOULD 
HAVE TOLD ME WHAT THE IMPACT SURFACE WAS. 
Q WERE ANY OF THOSE INJURIES LIFE THREATENING? 
A NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. PLEASE GO AHEAD. 
A WE LOOKED AT GAVIN'S TORSO. HE HAD TWO INJURIES 
THAT SHOWED ON THE FRONT. ONE OF THESE WAS SORT OF A C-
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1 SHAPED BRUISE. THIS SHAPE OF A BRUISE, THE SIZE THAT IT 
2 WAS, IS VERY TYPICAL OF A BITE MARK. THIS CHILD HAD BEEN 
3 BITTEN AT SOME POINT. THE EDGES OF THIS BRUISE WERE TURNING 
4 YELLOW BROWN. I THINK THAT BRUISE, THAT BITE, HAD BEEN 
5 THERE FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS. 
6 ON THE RIGHT LOWER FRONT OF HIS ABDOMEN WERE 
7 TWO BRUISES. ONE OF THEM WAS QUITE CIRCULAR AND THE OTHER 
8 ONE WAS SORT OF SEMI-CIRCULAR. 
9 LET ME SEE IF I CAN REPRESENT WHAT THIS ONE LOOKED| 
10 LIKE. 
11 THIS ONE ALSO HAD SOME GREENISH/BROWN DISCOLOR-
12 ATION AROUND THE EDGES. AND I THINK THAT INJURY HAD ALSO 
13 BEEN THERE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. 
14 Q DR. FRIKKE, IN TERMS OF THE BITE MARK WERE YOU 
15 ABLE TO DO ANY TYPE OF STUDY TO DETERMINE, PERHAPS, WHERE 
16 THE BITE MARK CAME FROM, WHO INFLICTED IT, OR WHETHER IT 
17 WAS AN ADULT OR CHILD OR ANYTHING? 
18 A I SHOWED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THIS INJURY TO A 
19 GENTLEMAN WHO WORKS WITH OUR OFFICE WHO IS A DENTIST AND 
20 WHO IS ALSO AN EXPERT AS A FORENSIC ORTHODONTIST. HE HAS 
21 CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN FINDINGS AND EXAMINATIONS AS 
22 A FORENSIC DENTIST. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN THE BITER CAN 
23 BE IDENTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF ACTUAL ABRASIONS OR SCRAPES 
24 THAT WOULD OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF MAKING THAT BITE MARK. 
25 IT WAS MY OPINION AT THE TIME THAT I DID THE AUTOPSY, AND 
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HE CONFIRMED THIS, THAT THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH IDENTIFYING 
FEATURES ABOUT THIS INJURY TO HAVE ALLOWED US TO IDENTIFY 
WHO THE BITER WAS. YOU CAN'T ESTIMATE FROM THE ACTUAL SIZE 
OF THE BITE MARK WHO THE BITER IS, IT DOES NOT LET YOU KNOW 
WHETHER IT'S AN ADULT OR A CHILD BECAUSE THE SIZE OF THE 
BITE, THE SIZE OF THE INJURY IS GOING TO DEPEND ON HOW MANY 
TEETH ENGAGED THE SKIN. IF YOU CATCH SOMEBODY WITH JUST 
INCISORS YOU ARE GOING TO MAKE A VERY SMALL MARK; IF YOU 
REALLY TAKE A DEEP BITE SO YOU GET SKIN ALL THE WAY BACK 
TO YOUR MOLARS, THEN YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A BIG BITE. 
SO THE SIZE OF THE BITE DOES DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN A SMALL 
MOUTH AND A BIG MOUTH. YOU HAVE TO ALSO LOOK FOR IDENTIFYING! 
FEATURES OF THE TEETH THAT ARE DOING THE BITING. 
IT WAS BOTH OF OUR OPINIONS THAT THERE WEREN'T 
ENOUGH IDENTIFYING FEATURES ON THIS INJURY TO HELP US BE 
ABLE TO IDENTIFY WHO THE BITER WAS. AND GIVEN THE COLOR 
CHANGES THAT WERE ALREADY SHOWING ON THAT IT WAS APPARENT 
THAT THAT BITE HAD BEEN INFLICTED SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE HE 
DIED AND WAS, IN MY OPINION, NOT SPECIFICALLY RELATIVE TO 
THE FATAL INJURY ITSELF. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, PLEASE CONTINUE WITH WHAT ELSE YOU 
OBSERVED ON THE EXTERNAL INJURIES. 
A I LOOKED AT GAVIN'S LEGS. HE HAD A COUPLE OF 
BRUISES ON HIS SHINS.' BOTH OF THESE BRUISES WERE SHOWING 
COLOR CHANGES TOWARDS THE YELLOW AND GREEN SIDE. THEY WERE 
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OLDER. THEY HAD BEEN THERE FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS. 
ON THE INSIDE OF GAVIN'S RIGHT ANKLE WAS A BRUISE. 
IT WAS QUITE SMALL. IT WAS OVERLYING THE BONE THAT STICKS 
OUT RIGHT HERE, WHICH IS SORT OF THE TYPICAL PLACE FOR PEOPLE 
TO BRUISE THEMSELVES. IT WAS SORT OF A GRAPE FLUID, HARD 
TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW OLD THAT ONE WAS. 
ON THE INSIDE OF GAVIN'S LEFT ANKLE WAS A SCRAPE, 
AN ABRASION. AND THIS WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF HEALING AROUND 
THE EDGES SO IT HAD BEEN THERE FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, DID YOU ALSO DO AN EXTERNAL EXAMIN-
ATION OF GAVIN'S BACKSIDE? 
A YES, I DID. 
MS. HORNAK: YOUR HONOR, MR. METOS HAS SEEN THIS 
EXHIBIT AS WELL AND WE'D ASK THAT IT BE USED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF HER TESTIMONY? 
33-S, MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
RECEIVED. 
THE WITNESS, 
THE BACK OF THE CHILD, 
THIS IS ALMOST EXACTLY 
I HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
THANK YOU, MR. METOS. 33-S IS 
CWHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 33 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
THIS IS A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 
THE SAME SCALE THAT THE FRONT WAS. 
THE SAME LENGTH AS GAVIN WAS TALL. 
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1 I'M USING THE SAME COLOR CONVENTIONS, BLUE FOR BRUISES, 
2 RED FOR SCRAPES. 
3 GAVIN HAD TWO INJURIES ON HIS BACK. ONE WAS 
4 THE SET OF, SORT OF PARALLEL BRUISES NEXT TO HIS SCAPULA. 
5 THESE BRUISES WERE SHOWING SIGNS OF HEALING AROUND THE EDGES 
6 THEY SORT OF HAD THAT YELLOW BROWN TINGE THAT HEALING BRUISESJ 
7 GET. 
8 ON HIS RIGHT BACK, FARTHER DOWN AND CLOSER TO 
9 HIS SIDE, WAS A BRUISE THAT WAS BLUE GREEN. IT WAS SHOWING 
10 SOME COLOR CHANGES BUT I THINK IT WAS MORE RECENT THAN THAT 
11 ONE. IN FACT, THIS WAS A VERY DEEP BRUISE. THIS BRUISING 
12 WENT ALL THE WAY THROUGH THE MUSCLES OF HIS CHEST WALL. 
13 WHEN WE DID THE INTERNAL EXAMINATION WE COULD SEE THAT BRUISlf 
14 FROM THE INSIDE OF HIS BODY. 
15 HE ALSO, RIGHT NEXT TO THAT WAS AN ABRASION OR 
16 SCRAPING INJURY. I DON'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR OPINION AS 
17 TO HOW RECENT THAT ABRASION WAS INCURRED. 
18 MS. HORNAK: THANK YOU, DR. FRIKKE. YOU CAN 
19 RETURN TO YOUR SEAT FOR JUST A FEW MINUTES. 
20 CWITNESS COMPLIES). 
21 Q CBY MS. HORNAK) DOCTOR—AND I SHOULD PROBABLY 
22 STATE, WHEN YOU WERE REFERRING TO THIS YOU WERE REFERRING 
23 TO EXHIBIT 33 WHICH IS A DIAGRAM OF THE BACK OF THE BODY. 
24 DID YOU OBSERVE ANY OTHER EXTERNAL INJURIES OTHER) 
25 THAN THOSE THAT YOU'VE INDICATED ON THE DIAGRAM OF GAVIN? 
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 A HE HAD INJURY TO HIS TONGUE, WHICH IS A LITTLE 
2 HARD TO KNOW WHETHER TO DESCRIBE THAT AS EXTERNAL OR INTER-
3 NAL, 'CAUSE THE TONGUE LIVES IN THE MOUTH, BUT HE ALSO HAD 
4 BRUISES OF HIS TONGUE. HE HAD BITTEN HIS TONGUE QUITE 
5 RECENTLY BEFORE HE DIED. 
6
 Q OKAY. AND WHEN YOU SAY "QUITE RECENTLY," APPROXI 
7 MATELY WHAT TIME PERIOD WOULD THAT BE? 
8
 A WELL, WHEN I TRIED TO DATE THAT TONGUE CONTUSION 
9 THAT WAS DONE ON THE BASIS OF MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION AND 
10 IT SHOWED ABSOLUTELY NO SIGNS OF HEALING SO IT WAS WITHIN 
11
 FOUR TO TWELVE HOURS OF THE TIME OF HIS DEATH. 
12
 Q AND HOW SEVERE WAS THAT INJURY, DR. FRIKKE? 
13
 A BRUISES OF THE TONGUE ARE NEVER LIFE THREATENING 
14 TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I MEAN, IT PROBABLY HURT, PROBABLY WOULD 
15 HAVE NO LONG TERM SEQUELA ON HIS HEALTH IF HE HAD LIVED. 
16 Q DID YOU OBSERVE ANY SCAR TISSUE ON HIS TONGUE? 
1? I A WHEN I DID THE MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF THE 
18
 I INJURY OF HIS TONGUE I DID SEE SCAR TISSUE. 
19
 I Q WHAT DID THAT INDICATE TO YOU? 
2 0
 I A THAT INDICATED THAT GAVIN HAD BITTEN HIS TONGUE— 
21
 ACTUALLY, THE SCAR TISSUE INVOLVED A BIGGER AREA THAN THE 
2 2
 ACUTE BRUISE OR BITE DID. HE HAD A RATHER SIGNIFICANT 
2 3
 I INJURY, PROBABLY OF A BITING NATURE, AT SOME POINT IN THE 
PAST. 24 
2 5
 Q DID YOU OBSERVE ANY OTHER EXTERNAL INJURIES ON 
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GAVIN? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q COULD ANY OF THESE EXTERNAL INJURIES HAVE CAUSED 
GAVIN'S DEATH? 
A NOT IN AND OF THEMSELVES, NO. 
Q AFTER THE EXTERNAL EXAMINATION WHAT DID YOU DO 
NEXT? 
A AFTER WE'VE COMPLETED ALL THIS DOCUMENTATION 
OF THE EXTERNAL APPEARANCE OF THE BODY WE THEN PROCEED WITH 
THE INTERNAL EXAMINATION. AND IN CHILDREN, BECAUSE WE ARE 
ALWAYS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY'RE DYING FROM 
NATURAL DISEASE PROCESSES, OUR FIRST APPROACH IS TO EVALU-
ATE THE POSSIBILITY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN CHILDREN. 
AND THE FIRST THING THAT WE DO IN THAT INVESTIGATION IS 
TO DO A LUMBAR PUNCTURE OF THE CHILD IN ORDER TO OBTAIN 
FLUID FROM AROUND THE BRAIN TO STUDY. 
Q AND WHAT IS THE LUMBAR PUNCTURE? CAN YOU EXPLAIN 
WHAT THAT IS, PLEASE? 
A LUMBAR PUNCTURE IS A PROCEDURE WHERE WE INSERT 
A NEEDLE BETWEEN THE BONES OF THE BACK BONE, DOWN CLOSE 
TO THE HIPS. WE PUT A NEEDLE BETWEEN THE BONES SO THAT 
IT ENTERS THE FLUID SPACE THAT SURROUNDS THE SPINAL CORD. 
WE CAN DRAW FLUID OUT OF THERE. THAT FLUID IS IN CONTINUOUS 
CIRCULATION WITH THE FLUID THAT SURROUNDS THE BRAIN. AND 
WE CAN EXAMINE THAT FLUID FOR SIGNS OF INFECTION. IF A 
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CHILD HAS MENINGITIS WE CAN FIND THE SIGNS OF THE INFECTION. 
WE WILL FIND THE BACTERIA OR THE INFLAMMATORY CELLS. IF 
THERE IS A HEMORRHAGE INTO THE BRAIN OR SPINAL CORD WE WILL 
SEE BLOOD IN THAT FLUID. 
Q WHEN YOU DID THE LUMBAR PUNCTURE ON GAVIN DID 
YOU DISCOVER ANYTHING? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DISCOVER? 
A GAVIN HAD, HIS CEREBRAL SPINAL FLUID WAS GROSSLY 
BLOODY. HE HAD BLOOD IN HIS SUBDURAL SPACE. 
Q WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? 
A THAT MEANS THAT SOMEWHERE IN HIS CENTRAL NERVOUS 
SYSTEM, EITHER IN THE HEAD OR IN THE VERTEBRAL COLUMN WHERE 
THE SPINAL CORD LIVES, HE HAD HEMORRHAGED. 
Q DID YOU EXAMINE THE INTERNAL ORGANS OF GAVIN? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q DID YOU OBSERVE ANYTHING UNUSUAL IN THOSE? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q PLEASE DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY WHAT YOU OBSERVED. 
A GAVIN HAD VERY DEFINITE SIGNS OF INJURY ON HIS 
HEAD, HIS NECK AND IN THE SPINAL CANAL. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, I'M HANDING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED 
AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 3*f. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q WHAT IS IT? 
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A THIS IS A SERIES OF DIAGRAMS THAT I PREPARED 
TO ILLUSTRATE THE INJURIES TO GAVIN'S HEAD AND SOME OF THE 
INJURIES TO HIS NECK. 
MS. HORNAK: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE WOULD ASK 
EXHIBIT 3k BE ADMITTED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. METOS: NO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE TESTIMONY. 
IT MAY BE ADMITTED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT I 
I NO. 3k WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, WOULD YOU PLEASE 
STEP DOWN HERE AGAIN? 
CWITNESS COMPLIES). 
DR. FRIKKE, WILL YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE FOR THE 
JURY WHAT THAT DIAGRAM DEPICTS AND WHAT INJURY YOU OBSERVED 
IN GAVIN? 
A OKAY. WHAT THESE ARE ARE BASICALLY THE SAME 
DIAGRAMS THAT I SHOWED YOU, YOU KNOW. THESE ARE THE SAME 
PICTURES AND I REPRODUCED THE EXTERNAL INJURIES THAT HE 
HAD, THE SCALP INJURY, FOREHEAD INJURY, AND AROUND THE NOSE 
AND MOUTH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: EXCUSE ME, DR. FRIKKE. WHEN YOU 
REFER TO THESE AND COMPARE THEM TO ANOTHER WOULD YOU USE 
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1 THE EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR THE RECORD? 
2 THE WITNESS: EXHIBIT NO. 34 IS THE SAME HEAD 
3 DIAGRAMS THAT WERE ON EXHIBITS 32 AND 33. SO THIS REPRO-
4 DUCES IN THIS LAYER THE INJURIES ON 32 AND 33. 
5 I'VE ALSO INCLUDED ON EXHIBIT NO. 34 A COUPLE 
6 OF AREAS OF ABNORMALITY ON GAVIN'S SCALP. HE HAD A COUPLE 
7 OF AREAS WHERE HE WAS MISSING HAIR. THE GROSS APPEARANCE 
8 OF THIS IS HE JUST—SOME OF THE HAIR WAS ABSENT, SOME OF 
9 IT WAS BROKEN OFF. THIS CAN BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF EITHER 
10 HAIR PULLING OR A CONDITION CALLED ALOPECIA AREATA WHICH 
11 IS AN INFLAMMATORY DISEASE WHICH CAUSES HAIR TO FALL OUT. 
12 IT'S NOT A SERIOUS INJURY. A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE IT. IT 
13 CAN RESOLVE BY ITSELF BUT THERE DEFINITELY WERE ABNOR-
14 MALITIES ON HIS SCALP. 
15 Q LET ME INTERRUPT YOU FOR A MINUTE, DR. FRIKKE. 
16 DID YOU FOLLOW UP ON THE MISSING HAIR? DID YOU CHECK INTO 
17 GAVIN'S HISTORY TO SEE IF YOU COULD DETERMINE WHAT THE CAUSE 
18 OF THAT MIGHT BE? 
19 A YES. I DID REVIEW GAVIN'S MEDICAL RECORDS THAT 
20 HAD BEEN GENERATED BY HIS PEDIATRICIAN. AND HE HAD BEEN 
21
 SEEN BY THE PEDIATRICIAN BECAUSE HIS MOTHER HAD NOTED THAT 
22 HIS HAIR WAS FALLING OUT. AND IT WAS THE PEDIATRICIAN'S 
23 OPINION THAT THIS WAS ALOPECIA AREATA. 
24 Q WHICH IS A NATURAL— 
25 A IT'S A NATURAL DISEASE PROCESS. THE ONLY WAY 
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TO DIFFERENTIATE HAIR PULLING FROM ALOPECIA AREATA IS TO 
EXAMINE THAT TISSUE UNDER THE MISCROSCOPE. I CHOSE NOT 
TO DO THAT AS PART OF MY EXAMINATION BECAUSE IT WAS SO FAR 
FORWARD AND HE HAS SUCH THIN, LIGHT HAIR, IF I HAD BIOPSIED 
THAT IT WOULD HAVE SHOWED THAT IT WAS SOMETHING AND I THOUGHT] 
IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY DEPRESSING TO HIS PARENTS. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO NEXT AS PART OF YOUR EXAMINATION 
OF GAVIN'S HEAD? 
A OKAY. THE INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF HIS HEAD 
INVOLVES, IN FACT, INCISING THE SCALP AND PULLING IT OFF 
OF THE SKULL SO THAT WE CAN EXAMINE THE INSIDE OF THE SCALP 
SO THAT WE CAN EXAMINE THE LAYER OF TISSUE UNDERNEATH THE 
SCALP CALLED THE SUBGALEAL SPACE AND THEN EXAMINE THE SKULL 
ITSELF. 
WHEN I EXAMINED THE INSIDE OF GAVIN'S SCALP ON 
THE FRONTAL PART OF HIS HEAD WHERE HE HAD THESE BRUISES 
THERE WAS HEMORRHAGING INTO THE SCALP TISSUE ITSELF. THIS 
IS JUST-
MR. METOS: EXCUSE ME, YOUR HONOR. FOR THE RECORDJ 
SHE'S POINTING TO OBJECTS ON AN OVERLAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, WOULD YOU IDENTIFY THAT, 
PLEASE? DESCRIPTIVELY. 
THE WITNESS: WHAT THIS IS IS AN OVERLAY. IT'S 
DEPICTING THE INTERNAL SURFACE OF THE SCALP AND THE OBSER-
VATIONS THAT I MADE THERE WHICH WOULD BE SCALP HEMORRHAGES. 
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1 THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR ABNORMALITY ASSOCIATED 
2 WITH THE SCALP UNDERLYING THE AREA OF ALOPECIA. 
3 THE EXTERNAL EXAMINATION OF THE BACK OF GAVIN'S 
4 SCALP WAS COMPLETELY UNREMARKABLE. IT JUST LOOKED LIKE 
5 A KID'S HEAD. 
6 THIS FIRST OVERLAY FOR THE BACK OF THE HEAD ON 
7 EXHIBIT 3**-S SHOWS WHAT I SAW IN THE INSIDE OF GAVIN'S SCALP, 
8 THERE WAS EXTENSIVE CONFLUENT EXPANTILE HEMORRHAGE INTO 
9 THE SUBGALEAL SPACE. ON THE BACK OF HIS HEAD THERE WAS 
10 SEVERE HEMORRHAGE INTO THE SUBGALEAL TISSUES AND THE SCALP 
11 ON THE BACK OF GAVIN'S HEAD. 
12 THIS HEMORRHAGE—THIS IS LINE—THE LOWER HORI-
13 ZONTAL LINE HERE SHOWS SORT OF THE EDGE OF THE SCALP. AND 
14 THAT'S THE LIMIT WHERE YOUR NECK MUSCLES INSERT INTO THE 
15 BONES OF YOUR SKULL. WHEN WE LOOKED AT THE NECK MUSCLES 
16 THEMSELVES THERE WAS HEMORRHAGE INTO THE NECK MUSCLE ON 
17 THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BACK OF THE NECK. 
18 Q (BY MS. HORNAK) WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THAT 
19 HEMORRHAGE ON THE BACK OF GAVIN'S HEAD? 
20 A IT COMPLETELY COVERED THE BACKSIDE OF HIS HEAD. 
21 IT EXTENDS ANTERIORLY, IT EXTENDS OVER THE TOP, AND IT 
22 EXTENDS TO THE—WE WILL SEE THOSE ON OTHER SET OF EXHIBITS. 
2 3
 THIS WAS A VERY TRAUMATIC HEMORRHAGE. 
24 Q WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION AS TO THE AGE OF THAT 
25 HEMORRHAGE? 
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A THE IMPRESSION THAT WL GET, LOOKING AT IT WITH 
JUST YOUR EYES, THAT THIS WAS A VERY RECENT HEMORRHAGE. 
THE MORE FORMAL WAY OF DETERMINING AGE ON THIS IS TO EXAMINE j 
HIS TISSUE UNDER THE MICROSCOPE, WHICH I DID DO, AS PART 
OF MY EXAMINATION. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE SIGN OF BODY 
REACTION TO THIS INJURY WHICH MEANS THAT IT HAS HAPPENED 
WITHIN A NUMBER OF HOURS OF THE TIME OF DEATH. CERTAINLY 
LESS THAN 12 HOURS. PROBABLY MORE IN THE RANGE OF AT LEAST 
—THERE WAS ENOUGH REACTION TO THINK THAT IT WAS AT LEAST 
FOUR HOURS. IT WAS SOMEWHERE IN THE FOUR TO TWELVE HOUR 
RANGE. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED OR WHAT CAUSED 
THAT TYPE OF INJURY OR HEMORRHAGE? 
A THE SCALP AND THE TISSUES OF THE SCALP ARE BRUISER 
WHENEVER THEY ARE STRUCK BY SOMETHING OR SOMETHING STRIKES 
THE HEAD. THIS IS BRUISING. 
Q WHAT IS THE MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT TYPE 
OF INJURY? 
A MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS IT INDICATES THAT THERE 
WAS FORCE APPLIED TO THAT PART OF THE HEAD. 
AS PART OF THE INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF THIS PART 
OF THE HEAD WHAT WE DID WAS REMOVE ALL OF THIS HEMORRHAGIC 
TISSUE FROM THE SKULL SO THAT WE COULD ACTUALLY OBSERVE 
THE BARE SKULL. AND WHAT I 'M SHOWING YOU IS A SECOND OVER-
LAY THAT SHOWS THE BACK OF GAVIN'S SKULL ON STATE'S EXHIBIT 
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1
 34-S. AND THIS DEMONSTRATES WHAT WE SAW ON THE SKULL, WHICH 
2
 IS THE FRACTURE. IT STARTED HERE AT THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE 
3
 SKULL, OR BASE OF THE SKULL. IN FACT, THE SPINAL CORD COMES 
4
 DOWN HERE. IT STARTED WHERE THE SPINAL CANAL JOINS THE 
5 SKULL, TRAVELED OVER THE BASE OF THE BRAIN AND THEN IT CAME 
6 UP THE BACK OF HIS SKULL, THE OCCIPITAL SKULL. THERE WERE 
7
 SEVERAL LITTLE FRAGMENTS BROKEN OFF HERE AND THEN THERE 
8 WAS SORT OF A WAVY COURSE THAT WENT ACROSS THE WHOLE BACK 
9
 OF HIS SKULL AND CAME ONTO THE RIGHT SIDE OF HIS SKULL. 
10
 AND THEN THERE WERE SEVERAL LITTLE LINEAL SATELLITE FRAC-
11
 TURES RADIATING OFF OF THAT. THIS SKULL FRACTURE, THE EDGES 
12
 OF THE SKULL FRACTURE HAD SEPARATED SO THAT THERE WAS 
13
 ACTUALLY SPACE BETWEEN THE FRACTURED EDGES AND THE SKULL. 
14
 Q WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE EDGES 
15
 OF THE SKULL FRACTURE HAD SEPARATED, IF ANYTHING? 
16
 A THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT IS THAT THE BRAIN INSIDE 
17
 I OF THE SKULL HAD SWOLLEN AND WAS PULLING—WAS PUSHING. 
AS THE BRAIN EXPANDS THE EDGES OF THE FRACTURE WERE SEPAR-
ATING. 
2 0
 | Q WERE YOU ABLE TO DETERMINE THE AGE OF THE SKULL 
21
 ' FRACTURE? 
2 2
 | A I DIDN'T ATTEMPT TO AGE THE SKULL FRACTURE. 
2 3
 I WHEN BONES FRACTURE IT TAKES A NUMBER OF DAYS FOR THERE 
2 4
 I TO BE A GOOD HEALING RESPONSIVE REACTION. MICROSCOPIC AGING 
2 5
 AND SKULL FRACTURES IS A VERY EARLY PHASE OF SOMETHING. 
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Q DR. FRIKKE, WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THAT SKULL 
FRACTURE? 
A THIS PATTERN OF FRACTURING WITH THE RADIATING 
FRACTURES AND THESE LITTLE BROKEN OFF PIECES IS TYPICAL 
• OF IMPACT AGAINST A FAIRLY FLAT SURFACE. THE NATURAL CONTOUR 
OF THE SKULL IS THAT IT'S ROUNDED. AND THIS INDICATES TO 
ME THAT THAT SKULL FLATENED OUT AND CAUSED THIS KIND OF 
A FRACTURE. 
Q WHAT IS THE MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT SKULL 
FRACTURE? 
A THE FACT THAT THE SKULL WAS FRACTURED MEANS THAT 
A LOT OF FORCE WAS APPLIED TO THAT SKULL. 
MS. HORNAK: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY, YES. 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, DO YOU RECOGNIZE 
WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 35? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q WHAT IS THAT? 
A THESE ARE DIAGRAMS OF THE SIDES OF THE CHILD'S 
HEAD AND OVERLAYS SHOWING THE INTERNAL INJURIES. 
MS. HORNAK: ALL RIGHT. STATE WOULD MOVE THAT 
THAT BE ADMITTED AT THIS TIME. 
JUDGE YOUNG*. MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: NO OBJECTION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: 35-S IS RECEIVED. 
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1 I (WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 35 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
2 | INTO EVIDENCE). 
3 
4 THE WITNESS: STATE'S EXHIBIT 35-S IS SIMILAR 
5 TO THE PRECEDING EXHIBIT IN WHICH I STARTED WITH SIDE VIEWS, 
6 DIAGRAMS OF THE HEAD. IN FACT, THESE ARE TAKEN FROM THE 
7 SAME SERIES OF DIAGRAMS AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 32 AND 33. AND 
8 THEY JUST SHOW THE LEFT VIEW AND RIGHT VIEW OF THE HEAD. 
9 AND AGAIN I HAVE REPEATED ON THESE DIAGRAMS THE INJURIES 
10 THAT WERE EVIDENT ON EXTERNAL EXAMINATION—THE FOREHEAD 
11 BRUISE, THE RIGHT SCALP BRUISE, THE INJURIES AROUND THE 
12 NOSE AND THE MOUTH, AND AREAS OF HAIR LOSS ON THE TOP OF 
13 THE SCALP. 
14 WHEN THE SCALP WAS PEELED BACK SO THAT WE COULD 
15 EXAMINE THE INTERNAL SURFACES OF THE SCALP WE SAW THE 
16 INJURIES THAT ARE DEMONSTRATED ON THESE FIRST SET OF OVER-
17 LAYS. AND I'M USING THE SAME CONVENTION AS ON THE PREVIOUS 
18 ONES, THAT THE SCALP SUBGALEAL HEMORRHAGE ARE IN BLUE LINES. 
19 BOTH THE INJURIES TO THE SCALP AND THE FOREHEAD THAT WE 
20 COULD SEE ON THE OUTSIDE HAD ASSOCIATED HEMORRHAGE INTO 
21 THE SCALP. AND WHAT I SAW IS THAT THERE WERE REMAINDER 
22 OF THE SCALP ON THE RIGHT—OR THE LEFT SIDE OF THE HEAD, 
23 THE TEMPORAL REGION, THE PARIETAL REGION AND THE OCCIPITAL 
24 REGION HAD THE SAME PATTERN, INTENSE HEMORRHAGE THAT WE 
25 SAW ON THE BACK OF THE HEAD. 
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ON THE RIGHT SIDE THAT HEMORRHAGE EXTENDED TO 
THE RIGHT AND EXTENDED OVER THE TOP OF THE SCALP OF THE 
HEAD. 
Q SO DR. FRIKKE, THE SUBGALEAL HEMORRHAGE WAS NOT 
ONLY ON THE BACK OF THE HEAD BUT ALSO ON BOTH SIDES OF THE 
HEAD. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. IT WAS VERY EXTENSIVE ON THE 
LEFT SIDE OF THE HEAD AND DID EXTEND ONTO THE RIGHT SIDE 
OF THE HEAD. 
Q WHAT ELSE DOES THAT DIAGRAM DEPICT? I THINK 
YOU MAY HAVE ANOTHER OVERLAY. 
A THE SECOND OVERLAY OF STATE'S EXHIBIT 35-S THAT 
SHOWS THAT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE SKULL THAT FRACTURE THAT 
I SHOWED YOU ON THE PREVIOUS EXHIBIT, WHICH WOULD BE 3<t, 
THAT THE FRACTURE EXTENDS OVER THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE SKULL, 
OVER THE RIGHT PARIETAL BONE AND THE TEMPORAL BONE AND, 
IN FACT, JUST IN FRONT OF THE LEFT EAR. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, I'M HANDING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED 
AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 36. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THIS? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q WHAT IS THAT? 
A THIS IS A SET OF DIAGRAMS THAT ALSO ILLUSTRATE, 
REPEAT THE ILLUSTRATION OF THE SKULL FRACTURES AND THEN 
ILLUSTRATE THE ABNORMALITIES THAT WE FOUND INSIDE OF GAVIN'S 
SKULL. 
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1
 MS. HORNAK: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE WOULD MOVE 
2 FOR THE ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 36. 
3
 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. METOS? 
4
 MR. METOS: NO OBJECTION. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: RECEIVED. 
6
 (WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 36 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
7
 INTO EVIDENCE). 
8 
9
 Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, WOULD YOU PLEASE 
10
 EXPLAIN FOR THE JURY WHAT THAT DIAGRAM SHOWS? 
11
 A STATE'S EXHIBIT 36 IS A DIAGRAM OF THE HUMAN 
12 SKULL. FRONTAL, POSTERIOR, RIGHT LATERAL AND LEFT LATERAL, 
13
 THESE ARE DIAGRAMS OF AN ADULT SKULL. THEY'RE NOT EXACTLY 
14
 I REPRESENTATIVE OF A CHILD'S SKULL BUT THEY'RE THE ONLY DIA-
GRAMS WE HAVE. THE CHILD'S SKULL, THIS JOINT BETWEEN THE 
POINT IS A LITTLE MORE ANTERIORLY. THIS IS A CORONAL SUTURE 
17
 | THIS IS THE LAMBDOID SUTURE. AND ON A CHILD IT'S ALSO A 
18
 I LITTLE MORE ANTERIOR BECAUSE THE RELATIVE PORTIONS OF THE 
19
 I BRAIN ARE DIFFERENT, BUT THE ANATOMY IS THE SAME. 
2 0
 I WHAT I HAVE REPEATED ON STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 36 
IS THE DIAGRAM OF THE SKULL FRACTURE. YOU CAN SEE IT COMES 
OFF THE BASE OF THE SKULL, GOES UP THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE 
2 3
 | OCCIPITAL BONE, CROSSES THE OCCIPITAL JOINTS, CROSSES THE 
2 4
 ' RIGHT PARIETAL BONE AND THEN COMES DOWN ON THE LEFT TEMPORAL 
BONE. THIS IS WHERE THE EAR WOULD BE. IT TERMINATES 
317 
U000U9 
15 
16 
21 
22 
25 
10 
11 
1 ANTERIOR TO THE EAR, 
2
 THE NEXT PART OF THE INTERNAL EXAMINATION ON 
3
 THE HEAD IS TO, IN FACT, REMOVE THIS PART OF THE BONE SO 
4
 THAT WE CAN LOOK AT THEM, THERE ARE SPACES INSIDE THE SKULL, 
5 AND EXAMINE THE TISSUES INSIDE OF THE SKULL. 
6
 THE FIRST OVERLAY ON STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 36 IS 
7 A SERIES OF VERTICAL YELLOW LINES. AND WHAT THIS IS IS 
8 THE PATTERN OF SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE THAT WE OBSERVED IN 
9
 I GAVIN'S HEAD. THE SUBDURAL SPACE IS A SPACE THAT COMPLETELY 
SURROUNDS THE BRAIN, IT COMPLETELY SURROUNDS THE SPINAL 
CORD, IT IS A SPACE THAT IS VERY NARROW, LIKE A QUARTER 
12 | OF AN INCH THICK, AND IT IS FILLED WITH CEREBRAL SPINAL 
13 I FLUID. THE SAME FLUID THAT WE SAMPLED IN DOING THE LUMBAR 
14
 I PUCTURE. 
15
 I Q DR. FRIKKE, THIS IS SEPARATE THAN THE SUBGALEAL 
HEMORRHAGE THAT YOU DESCRIBED EARLIER? 
A YES. THIS IS A SPACE THAT'S INSIDE THE SKULL. 
IT'S NOT OUTSIDE OF THE SKULL. IT'S INSIDE OF THE SKULL. 
THIS IS A SPACE THAT WE SEE WHEN WE REMOVE THE SKULL. 
Q WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THAT HEMORRHAGE? 
A BASICALLY THE ENTIRE SUBDURAL SPACE HAD BLOOD 
IN IT. THE NORMAL FLUID THAT'S IN THERE IS CLEAR, COLOR-
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
2 3
 I LESS. IT LOOKS LIKE WATER. THIS SPACE, HE HAD HEMORRHAGED 
2 4
 I INTO THE SUBDURAL SPACE SO THE ENTIRE SUBDURAL SPACE IN 
2 5
 I THE SKULL—AND, IN FACT, WHEN WE DID THE SPINAL EXAMINATION 
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THE SUBDURAL SPACE IN THE SPINAL CORD ALSO WAS FILLED WITH 
BLOOD. 
Q WHAT COULD HAVE CAUSED THE SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE? 
A SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE TYPICALLY OCCURS WHEN EITHER 
THE HEAD IS WHIPLASHED BACK AND FORTH SO THAT THE BRAIN 
AND SKULL ARE MOVING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS OR WHEN THE 
HEAD IS ACTUALLY STRUCK. THE SUBDURAL SPACE IS CROSSED 
BY VERY DELICATE LITTLE VEINS THAT ARE COMING OUT OF THE 
BRAIN AND GOING TO THE SKULL. AND THE DELICATE LITTLE VEINS 
10 I CAN GET TORN AND YOU GET HEMORRHAGE INTO THE SUBDURAL SPACE. 
11 Q AND WERE YOU ABLE TO DETERMINE THE AGE OF THE 
12 SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE? 
13 A NO. ASSESSING THE AGE OF A SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE 
14 REQUIRES THAT, ONE, THAT THE BLOOD BE CLOTTED AND STUCK, 
15 OR ADHERENT TO THE DURA. AND IT WASN'T IN THIS CASE. IT 
16 WAS STILL LIQUID. AND THEN MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION WE DON'T 
1? START SEEING ANY KIND OF ORGANIZATION FOR SEVERAL DAYS. 
18 Q ALL RIGHT. WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE SIGNIFICANT 
19 THAT YOU NOTED ABOUT THE SUBDURAL HEMORRHAGE? 
20 A NO. 
21 Q WHAT ELSE IS INDICATED ON THE DIAGRAM, DR. FRlKKE"j 
22 A THE NEXT OVERLAY SHOWS THE INJURIES THAT WERE 
23 PRESENT IN THE SPACE THAT WE HAVE CALLED THE SUBARACHNOID 
24 SPACE. THE BRAIN ITSELF IS COVERED WITH A VERY DELICATE 
25
 [ TRANSPARENT MEMBRANE THAT CONTAINS A LOT OF BLOOD VESSELS. 
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THIS MEMBRANE IS CALLED THE ARACHNOID MEMBRANE. YOU CAN 
SEE THROUGH IT. IT HAS A LOT OF LITTLE BLOOD VESSELS THAT 
YOU CAN SEE WITH YOUR EYES AND SEE WITH THE MISCROSCOPE 
AND IT COVERS, COMPLETELY COVERS THE BRAIN AND HAS A THIN 
LAYER OF CEREBRAL SPINAL FLUID UNDERNEATH IT BETWEEN THE 
BRAIN AND THE ARACHNOID. AND SO BLOOD, IF THERE IS GOING 
TO BE A HEMORRHAGE, BLOOD CAN ACCUMULATE IN THE SUBARACHNOID 
SPACE. AND WHAT WE SAW ON GAVIN WAS THAT HE HAD A SUBARACH-
NOID HEMORRHAGE HERE ON WHAT WOULD BE THE RIGHT OCCIPITAL 
LOBE. YOU REMEM3ER, THE BRAIN HAS TWO LOBES THAT ARE SEPAR-
ATED. AND IT WAS ON THE INFERIOR SURFACE OF THE RIGHT 
OCCIPITAL LOBE. AND THEN OVER THE TOP OF THE BRAIN ON BOTH 
THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT SIDE ON THE TOPS OF THE PARIETAL 
LOBES. 
Q WERE YOU ABLE TO DETERMINE THE AGE OF THIS SUB-
ARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE? 
A I DID EXAMINE IT AT THESE POSITIONS. I DID 
EXAMINE THE SUBARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE THAT OCCURRED IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH ANOTHER BRAIN INJURY THAT WE DID ASSESS AGE 
ON. 
Q WHAT WERE YOU ABLE TO DETERMINE? 
A MY OPINION WAS THAT THE INJURIES TO GAVIN'S 
BRAIN—IF I COULD SHOW THE NEXT OVERLAY, SHOW WHERE WE 
ACTUALLY DID THAT DETERMINATION. 
Q SURE. 
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A THE THIRD OVERLAY ILLUSTRATES THE INJURIES TO 
THE BRAIN ITSELF. ALL OF THESE OTHER INJURIES HAVE BEEN 
INJURIES TO THINGS THAT ARE AROUND THE BRAIN. THESE PURPLE 
MARKS ON STATE'S EXHIBIT 36 SHOW THE INJURIES TO THE BRAIN 
ITSELF. AND WHAT THESE ARE IS WHAT WE CALL CEREBRAL CONTU-
SIONS. THEY ARE ACTUALLY BRUISES OF THE BRAIN. THE BRAIN 
IS TORN, IT HEMORRHAGES, AND SO YOU GET WHAT IS LIKE BRUISES 
THERE IS HEMORRHAGE INTO THE SUBARACHNOID SPACES ASSOCIATED 
WITH THESE. THERE'S HEMORRHAGE INTO THE TISSUE OF THE BRAIN 
10 I ITSELF AND THE BRAIN ITSELF IS TORN. AND THESE ARE AT THE 
11 TIPS OF THE FRONTAL LOBES. THIS IS WHERE GAVIN'S BRAIN 
12 WAS INJURED. 
13 THIS, RIGHT BEHIND HIS FOREHEAD AND ABOVE HIS 
M EYES, THIS IS EXACTLY OPPOSITE OF WHERE THE SKULL FRACTURES 
15 WERE. THESE ARE THE CONTRECOUP INJURIES THAT I WAS TALKING 
1« ABOUT EARLIER IN MY TESTIMONY. AND THESE ARE THE AREAS 
1? WHERE WE DO THE MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION TO TRY TO DETERMINE 
'• HOW OLD THE INJURY TO THE BRAIN WAS. AND THIS IS THE LOCA-
1* TION WHERE OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT THOSE INJURIES ARE 
2 0
 PROBABLY IN THE RANGE OF FIVE TO SIX HOURS OLD. 
21 Q DR. FRIKKE, WHAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE INJURIES 
2 2
 TO THE BRAIN ITSELF? 
M A THIS PATTERN OF FRONTAL LOBE CONTUSIONS TYPICALLY 
2 4
 OCCURS WHEN A MOVING HEAD IS STRUCK ON THE BACK. THE BACK 
2 5
 OF THE HEAD STRIKES AND THE HEAD IS MOVING AND THE BACK 
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OF THE HEAD STRIKES A RELATIVELY IMMOBILE SURFACE. THE 
BACK OF THE HEAD FRACTURES, THE BACK OF THE SKULL FRACTURES, 
THE BRAIN BOUNCES FORWARD AND INJURES THE TIP OF THE FRONTAL 
LOBES. 
Q AND WHAT AMOUNT OF FORCE ARE WE TALKING ABOUT 
WHEN YOU MENTION THE BACK OF THE HEAD HITTING THE FLAT 
SURFACE? 
A THE DEGREE, THE AMOUNT OF FORCE THAT IS REQUIRED 
IS SOMETHING THAT WE CAN'T MEASURE IN CHILDREN. WE CAN'T 
MEASURE IN ADULTS EITHER. FOR ETHICAL REASONS WE CAN'T 
DO THESE EXPERIMENTS AND FOR BIOLOGICAL REASONS EVERY SCALP, 
EVERY SKULL, EVERY HEAD IS DIFFERENT. I CAN'T GIVE YOU 
A NUMBER. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, OTHER THAN THE INJURIES THAT YOU 
DESCRIBED ON THE HEAD DID YOUR EXTERNAL EXAMINATION ALSO 
DISCOVER ANY OTHER INTERNAL INJURIES? 
A THERE WERE NO OTHER INJURIES IN THE SUBSTANCE 
OF THE BRAIN ITSELF. I'VE ALREADY DESCRIBED THE INJURIES 
THAT I SAW ON THE INSIDE OF THE TONGUE WHICH, YOU KNOW, 
IS BASICALLY AN INTERNAL INJURY. 
THE SUBARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE THAT I DESCRIBE UP 
HERE IN THE INSIDE OF THE HEAD ITSELF, IN FACT, EXTENDS 
DOWN THE SPINAL CORD WHICH COMES OUT HERE SO THAT ALL THE 
WAY DOWN THE SPINAL CANAL THERE WAS SUBDURAL BLOOD. AND 
THAT'S JUST A CONTINUATION OF THE SAME PROCESS THAT'S GOING 
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1 ON INSIDE OF THE HEAD. 
2
 Q WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE SIGNIFICANT ABOUT THE 
3 HEAD INJURIES THAT YOU'VE DESCRIBED TO THE JURY OTHER THAN 
* WHAT YOU'VE TOLD US? 
5 A ON GROSS EXAMINATION I DIDN'T SEE ANY OTHER ABNOR-
* MALITIES. 
7
 Q DR. FRIKKE, DID YOU ALSO EXAMINE THE NECK AND 
* CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM OF GAVIN? 
9
 A YES, I DID. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK IF WE'RE CHANGING 
M DIRECTION SHOULD WE TAKE OUR NOON RECESS AT THIS TIME? 
12 MS. HORNAK: THIS IS PROBABLY— 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: LET'S TAKE OUR NOON RECESS AT THIS 
*« TIME. WE WILL RECONVENE AT 1:30. 
'5 AGAIN, REMEMBER THE CAUTION THAT I GAVE TO THE 
'< JURY YESTERDAY ABOUT NOT DISCUSSING THE CASE WITH ANYONE 
17
 ELSE. RETURN SO WE CAN CONVENE AT THAT TIME. WE WILL BE 
18
 IN RECESS. 
19
 CRECESS). 
ZO 
21
 JUDGE YOUNG: DR. FRIKKE, IF YOU WILL RESUME 
22
 THE WITNESS SEAT. 
2
* Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, BEFORE WE BROKE 
24
 FOR LUNCH YOU WERE STARTING TO TELL US IF YOU DID AN EXAMIN-
25
 ATION, INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF GAVIN'S NECK AND CENTRAL 
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NERVOUS SYSTEM. DID YOU DO SUCH AN EXAMINATION? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND DID YOU DISCOVER SOME INJURIES THERE? 
A YES, I DID. 
MS. HORNAK: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE WOULD MOVE 
FOR ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT NO. 37. 
JUDGE YOUNG: STATE'S EXHIBIT 37. ANY OBJECTION, 
MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: NO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 37 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, WOULD YOU PLEASE 
STEP BACK DOWN TO THE EASEL? SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED 
AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 37. CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT THAT IS? 
A STATE'S EXHIBIT 37 IS A DIAGRAM OF THE SKULL 
VERTEBRAL COLUMN AND THE RIB CAGE SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM. 
Q DID YOU DRAW THAT DIAGRAM? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WILL YOU PLEASE PUT IT ON THE EASEL? 
CWITNESS COMPLIES). 
Q DR. FRIKKE, USING THE DIAGRAM AND THE POINTER, 
AGAIN, WILL YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY THE INJURIES 
THAT YOU DISCOVERED ON GAVIN IN THE NECK AREA? 
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A THE INJURIES THAT I HAVE DIAGRAMED ON STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 37 ARE TWO INJURIES. BOTH HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED 
WITH RED INK. I'VE REPEATED THE ILLUSTRATION OF THE SKULL 
FRACTURE CROSSING THE LEFT OCCIPITAL BONE, THE LEFT PARIETAL 
BONE AND THE LEFT TEMPORAL BONE ENDING JUST ANTERIOR TO 
THE EAR. 
THE SECOND INJURY THAT WAS IDENTIFIED ON THE 
INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF GAVIN ADAMS WAS A VERTEBRAL FRACTURE, 
THE FRACTURE WAS LOCATED AT THE JUNCTION OF THE NECK WITH 
10 I THE CHEST, OR THE THORACIC VERTEBRAL COLUMN. THIS FRACTURE 
11 INVOLVED THE VERTEBRAL BODIES OR THE MAIN STRUCTURE, THE 
12 STRUCTURAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF THE SEVENTH CERVICAL VERTE-
13 BRAE, THE INTERVERTEBRAL DISK AND THE FIRST THORACIC VERTE-
,4
 BRAE. THESE AREAS OF THE BONE WERE CRUSHED AND FRACTURED. 
15 ASSOCIATED WITH THAT FRACTURE WAS VERY EXTENSIVE 
1* I HEMORRHAGE, AND TO THE TISSUES THAT SURROUND THIS FRACTURE. 
THESE ARE THE CONNECTIONS OF LIGAMENTS OF THE VERTEBRAL 
18
 I COLUMN, THE SOFT TISSUES THAT SURROUND THE TRACHEA AND 
19
 ESOPHAGUS THAT ARE COMING DOWN ANTERIOR TO THIS AREA AND 
2 0
 THE TISSUES IN THE UPPER PART OF THE CHEST, INCLUDING THOSE 
21
 AREAS AROUND THE TRACHEA AND ESOPHAGUS AND THE GREAT VESSELS 
2 2
 I OF THE BLOOD VESSELS WHICH ARE GOING TO GO UP INTO THE NECK 
AND OUT INTO THE ARMS. 
Q THANK YOU, DR. FRIKKE. YOU CAN RETURN TO YOUR 
SEAT. 
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23 
24 
25 
(WITNESS COMPLIES). 
Q WERE YOU ABLE TO FORM AN OPINION AS TO THE AGE 
OF THE FRACTURE IN THE NECK? 
A I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DO ANY FORMAL MICROSCOPIC 
DETERMINATIONS. THIS, THE BONE FRACTURES, CANNOT BE DATED 
IN A PERIOD OF TIME LESS THAN A DAY OR TWO. THE SOFT TISSUE 
INJURIES THAT OCCURRED IN THAT PART OF THE BODY, I THOUGHT, 
AND SUM TOTAL OF THINGS, WERE CONSISTENT WITH HAVING BEEN 
INFLICTED AT THE SAME TIME AS THE HEAD INJURIES. AND SO 
10 I MY ASSESSMENT OF AGE IS BASED ON THE INJURIES OF THE HEAD. 
11 Q WOULD YOUR OPINION BE THEN THAT THE HEAD AND 
12 NECK INJURIES OCCURRED AT THE SAME TIME? 
13 A THAT IS MY OPINION, YES. 
14 Q DID YOU ALSO EXAMINE THE EYES OF GAVIN? 
15 A YES, I DID. 
!« Q DID YOU NOTE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT ABOUT HIS EYES? 
17 A WHEN I REMOVED GAVIN'S EYES—THE EYES ARE ATTACHED 
18 TO THE BRAIN VIA THE OPTIC NERVES. AND THE OPTIC NERVES 
19 HAD HEMORRHAGE AROUND THEIR SURFACES. I SAW THAT WHEN I 
20 EXAMINED THE EYES, WHEN I REMOVED THEM. I REQUESTED THAT 
21 THOSE EYES BE EXAMINED BY A SPECIALIST IN EYE PATHOLOGY. 
22 AND HE CONCURRED WITH THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS SUBARACHNOID 
2J HEMORRHAGE ON THE OPTIC NERVES. 
14
 Q WHAT WOULD THAT SUBARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE MEAN? 
25 I WHAT DOES THAT INDICATE? 
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A IT HAS THE SAME SIGNIFICANCE AS A SUBARACHNOID 
HEMORRHAGE ELSEWHERE ON THE BRAIN AND THE SPINAL CORD THAT 
THAT PART OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYTEM WAS INJURED. 
Q BASED UPON YOUR OBSERVATIONS AND WHAT YOU'VE 
DETAILED FOR THE JURY OF THE HEAD AND NECK INJURIES COULD 
YOU DETERMINE WHAT HAD CAUSED THESE INJURIES? 
A I FORMED AN OPINION. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT OPINION? 
A MY OPINION WAS THAT THE HEAD AND THE NECK 
10 I INJURIES GO TOGETHER AS A MECHANISM OF INJURY, WHICH INV0LVES| 
11 THE HEAD BEING SWUNG OR MOVED FORCIBLY AGAINST A RELATIVELY 
12 FIXED OBJECT SUCH AS THE HEAD IS IN MOTION, COMES TO REST 
13 AGAINST A FAIRLY FIXED OBJECT, INCURS THE INJURIES TO THE 
14 SCALP, THE SKULL AND THE BRAIN, THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED, AND 
15 IN THE COURSE OF THAT INJURY THE NECK, THE HEAD IS FORCIBLY 
1« FLEXED FORWARD ON THE NECK SUCH THAT THE NECK, THE ANGLE 
17 OF FLEX OF THE NECK EXCEEDS THE MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF 
18
 THE VERTEBRAL COLUMN AND SO IT COLLAPSES AND IT WAS A FRAC-
19 TURE. 
2 0
 Q WHERE ON THE HEAD WOULD IT COME IN CONTACT WITH 
21
 THIS FIXED SURFACE? 
22
 A IN MY OPINION THE CONTACT POINT ON THE HEAD WAS 
25
 ON THE BACK, PROBABLY TO THE RIGHT OF THE MIDLINE. 
24
 J Q WOULD IT ALSO BE POSSIBLE FOR AN AFFIXED OBJECT 
TO BE MOVED HITTING THE BACK OF THE HEAD? 25 
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A I THINK THAT IS CONSIDERABLY LESS LIKELY. THE 
INJURIES THAT I OBSERVED ON GAVIN'S HEAD ARE NOT TYPICALLY 
THOSE SEEN WHEN A STATIONARY HEAD IS STRUCK WITH A MOVING 
OBJECT. 
Q DID YOU NOTICE ANY EXTERNAL LACERATIONS OR 
INJURIES THAT WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNAL INJURIES 
THAT YOU OBSERVED IN GAVIN'S HEAD? 
A THERE WERE NO EXTERNAL INJURIES ON THE BACK OR 
THE LEFT SIDE OF GAVIN'S SCALP THAT COULD BE SEEN ON EXTER-
10 I NAL EXAMINATION. 
U Q WOULD YOU EXPECT TO SEE ANY TYPE OF EXTERNAL 
12 INJURIES CONSISTENT WITH THESE INTERNAL INJURIES? 
13 A NOT NECESSARILY, NO. 
14 Q WHY IS THAT? 
15 A IF THE IMPACTING SURFACE IS SMOOTH, HAS NO PRO-
!« TRUDING RIDGES OR KNOBS OR TEXTURAL SURFACES, ONE WOULD 
17
 NOT NECESSARILY OBSERVE INJURIES ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE SCALP. 
18 Q YOU EXPLAINED EARLIER TO THE JURY THE CONTRECOUP 
19
 INJURY. 
*° A CORRECT. 
*! Q IS THAT WHAT HAPPENED TO GAVIN IN THIS CASE? 
** A THAT'S MY INTERPRETATION OF THE OBSERVATIONS 
*• THAT I MADE IS THAT THE INJURIES TO THE FRONT OF HIS BRAIN 
1 4
 WERE CONTRECOUP INJURIES. 
2 5
 Q IS A CHILD'S HEAD MORE FLEXIBLE THAN AN ADULT'S 
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1 HEAD? 
2 A THE SKULL IS MORE FLEXIBLE IN A CHILD THAN IN 
3 AN ADULT. 
4 Q AND WHAT'S THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT? WHAT DOES 
5 THAT MEAN? 
« A THAT MEANS THAT THE CHILD'S SKULL WILL DEFORM 
7 MORE READILY THAN WILL AN ADULT SKULL. IT ALSO MEANS THAT 
8 THE SKULL CAN SNAP BACK INTO ITS ORIGINAL CONFIRMATION MORE 
9 READILY THAN WILL AN ADULT SKULL. 
10 Q DID YOU ALSO DO AN INTERNAL EXAMINATION OR MICRO-
11 SCOPIC EXAMINATION OF GAVIN'S LUNGS? 
12 A YES, I DID. 
13 Q DID YOU OBSERVE ANYTHING UNUSUAL IN GAVIN'S LUNGS?) 
14 A GAVIN'S LUNGS HAVE A VERY UNUSUAL INJURY PATTERN 
15 IN PATHOLOGY TERMS. WE CALL IT FOREIGN BODY INFLAMMATION 
16 AND REACTION. WHAT GAVIN HAS IS IN ALL REGIONS OF HIS LUNG 
17 IS ASPIRATOR INHALED FOREIGN MATERIALS THAT LOOKED TO 
18 BE PLANT OR VEGETABLE MATERIAL. THESE LITTLE MICROSCOPICALLY! 
19 RECOGNIZABLE PIECES OF PLANT MATERIAL ARE IN ALL REGIONS 
20 OF HIS LUNGS INCLUDING THE LARGER AIRWAYS AND THE MICROSCOPIC; 
21 AIRWAYS. AND THE BODY HAS REACTED TO THOSE PIECES OF PLANT 
22 MATERIAL. IT HAS MANIFESTED A REACTION WHICH WE CALL A 
21 FOREIGN BODY REACTION, WHICH IS, VERY LARGE CELLS COME INTO 
24 THAT AREA AND TRY TO COVER UP OR ENGULF THOSE FOREIGN OBJECTS; 
25 SO THEY ARE NO LONGER AN IRRITANT TO THE BODY. AND HE HAD 
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1 THOSE IN ALL SECTIONS OF HIS LUNGS. 
2 Q IS IT POSSIBLE THIS WAS JUST FOOD THAT HE HAD 
* DIGESTED EARLIER? 
4 A DIGESTION OCCURS IN THE GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM. 
5 THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS WITH FOOD THAT IS SWALLOWED. FOOD 
« MATERIALS, WHICH THIS COULD BE, WHICH GO INTO THE LUNGS, 
t WHICH IS AN ABNORMAL LOCATION FOR FOOD, WILL INCITE THIS 
* FOREIGN BODY INFLAMMATION REACTION. 
* Q SO WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOREIGN BODIES 
10 THAT YOU FOUND IN HIS LUNGS? WHAT DID THAT INDICATE TO 
11 YOU? 
12 A IT INDICATED TO ME THAT AT LEAST ON ONE OCCASION 
13 IN THE PAST GAVIN HAS HAD A VERY SEVERE CHOKING EPISODE 
14 IN WHICH HE GOT PLANT MATERIAL, FOODS, INTO HIS LUNGS IN 
15 A VERY FLORID PATTERN WHICH IS NOT TYPICAL OF WHAT WE SEE 
1« FROM NORMAL CHILDREN. 
17 Q 1 BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT GAVIN WAS 
18
 PRONOUNCED DEAD AT 3:00 O'CLOCK ON MARCH 20TH. 
19 A WE WERE TOLD HE WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD AT 3:00 
2 0
 O'CLOCK. WHEN I REVIEWED THE EMERGENCY ROOM RECORDS FROM 
21
 PIONEER VALLEY—IN FACT, THEY STOPPED HIS RESUSCITATION 
22
 EFFORTS AT 3:10. 
*l Q WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO HAVE SOMEONE DECLARED DEAD? 
24
 I A DECLARATION OF DEATH IS THE STATEMENT OF ANY 
PERSON WHO IS PRESENT AT THE SCENE AND WHO HAS ANY DEGREE 
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1 OF LIFE SAVING AND LIFE ASSESSMENT MEDICAL SKILLS IN THEIR 
2 OPINION THAT PATIENT CAN NO LONGER BE REASONABLY EXPECTED 
3 TO BE RESUSCITATED AND LIFE SAVINGS MEASURES ARE STOPPED. 
4 Q WHEN WERE THE INJURIES ON GAVIN INFLICTED IN 
5 HIS HEAD AND NECK INJURY IN RELATION TO WHEN HE WAS PRO-
« NOUNCED DEAD AT 3:10? 
7 A IT'S MY OPINION THAT THE INJURIES TO HIS BRAIN 
8 WERE INFLICTED PROBABLY FIVE TO SIX HOURS BEFORE HE WAS 
9 DECLARED DEAD. 
10 Q AND HOW DO YOU COME UP WITH—HOW DO YOU FORM 
11 THAT OPINION? 
12 A WHEN THE BRAIN IS INJURED IT UNDERGOES A SERIES 
13 OF CHANGES. THE CELLS THAT FORM THE BRAIN ARE GOING TO 
14 RESPOND TO THE INJURY. 
15 IN THE FRONTAL LOBES WHERE HE HAD THESE BRUISINGS 
16 THE BLOOD SUPPLY IN THAT IMMEDIATE AREA IS INTERRUPTED 
17 BECAUSE THOSE BLOOD VESSELS ARE TORN AND SO THEY ARE NO 
1* LONGER CONDUCTING BLOOD TO THE NERVE CELLS THAT THEY SHOULD 
19 BE SUPPLYING THAT BLOOD TO. THESE NERVE CELLS ARE GOING 
20 TO DIE BECAUSE THEY ARE NO LONGER GETTING A BLOOD SUPPLY. 
21 THE CELLS THAT SURROUND THOSE NERVE CELLS ARE ALSO GOING— 
22 THE FILLER CELLS OF THE BRAIN GANGLIAL CELLS ARE NO LONGER 
23 GOING TO BE RECEIVING THE OXYGEN THEY SHOULD BE GETTING. 
24 THE CHANGES THAT OCCUR IN THE PROCESS OF THOSE 
2 5
 CELLS DYING OCCUR OVER A CONTINUM OF TIME AND VERY 
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1 IMMEDIATELY AFTER THOSE CELLS ARE INJURED THERE IS-NO CHANGE 
2 THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY WITH OUR EYES USING A LIGHT MICROSCOPE. 
3 THE VERY EARLIEST CHANGES THAT CAN BE SEEN OCCUR IN THE 
4 RANGE OF FOUR OR FIVE OR SIX HOURS AFTER THE INJURY HAS 
5 OCCURRED. THOSE ARE THE VERY FIRST, MOST SUBTLE CHANGES 
6 THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY LOOKING AT THOSE CELLS WITH A LIGHT 
1 MICROSCOPE. THOSE ARE THE CHANGES THAT WE HAVE IDENTIFIED 
8 IN THE FRONTAL LOBES OF GAVIN ADAMS. 
9 Q WOULD IT BE YOUR OPINION THEN, DR. FRIKKE, THAT 
10 THESE INJURIES OCCURRED AT ABOUT 9:00 OR 10:00 O'CLOCK ON 
H THE MORNING OF MARCH 20TH? 
12 A THAT WOULD FIT OUR ASSESSMENT AS TO THE INTERVAL 
13 BETWEEN INJURY AND THE TIME OF DEATH. 
14 Q WHEN GAVIN INCURRED THESE INJURIES WOULD HE SHOW 
15 ANY SYMPTOMS? 
16
 A I THINK IT'S QUITE PROBABLE THAT HE DID. 
17
 Q WHAT SYMPTOMS WOULD HE SHOW? 
18
 A I THINK A NORMAL CHILD WHO HAS INCURRED THIS 
19
 INJURY TO HIS SCALP AND HIS SKULL, HIS BRAIN, WOULD, IF 
2 0
 HE IS CONSCIOUS, SHOW SIGNS OF PAIN, CRYING, FUSSING, WHAT-
21
 EVER THAT CHILD'S USUAL REACTION TO PAIN IS. IT IS POSSIBLE 
2 2
 THAT THIS CHILD WITH THIS DEGREE OF INJURY WOULD HAVE BECOME 
2 8
 IMMEDIATELY UNCONSCIOUS. IT'S ALSO POSSIBLE THAT HE WOULD 
2 4
 I HAVE RETAINED CONSCIOUSNESS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BECAUSE 
WE KNOW THAT HE DID DEVELOP CEREBRAL EDEMA. HIS BRAIN 
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1 SWELLED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS INJURY AND IT'S POSSIBLE 
2 THAT IF HE WAS CONSCIOUS AFTER THE INJURY WAS INFLICTED 
3 THAT HE PROGRESSIVELY LOST CONSCIOUSNESS AS A RESULT OF 
4 HIS BRAIN SWELLING. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS ALERT, LESS 
5 REACTIVE, POTENTIALLY HE COULD HAVE HAD SEIZURES AND EVEN-
6 TUALLY WOULD HAVE BECOME UNCONSCIOUS AND COMMATOSE. 
7 Q HOW SOON WOULD THESE SYMPTOMS APPEAR AFTER THE 
8 INJURIES? 
9 A I CAN'T PREDICT THAT WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY 
10 BECAUSE I KNOW THAT THERE ARE CHILDREN WHO GO IMMEDIATELY 
11 UNCONSCIOUS AS A RESULT OF BLOWS TO THE HEAD. OTHER CHILDREN 
12 DO HAVE SOME LUCID INTERVAL AND THEN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF 
13 THE SWELLING THEY WILL LOSE CONSCIOUSNESS. SO I CAN'T PRE-
14 DICT. 
15 Q DR. FRIKKE, WOULD THESE INJURIES BE HIGHLY CON-
'S SI STENT WITH A FALL FROM A BUNK BED TO A CARPETED FLOOR, 
1? THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE FLOOR AND THE BED APPROXIMATELY 
18
 53 INCHES? 
1* MR. METOS: I'LL OBJECT WITHOUT FURTHER FOUN-
2 0
 DATION. 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION'S OVERRULED. 
2 2
 A CBY THE WITNESS) IN MY OPINION THIS COLLECTION 
2J
 OF INJURIES THAT GAVIN HAS IS HIGHLY INCONSISTENT WITH A 
2 4
 I FALL FROM THAT DISTANCE. 
Q WHY IS THAT, DR. FRIKKE? 
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A IN MY EXPERIENCE AND IN MY READING OF THE LITER-
ATURE, WHICH IS THE COLLECTED EXPERIENCE OF OTHER FORENSIC 
PATHOLOGISTS AND OTHER PHYSICIANS WHO CARE FOR CHILDREN 
WHO HAVE BEEN INJURED, CHILDREN WHO FALL FROM THE HEIGHT 
OF USUALLY HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE OR DISTANCES WITHIN THE HOUSE 
DO NOT SUSTAIN FATAL HEAD INJURIES. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, I BELIEVE THAT YOU INDICATED YOU 
RELIED UPON YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE AS WELL AS STUDIES AND 
EXPERIENCES OF OTHER PHYSICIANS OR PEOPLE IN YOUR AREA. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH SOME STUDIES THAT ADDRESS 
THE SUBJECT OF CHILDREN FALLING FROM BEDS? 
A YES. 
Q AND SPECIFICALLY ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE STUDY 
THAT WAS PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICIANS SURGERY 
IN 1983, A NEW YORK STUDY, ENTITLED TEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
WITH FALLS FROM HEIGHTS IN CHILDREN? 
A YES, I AM FAMILIAR WITH THAT STUDY. 
Q WHAT DID THAT STUDY INDICATE? 
A THIS PAPER WAS PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL OF PEDIA-
TRICS WHICH IS A REFEREE JOURNAL. PEOPLE DO STUDIES, THEY 
SUBMIT THE RESULTS OF THEIR STUDIES. 
MR. METOS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK I NEED TO OBJECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: JUST A MOMENT, PLEASE. 
MR. METOS: YOUR HONOR; OBJECTION. 
33^ 
nnOGSJG 
25 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. METOS? 
2 MR. METOS: I NEED TO OBJECT TO THIS LINE OF 
3 QUESTIONING. WE'RE GETTING INTO SOME HEARSAY. IF SHE READ 
4 THE ARTICLES AND REACHED A GENERAL CONCLUSION BASED ON HER 
5 EXPERIENCE AND HER KNOWLEDGE IN READING OF THE MATERIALS 
« I THINK WE CAN TALK ABOUT THAT, BUT IF WE'RE GOING INTO 
1 THE SPECIFICS OF INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES — 
• JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION'S OVERRULED. SHE 
9 MAY TESTIFY TO IT. 
10 MR. METOS: ALL RIGHT. 
11 A CBY THE WITNESS) THIS IS A STUDY THAT WAS CON-
12 DUCTED IN HARLEM, WHICH IS IN NEW YORK CITY. AND WHAT THEY 
13 DID WAS REVIEW THE EXPERIENCE IN CHILDREN WHO WERE BROUGHT 
14 TO HARLEM HOSPITAL CENTER. AND THESE ARE CHILDREN WHO HAVE 
15 FALLEN. AND THEY ARE DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH FREE FALLS. 
1« THESE ARE FALLS IN WHICH THE POINT OF EXIT AND THE POINT 
17 OF IMPACT IS A FREE FALL. THERE ARE NO INTERVENING OBJECTS 
18
 FOR WHICH THE BODY WILL HAVE A TEMPORARY REST. 
19 THEY REPORTED ON THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH CHILDREN 
2 0
 WHO WERE 16 YEARS OLD OF AGE OR LESS. 
21
 IN THE PERIOD THAT THEY STUDIED, 61 CHILDREN 
2 2
 WERE BROUGHT TO THEIR HOSPITAL WHO HAD, WHO FIT THIS CRITERIA 
2J
 OF FREE FALLS. FOUR—NO. FOURTEEN CHILDREN DIED OUT OF 
2 4
 I THAT 61. AND ALL OF THOSE CHILDREN HAD FALLEN FROM FOUR 
STORIES OR HIGHER. 
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1 Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, DID THEY ALSO LOOK 
2 AT THE CHILDREN THAT HAD FALLEN FROM THREE STORIES OR LESS? 
i A YES, THEY DID. 
4 Q HOW MANY OF THOSE CHILDREN DIED? 
5 A NONE OF THEM. 
« Q ARE YOU ALSO FAMILIAR WITH THE STUDY PUBLISHED 
7 IN THE PEDIATRICS JOURNAL, 1977, INJURIES RESULTING WHEN 
8 SMALL CHILDREN FALL OUT OF BED? 
9 A YES, I AM FAMILIAR WITH THAT PAPER. 
10 Q CAN YOU PLEASE TELL THE JURY ABOUT THAT STUDY? 
11 MR. METOS: I'D MAKE THE SAME OBJECTION, YOUR 
12 HONOR. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION'S OVERRULED. 
14 A (BY THE WITNESS) THIS IS THE RESULT OF A STUDY 
15 THAT WAS CONDUCTED BY A PEDIATRICIAN, TWO PEDIATRICIANS 
16 AND ONE OF THEIR COLLEAGUES. IT WAS CONDUCTED IN CHILDRENS' 
17 HOSPITALS IN PART OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, WHICH IS IN 
18 DETROIT, I THINK. AND WHAT THEY DID WAS INTERVIEWED PARENTS 
19 WHO BROUGHT THEIR CHILDREN INTO THEIR PEDIATRIC PRACTICES, 
*0 ASKED THOSE PARENTS TO FILL OUT A QUESTIONNAIRE WHERE THEY 
21 WOULD ANSWER IF THEY RECOLLECTED THEIR CHILDREN HAVING FALLEN 
22
 OFF BEDS, COUCHES, KITCHEN TABLES, THINGS OF THE USUAL 
*J DOMESTIC FURNITURE HEIGHT, AND TO RECORD ON THE QUESTION-
2 4
 NAIRE WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE FALLS WERE. 
** THEY ALSO WENT INTO THE RECORDS OF THEIR 
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HOSPITAL WHERE DOCUMENTS, INCIDENT REPORTS ARE FILED WHEN-
EVER A CHILD, WHO IS A PATIENT IN THAT HOSPITAL, FALLS OFF 
OF A BED, A COT, AN EXAMINING TABLE, A GURNEY, WHATEVER. 
WHEN THAT CHILD FALLS, HOSPITAL POLICY IS THAT AN INCIDENT 
REPORT IS FILLED OUT AND INJURIES THERE ARE DOCUMENTED. 
IN THESE TWO STUDY POPULATIONS, ONE FROM THE 
REPORTS BY THE PARENTS AND THE OTHER BY THE HOSPITAL PER-
SONNEL, THERE WERE 161 CHILDREN SURVEYED BY THE PARENTS. 
THERE WERE 220 FALLS. THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT BRAIN 
INJURIES TO THOSE CHILDREN. 
IN THE CHILDREN WHO FELL IN THE HOSPITAL THERE 
WERE 85 DOCUMENTED FALLS AND THERE WERE NO SERIOUS CENTRAL 
NERVOUS SYSTEM INJURIES TO THOSE CHILDREN. 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) OUT OF THOSE 2^ 6 CHILDREN THAT 
FELL, THE 85 IN THE HOSPITAL AND THE 161 OUT OF THE HOSPITAL, 
DID ANY OF THOSE CHILDREN DIE? 
A NO. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, HAVE YOU EXAMINED PERSONS WHO HAVE 
FALLEN OFF OF OBJECTS SUCH AS BUILDINGS, ANY OTHER OBJECTS 
IN AUTOPSIES? HAVE YOU DONE AUTOPSIES ON PERSONS WHO HAVE 
FALLEN OFF OF OBJECTS? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q WHAT TYPE OF INJURIES DO YOU USUALLY SEE? 
A PEOPLE WHO FALL FROM HEIGHTS, AND BY THAT I MEAN 
A ONE STORY OR HIGHER WHERE THERE ARE NO INTERVENING OBJECTS 
11L 
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THAT THEY CAN STRIKE ON THE WAY DOWN TO IMPACTING THE GROUND, 
THE GROUND IS THEIR FIRST IMPACT, BY DEFINITION, OF COURSE, 
I SEE THE ONES WHO DIE. I DON'T SEE THE PEOPLE WHO SURVIVE. 
AND IT'S BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT THOSE INJURIES, THOSE INDI-
VIDUALS HAVE INJURIES TO MORE THAN ONE PART OF THE BODY. 
THEY DON'T ALWAYS HAVE HEAD INJURIES BUT FREQUENTLY THEY 
DO. ALMOST ALWAYS THEY WILL HAVE INJURIES TO THEIR ARMS 
OR THEIR LEGS. THEY WILL BREAK THEIR ARMS, THEY WILL BREAK 
THEIR LEGS OR THERE WILL BE FRACTURES TO THE PELVIC SKELETON. 
IF THEY LAND ON THEIR FEET THEY'RE GOING TO BREAK THEIR 
PELVISES AND THEY ARE GOING TO BREAK THEIR LEGS. 
FREQUENTLY, THE FIRST IMPACTING SURFACE WILL 
BE THE CHEST OR THE TORSO. MOST OF THE PEOPLE WHO DIE FROM 
FALLS FROM HEIGHTS WILL HAVE TORSO INJURIES, RIB FRACTURES, 
INJURIES TO THE INTERNAL ORGANS, THE HEART, THE LUNGS, THE 
LIVER, THE SPLEEN, ARE THE COMMON SITES OF INJURIES. 
IN MY EXPERIENCE, I HAVEN'T SEEN A FALL FROM 
A HEIGHT THAT IS PURE INJURY TO THE HEAD. 
Q DID GAVIN HAVE ANY OF THESE OTHER INJURIES THAT 
YOU'VE MENTIONED THAT YOU'VE SEEN IN OTHER PERSONS WHO HAVE 
FALLEN FROM HEIGHTS? 
A NO. THE COLLECTION OF INJURIES THAT HE HAD WAS 
HIGHLY INCONSISTENT, IN MY EXPERIENCE, AND THE EXPERIENCE 
OF THESE PEOPLE, WHO HAVE DONE THESE STUDIES, WITH A FREE 
FALL FROM A HEIGHT. 
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Q IN YOUR OPINION WHAT WOULD BE THE HEIGHT OF A 
FALL REQUIRED IN GAVIN'S CASE TO SEE THE TYPE OF INJURIES 
THAT YOU SAW ON GAVIN? 
MR. METOS: I'D OBJECT WITHOUT SOME FURTHER 
FOUNDATION, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THAT 
QUESTION AS WELL. SHE'S ALREADY TESTIFIED AS TO THE RESULTS 
OF THE INDEPENDENT STUDIES AS TO THREE AND FOUR STORY 
BUILDINGS, BUT WITHOUT FURTHER FOUNDATION I HAVE CONCERN 
10 I ABOUT HOW SHE'S COMING TO THAT CONCLUSION. 
" MS. HORNAK: CAN WE — 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED, 
13 MS. HORNAK: CAN WE APPROACH THE BENCH FOR A 
1* MINUTE? 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. 
1C
 (WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND 
17
 COUNSEL WAS HELD AT THE BENCH, AFTER WHICH, THE FOLLOWING 
18
 I PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD) 
19 
2 0
 I JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY ASK YOUR NEXT QUESTION. 
21
 | MS. HORNAK: OKAY. 
Q (BY MS. HORNAK) COULD THESE INJURIES THAT YOU 
2J
 | OBSERVED ON GAVIN BE CONSISTENT WITH APPLYING C.P.R.? 
A NO. 
Q WHY NOT? 
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*A CARDIAL PULMONARY RESUSCITATION INJURIES IN 
CHILDREN ARE UNCOMMON. THE MOST SEVERE INJURY I'VE SEEN 
IN A TINY INFANT WITH C.P.R. WAS A RUPTURED LIVER. IT WAS 
A PREMATURE INFANT. CHILDREN GAVIN'S AGE TYPICALLY WILL 
NOT INCUR ANY INJURIES AT ALL TO THEIR RIBS OR THEIR STERNUM. 
THERE MAY BE SOME EVIDENCE OF CONTUSION OR BRUISING OF THE 
LUNGS. 
Q IS IT POSSIBLE THAT GAVIN COULD HAVE SUSTAINED 
THESE INJURIES IF HE FELL OFF OF A BED ONTO A TOY? A PLASTIC! 
10 I TABLE, FOR EXAMPLE? 
11 A I THINK THAT'S QUITE UNLIKELY. 
12 Q WHY IS THAT? 
13 A FIRST OF ALL, I DON'T THINK THE DISTANCE IS FAR 
14 ENOUGH TO GENERATE THE VELOCITY THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO 
15 IMPART THE FORCE THAT WAS NEEDED TO GENERATE THESE INJURIES. 
16 PLASTIC, CHILDREN'S FURNITURE, TABLES, CHAIRS, TOYS, ARE 
H DESIGNED TO BE VERY RESILLIENT AND TO FLEX AND TO GIVE WAY. 
18 I DON'T THINK THEY COULD PROVIDE THE RESISTIVE FORCE 
19 NECESSARY TO CREATE THE INJURIES THAT GAVIN HAS. 
*0 Q COULD THESE INJURIES BE CONSISTENT WITH GAVIN 
21 DYING FROM SUDDEN INFANT DEATH SYNDROME OR S.I.D.S.? 
** A NO. 
*' Q WHY NOT? 
2 4
 I A THE DEFINITION OF SUDDEN INFANT DEATH SYNDROME 
IS THAT IT IS CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGE OF ONE MONTH AND 25 
00003 
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1 12 MONTHS WHO DIE SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IN A GOOD, 
2 APPARENT GOOD HEALTH WHO HAVE NO CAUSE OF DEATH, NO ABNOR-
3 MALITIES DEFINED AFTER A THOROUGH POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION. 
4
 Q IS IT POSSIBLE THAT GAVIN COULD HAVE RECEIVED 
5 THESE INJURIES, AND I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED AT ABOUT 9:00 
* OR 10:00 THAT MORNING, BECOME SLEEPY, OR PERHAPS COMMATOSE, 
7
 AND THEN PLACED IN BED FOR SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE DISCOVERING 
* IT WAS A FATAL DECISION BY A CARETAKER? 
* A I THINK THAT IS POSSIBLE. 
10 Q DID YOU SEE ANY EVIDENCE AT ALL THAT THIS INJURY 
H HAPPENED TWO DAYS EARLIER ON, SAY, MARCH 18TH? 
12 A THE EXAMINATIONS THAT WE DID OF HIS BRAIN AND 
13 SCALP ARE HIGHLY INCONSISTENT WITH AN INJURY THAT IS THAT 
!4
 OLD. THE CHANGES WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE—THE HEALING AND 
" REACTIVE CHANGES WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE STRIKING IF THAT 
1C
 CEREBRAL CONTUSION HAD BEEN TWO DAYS OLD. 
17
 Q DID YOU SEE ANY EVIDENCE IN GAVIN THAT HE IS 
18
 MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO HEMORRHAGES OR FRACTURES THAN OTHER 
19
 CHILDREN HIS AGE? 
2 0
 A NO, I DID NOT. 
21
 Q I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED, DR. FRIKKE, THAT IN 
2 2
 YOUR OPINION WHAT CAUSED THIS INJURY WAS THE SWINGING OF 
2 1
 GAVIN'S HEAD AGAINST A SURFACE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 4
 I A I THINK THAT'S A MECHANISM THAT ACCOUNTS FOR 
BOTH THE INJURIES TO THE HEAD, WHICH IS THE SCALP, THE SKULL J 25 
3^ 1 
000033 
THE COVERINGS OF THE BRAIN AND THE BRAIN ITSELF, AND IT 
ACCOUNTS FOR THE NECK FRACTURE. 
Q IS IT POSSIBLE THAT GAVIN COULD HAVE BEEN SWUNG 
BY AN ADULT AGAINST A WALL TO CAUSE THESE INJURIES? 
A THAT IS POSSIBLE. 
Q IS IT ALSO POSSIBLE THAT HE COULD HAVE BEEN SWUNG 
AGAINST A FLOOR TO CAUSE THESE INJURIES? 
A THAT IS ALSO POSSIBLE. 
Q WHAT WOULD BE THE pIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SWINGING 
OF HIM AGAINST THE FLOOR AND A FALL FROM A BUNK BED TO THE 
FLOOR? 
MR. METOS: WELL, I'LL OBJECT WITHOUT FURTHER 
FOUNDATION ON THIS ISSUE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION'S OVERRULED. 
A CBY THE WITNESS) THE FORCE THAT IS INCURRED 
IN ANY ACTION AND REACTION IS A FUNCTION OF THE MASS OF 
THE OBJECT THAT IS MOVING AND THE VELOCITY. THE RELATIONSHIP) 
IS FORCE EQUALS MASS TIMES THE VELOCITY SQUARED. VELOCITY 
IS THE TERM IN THAT MATHEMATICAL EQUATION THAT IS THE 
DOMINANT, OVERRIDING FORCE. IF YOU DOUBLE THE VELOCITY 
THE FORCE GOES UP BY FOUR. IT'S MULTIPLIED BY ITSELF EACH 
TIME. 
THE MASS OF GAVIN IN A FREE FALL, OR BEING SWUNG, 
DOES NOT CHANGE. THE MASS IS CONSTANT. SO WE HAVE TO LOOK, 
WHEN WE'RE LOOKING AT DEGREE OF INJURY, CONSIDERING THE 
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VELOCITY, THAT THAT IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR. 
I KNOW FROM MY EXPERIENCE, AND I KNOW FROM THE 
EXPERIENCE OF OTHER PHYSICIANS AND COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE 
STUDIED THIS, THAT THE VELOCITY THAT OCCURS WHEN A CHILD 
FALLS OFF A BED, AS DOCUMENTED IN THESE OTHER STUDIES, IS 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE ENOUGH FORCE TO CAUSE FATAL INJURIES 
TO A CHILD. THAT SAYS TO ME THAT THE VELOCITY THAT IS 
ATTAINED IN THE COURSE OF A DOMESTIC FALL IS NOT ENOUGH 
TO FATALLY INJURE A CHILD. 
10 | SO MY CONCLUSION IS THEN THAT THE VELOCITY THAT 
11 GAVIN HAD ACHIEVED AT THE TIME THAT THIS INJURY OCCURRED 
12 HAD TO BE GREATER THAN WHAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED AS A RESULT 
13 OF A FREE FALL. AND MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THAT VELOCITY 
,4
 WAS ADDED TO HIM BY AN EXTRANEOUS FORCE. IN MY OPINION, 
15 THAT WAS ANOTHER PERSON WHO ADDED THAT VELOCITY TO HIM. 
1* Q ARE YOU FAMILIAR OR AWARE OF ANY STUDIES THAT 
17
 ARE DONE USING INANIMATE OBJECTS SUCH AS A BOWLING BALL 
18
 AGAINST A WALL OR ANOTHER SURFACE TO REPLICATE CONDITIONS 
19
 THAT COULD BE SEEN IN A SKULL? 
2 0
 A THERE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF BASIC SCIENCE TYPE 
21
 STUDIES THAT HAVE BEEN DONE TRYING TO ANALYZE PATTERNS OF 
2 2
 I FRACTURES, MECHANISMS OF FRACTURES, THE WAY FRACTURES OCCUR, 
USING INANIMATE OBJECTS AND USING HUMAN TISSUES FROM CELLS. 23 
2 4
 Q IS IT POSSIBLE IN THE STUDY, DR. FRIKKE, WITH 
25 AN INANIMATE OBJECT TO ACTUALLY DETERMINE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN 
3*+3 
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INSIDE OF A SKULL? 
A I DON'T THINK THAT THERE ARE ANY EXPERIMENTAL 
SYSTEMS THAT WE USE. I MEAN, IT'S VERY COMMON AND IT'S 
REPUTABLE RESEARCH TO TRY TO MODEL, TO DEVELOP MODELS THAT 
WILL REPLICATE OR TRY TO REPRODUCE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE HUMAN 
BODY WHEN IT'S INJURED. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR PREVEN-
TION STUDIES, AUTOMOBILE DESIGN, BUILDING DESIGN, THESE 
SORTS OF THINGS. AND IN MY OPINION AND THE OPINION OF OTHER 
PEOPLE THESE ARE THE BEST MODELS. THEY CANNOT ACCURATELY 
10 I AND TRULY REPRODUCE THE CONDITIONS THAT OCCUR IN A LIVING 
11 BODY WHEN IT IS INJURED. THEY CAN ONLY ATTEMPT TO MODEL 
12 IT OR ESTIMATE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE LIVING BODY. 
13 MS. HORNAK: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS? 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY, YES. 
15 Q (BY MS. HORNAK) DR. FRIKKE, I AM HANDING YOU 
'* WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 38, WHICH IS IN TWO 
17
 | PARTS. DO YOU RECOGNIZE A PART OF THAT? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q WHAT IS THAT? 
2 0
 | A STATE'S EXHIBIT 38, THE PART THAT I RECOGNIZE, 
21
 I IS A SMALL PLASTIC BAG WHICH IS LABELED WITH THE LABEL PRO-
22
 I VIDEO BY MY OFFICE WHICH INCLUDES GAVIN'S NAME, HIS CASE 
2J
 I NUMBER, THE DATE OF THE AUTOPSY, AND IT IS IDENTIFIED AS 
HEAD HAIR, AND I HAVE INITIALED THIS LABEL WITH MY INITIALS. 
Q IS THAT HEAD HAIR THAT YOU TOOK FROM GAVIN? 
18 
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A IT LOOKS LIKE THE HEAD HAIR I PUT IN THERE. 
MS. HORNAK: ALL RIGHT. YOUR HONOR, AT THIS 
TIME WE WOULD NOT MOVE TO ADMIT EXHIBIT 38 BECAUSE WE HAVE 
A QUESTION OF ANOTHER WITNESS AND I HAVE NO OTHER QUESTIONS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: CROSS-EXAMINATION, MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Q DR. FRIKKE, YOU HAVE STATED THAT YOU ARE LICENSED 
IN BOTH UTAH AND MINNESOTA AND PRACTICE MEDICINE; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
YOU WERE LICENSED IN UTAH IN 1991? 
THAT IS CORRECT. 
WHEN WERE YOU LICENSED IN MINNESOTA? 
1990. 
SO YOU HAVE BEEN A LICENSED PHYSICIAN FOR TWO 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
YEARS? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOUR WORK IN MINNESOTA WAS AS A FELLOW, OR WORKING 
ON A FELLOWSHIP, TO EARN YOUR, I GUESS YOUR CERTIFICATION 
AS A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND SO WHEN YOU WERE WORKING IN MINNESOTA DOING 
Jii 
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AUTOPSIES, YOU WERE NOT A FULL FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST. 
A I FUNCTIONED AS A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST. I PER-
FORMED THE FUNCTION OF A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST. 
Q YOU DIDN'T HAVE A MEDICAL LICENSE TO BE A FOREN-
SIC PATHOLOGIST? 
A THERE ISN'T SUCH A MEDICAL LICENSE. 
Q TO BE A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST WERE YOU BOARD CER-
TIFIED AT THAT TIME? 
A I WAS BOARD CERTIFIED IN ANATOMIC AND CLINICAL 
10
 | PATHOLOGY DURING PART OF THAT TIME. 
Q BUT YOU WEREN'T BOARD CERTIFIED IN FORENSIC PATH-
'* I OLOGY. 
13
 A NO, I WAS NOT. 
14
 I Q AND THAT DIDN'T OCCUR UNTIL AFTER YOU FINISHED 
THIS FELLOWSHIP. 
A IN ORDER TO BECOME ELIGIBLE TO BE CERTIFIED AS 
A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST ONE IS OBLIGATED TO DO EITHER 12 
MONTHS OF FELLOWSHIP IN A RECOGNIZED FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM 
OR FUNCTION AS A FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST FULL TIME FOR TWO 
YEARS. 
Q AND THAT IS WHAT YOU WERE DOING IN MINNESOTA. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, YOU TALKED ABOUT THE THINGS YOU DID 
WITH RESPECT TO YOUR INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE. YOU TALKED 
TO SOME OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICERS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
_i4L 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
THE SCENE? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
YOU TALKED TO, WOULD IT BE, DETECTIVE PATRICK? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
DID YOU TALK TO ANY OF THE OTHER OFFICERS AT 
NO. 
DID YOU GO TO THE SCENE? 
NO, I DID NOT. 
DID YOU REQUEST DETECTIVE PATRICK PROVIDE YOU 
WITH PICTURES OF THE SCENE? 
A 
Q 
A 
POSTMORTEM 
THEN. 
Q 
TESTIFYING 
THE SCENE? 
A 
I SAW SOME PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SCENE, YES. 
WHEN DID YOU SEE THOSE? 
I SAW A POLAROID, I THINK, AT THE TIME OF THE 
EXAMINATION AND I'VE SEEN OTHER PHOTOGRAPHS SINCE 
OKAY. AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING DO YOU RECALL 
THAT YOU HADN'T INSPECTED ANY PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
I DO RECALL TESTIFYING TO THAT. AND I HAVE 
REVIEWED MY MEMORY SINCE THEN AND I SAW A PHOTOGRAPH THAT 
WAS VERY DARK AND BROWN. I DO REMEMBER SEEING THAT. 
<3 
WERE TAKEN 
ALL RIGHT. DID YOU INSPECT PHOTOGRAPHS THAT 
SOME TWO DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT ON THE 20TH 
OR—21ST OR 22ND OF MARCH? 
A I HAVE SEEN PHOTOGRAPHS. I DON'T KNOW WHEN THEY 
3*»7 1 
000033 
WERE TAKEN. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTERNAL 
EXAMINATION YOU DESCRIBED GAVIN'S HEIGHT AS BEING 33 INCHES 
LONG; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND HIS WEIGHT WAS 26 POUNDS. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. HE WAS 12 KILOGRAMS. 
Q DID YOU MAKE ANY ATTEMPTS TO EITHER ESTIMATE 
OR WEIGH GAVIN'S HEAD? 
10 I A THE USUAL METHOD FOR ASSESSING HEAD GROWTH IN 
11 CHILDREN IS TO MEASURE THE OCCIPITAL/FRONTAL CIRCUMFERENCE, 
12 WHICH WE DID DO. 
13 Q COULD YOU ESTIMATE—WELL, IN A TWO YEAR OLD, 
14 TWO AND A HALF YEAR OLD AS GAVIN WAS, DOES THE HEAD—LET 
15 ME BACK UP. 
,6
 YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH CHILDREN, YOU'VE DONE 
,7
 I AUTOPSIES ON CHILDREN AND READ LITERATURE ABOUT IT; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS THERE A ROUGH PERCENTAGE OF THE BODY WEIGHT 
21
 I THAT IS IN THE HEAD IN A CHILD OF TWO TO TWO AND A HALF 
22
 I YEARS OF AGE? 
A I'M SURE THAT VALUE IS KNOWN BUT I DON'T KNOW 
IT RIGHT NOW. 
Q YOU'RE NOT AWARE OF THAT? 
IkS 
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M A I'M SURE THE VALUE, THESE THINGS HAVE BEEN ESTI-
2 MATED AND CALCULATED. I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS EXACTLY. 
3
 Q THAT WAS MY QUESTION. YOU'RE NOT AWARE OF THAT. 
4
 A NOT RIGHT NOW, NO. 
5
 I Q AND YOU DIDN'T MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO GIVE A WEIGHT 
ON GAVIN'S HEAD ALONE. 
A NO. 
* Q EITHER TO ESTIMATE BY MEANS OF THESE STUDIES 
9
 OR OTHER MEANS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
10
 A NO. 
11 Q WITH RESPECT TO YOUR INTERNAL EXAMINATION YOU 
1* INDICATED THAT AS PART OF THE EXAMINATION YOU DO HAVE TO 
13
 REMOVE THE SKULL AND LOOK AT THE BRAIN; IS THAT RIGHT? 
14
 A WE REMOVE THE TOP OF THE SKULL, YES. 
15
 Q TOP OF THE SKULL. DID YOU MAKE ANY MEASUREMENTS 
16
 ON THE THICKNESS OF THE SKULL AT THAT POINT? 
17
 A NO. 
18
 Q WERE THERE ANY—WAS THERE ANY MEASUREMENTS OR 
19
 TESTING DONE TO THE SKULL ITSELF TO MEASURE ITS ELASTICITY 
2 0
 OR ABILITY TO BEND AND MOVE? 
21
 A NO, WE MADE NONE OF THOSE MEASUREMENTS. 
2 2
 Q NOW, WITH RESPECT TO A SKULL FRACTURE, YOU 
2 8
 DESCRIBED TO MS. HORNAK BASICALLY HOW-THIS FRACTURE MAY 
2 4
 I HAVE OCCURRED. AND YOU SAY IT'S VERY LIKELY, BASED ON THE 
EVIDENCE, THAT THE HEAD WAS MOVING AND STRUCK A FLAT OBJECT; 
3^9 
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1 IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 A THAT'S MY INTERPRETATION, YES. 
3 Q OKAY. WHEN A SKULL STRIKES A FIXED OBJECT WHAT 
* HAPPENS IS, WHERE THE SKULL HITS THE OBJECT, THE SKULL 
5 FLATTENS OUT; IS THAT RIGHT? IT TAKES ON THE SHAPE OF THE 
« OBJECT THAT'S STRUCK. 
1 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
» Q AND SOME OTHER PART OF THE SKULL HAS TO BEND 
• OUT IN REACTION TO THAT; IS THAT RIGHT? 
10 A YES. THAT'S WHAT THE MODELING STUDIES SHOW. 
11 Q YEAH. AND THE STUDIES ALSO SHOW THAT AT THE 
12 POINT WHERE THE OUT BENDING IS IS WHERE THIS FRACTURE GEN-
13 ERALLY BEGINS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
14 A NOT NECESSARILY. IT CAN—THE FRACTURE CAN OCCUR 
15 ON THE INTERNAL SURFACE OF THE BRAIN AT THE POINT OF IMPACT 
16
 WHERE THE INSIDE TABLE OF THE BRAIN IS BEING STRETCHED OR 
17
 THE FRACTURE CAN OCCUR AT THE OUT BENDING WHERE THE SKULL 
18
 HAS BENT OUT TO ACCOMMODATE THE IN BENDING. AND IN THAT 
19
 CASE THE FRACTURE BEGINS ON THE OUTER TABLE OF THE SKULL. 
2 0
 Q BASICALLY, I GUESS TO STATE IT OTHERWISE, OR 
21
 TO MAKE A MORE GENERAL STATEMENT, IT BEGINS AT THE POINT 
2 2
 I WHERE THE SKULL IS UNDER THE MOST STRESS. IS THAT SAFE 
TO SAY? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q SO IF A SKULL IS STRUCK BY, SAY, A HAMMER, AND 
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24 
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I APOLOGIZE TO THE JURY, THIS SOUNDS KIND OF GROSS, THERE'S 
A GREAT POINT OF STRESS THERE AND, GENERALLY, THAT'S WHERE 
YOU SEE IN BENDING AND THE FRACTURES; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q VITH THE FLAT OBJECTS, THOUGH, THE SKULL TENDS 
TO FLATTEN OUT AND THE FRACTURES BEGIN AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL 
POINT OF CONTACT. 
A IT CAN OCCUR THAT WAY, YES. 
Q OKAY. AND WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THE FRACTURE 
10 I BEGINNING THERE THAT'S NOT WHERE THE FRACTURE OCCURS AND 
11 STOPS. AS THE SKULL REBOUNDS AND REACTS THE FRACTURE 
12 CONTINUES TO MOVE. THIS IS ALL IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF 
13 TIME, IS IT? 
1* A THE FRACTURE WILL PROPAGATE ITSELF UNTIL THE 
15 STRESSES ARE RELIEVED. AND WHETHER THAT OCCURS DURING THE 
1* ACTUAL IN BENDING AND IMPACT OR IF IT CONTINUES DURING THE 
,7
 I REBOUND OF THE SKULL, I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY. WE'RE TALKING 
ABOUT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SECONDS. 18 
,9
 Q BUT IT HAPPENS VERY QUICKLY, 
20 A YES. IT IS ALL PART OF THE SAME PROCESS. 
21
 I Q YEAH. YOU TALKED TO MS. HORNAK ABOUT SOME 
22
 ' VARIABLES THAT AFFECT WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL SKULL IS MORE 
21
 I SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRACTURE IN TERMS OF ELASTICITY. 
24
 I A I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WE DISCUSSED THE VARIABLES 
25
 • THAT AFFECT THAT. 
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Q OKAY. YOU MENTIONED TO HER THAT A CHILD'S SKULL 
IS MORE EASILY BENT OR IS MORE ELASTIC AND IS LESS LIKELY 
TO FRACTURE. 
A IT IS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN AN ADULT SKULL. 
Q A CHILD'S SKULL IS ALSO THINNER THAN AN ADULT'S 
SKULL; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q FROM THINGS THAT—SOME VARIABLES THAT MAY AFFECT 
WHETHER A SKULL FRACTURES UNDER THE SAME DEGREE OF STRESS 
WOULD BE THE THICKNESS OF THE SKULL; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A I BELIEVE SO. 
Q A THINNER OBJECT IS MORE LIKELY TO FRACTURE AT 
A LOWER FORCE THAN A THICKER OBJECT. 
A NOT NECESSARILY. IT DEPENDS ON THE TENSILE 
STRENGTH OF THAT OBJECT. I MEAN, YOU KNOW, PAPER IS VERY 
THIN AND IT TEARS VERY EASILY. THE ACETATE THAT WE USE 
THERE IS THE SAME THICKNESS AND IT'S VERY STRONG. 
Q I'M TALKING ABOUT THE SAME OBJECT, SAME TYPE 
OF OBJECT. A BONE THAT HAS THE SAME ESSENTIAL MAKE-UP, 
A THICKER BONE IS LESS LIKELY TO FRACTURE THAN A THIN BONE 
IN THE SAME BODY. 
A IF WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME BONE, YES. 
Q YES, WITH THE SAME AMOUNT OF FORCE APPLIED TO 
IT. 
A I BELIEVE THAT COULD BE A GENERAL RULE, YES. 
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1 Q AND THE ELASTICITY, THE BENDABILITY OF THE BONE 
2 ALSO WOULD AFFECT THAT— 
3 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
4 Q YOU TALKED WITH RESPECT TO SKULL FRACTURES, THE 
5 HAIR ON THE SCALP PLAYS SOME ROLE IN IT; IS THAT RIGHT? 
« A YES, THEY DO. 
f Q PERSONS WITH THICK, MATTED HAIR, THAT MAY ABSORB 
8 PART OF THE BLOW AND CUSHION THE BLOW TO SOME EXTENT; IS 
9 THAT RIGHT? 
10 A YES. 
11 Q THE HAIR OF GAVIN ADAMS WAS RELATIVELY THIN, 
12 THOUGH. 
13 A YES, IT WAS. 
14 Q NOW, YOU TALKED ABOUT CERTAIN STUDIES THAT YOU 
15 HAD REVIEWED WITH RESPECT TO CHILDREN FALLING OUT OF BED. 
1« HAVE YOU REVIEWED ANY OF THE LITERATURE REGARDING THE AMOUNT 
17 OF FORCE THAT IT WOULD TAKE TO FRACTURE THE AVERAGE ADULT 
18
 SKULL? 
1* A I HAVE SEEN SOME STUDIES THAT INVOLVED DECAPI-
20
 TATION OF HEADS IN DROP STUDIES, YES, I HAVE SEEN SOME OF 
21
 THOSE. 
22
 Q ALL RIGHT. HAVE YOU ALSO REVIEWED SOME FORENSIC 
2
* PATHOLOGY BOOKS THAT INCORPORATE THOSE STUDIES? 
2 4
 A I HAVE SEEN THOSE, SOME OF THOSE KIND OF STUDIES 
25
 REVIEWED IN FORENSIC PATHOLOGY BOOKS. 
J 353 
000043 
Q ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT THE RESULTS ARE WITH 
RESPECT TO THOSE STUDIES? 
A THE GENERAL RESULT IS THAT IF YOU DROP A HEAD 
FAR ENOUGH THE SKULL WILL FRACTURE. 
Q IN TERMS OF FOOT POUNDS OF ENERGY ARE YOU AWARE 
OF WHAT THOSE RESULTS WERE? 
A I HAVE MADE NO NOTE OF THOSE, NO. 
Q HAVE YOU REVIEWED—LET ME ASK YOU THIS. ARE 
THERE SOME TEXTS OR STANDARD BOOKS YOU USE IN YOUR PRACTICE? 
10 I A YES. 
11 Q HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF AN AUTHOR BY THE NAME 
12 OF DEMAYO? 
13 A THERE ARE TWO DEMAYOS WHO ARE WELL-KNOWN IN 
14 FORENSIC PATHOLOGY. 
15 Q ARE YOU AWARE OF A TEXT WRITTEN BY DEMAYO, 
'< ACTUALLY IT'S BY BOTH DEMAYOS, CALLED FORENSIC PATHOLOGY? 
1? A YES. 
'• Q IS THIS A BOOK THAT YOU REGULARLY REFER TO? 
19 A THAT'S ONE OF THEM THAT I REFER TO. 
2 0
 Q WITH RESPECT TO A CHAPTER IN THAT BOOK REGARDING 
21
 TRAUMA TO SKULL AND BRAIN HAVE YOU REVIEWED THAT CHAPTER? 
2 2
 A YES, I HAVE. 
2
' Q ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THEIR CONCLUSION THAT IT 
2 4
 WOULD TAKE ROUGHLY—IN CERTAIN STUDIES THEY CONCLUDE THAT 
2 5
 I IT TAKES SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 33.3 TO 75 FOOT POUNDS OF ENERGY 
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10 
I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
TO CAUSE 
A 
OF THEIR 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
• A LINEAR FRACTURE IN AN ADULT SKULL. 
IF THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE READING IT FROM, A COPY 
I BOOK, I BELIEVE THAT'S WHAT THEY SAID. 
DO YOU WANT TO INSPECT IT? 
PARDON? 
WOULD YOU LIKE TO INSPECT IT? 
SURE. 
MR. METOS: DO WE NEED THIS MARKED, YOUR HONOR? 
JUDGE YOUNG: IF YOU WISH. 
(BY MR. METOS) I'LL HAND YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED 
AS DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 39-D. FIRST OF ALL, HAVE YOU 
INSPECTED THE FRONT PAGE? IS THAT THE BOOK THAT YOU WERE 
TALKING 
A 
Q 
OF THAT 
A 
Q 
BOOK OR 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
l<tl A N D 
IF YOU'C 
ABOUT, DEMAYO AND DEMAYO? 
YES, IT IS. 
AND THE GENERAL TEXT REFERS TO THE SIXTH CHAPTER 
BOOK? 
YES, IT DOES. 
AT SOME TIME IN THE PAST HAVE YOU REVIEWED THAT 
THAT PARTICULAR CHAPTER-
YES, I HAVE. 
—IN RELATION TO YOUR WORK? 
YES. 
LET ME HAVE YOU TURN NOW TO PAGE, I BELIEVE IT'S 
l*f2. BEGINNING ABOUT—WELL, AFTER FOOTNOTE THREE. 
> REVIEW THAT. 
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A ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE — 
Q WELL, READ IT TO YOURSELF AND THEN I CAN ASK 
YOU QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. 
A OKAY, I'VE READ IT. 
Q DID YOU READ THE NEXT PARAGRAPH ALSO? WELL, 
LET ME ASK YOU SOME QUESTION ABOUT THAT PARTICULAR PARA-
GRAPH. 
THE AUTHORS CONCLUDE THERE THAT WITH RESPECT | 
TO SKULL FRACTURES, ONCE THERE'S A LINEAR FRACTURE IT DOESN'T 
TAKE A LOT OF FORCE TO MAKE A BIGGER FRACTURE, WHAT'S CALLED 
A STELLATE FRACTURE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE SAYING. 
Q I MEAN, A LOT MORE ADDITIONAL FORCE. ONCE THE 
SKULL IS FRACTURED, IT DOESN'T TAKE MUCH MORE FORCE TO 
AGGRAVATE THE FRACTURE. 
A THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF FORCE THAT 
IT TAKES TO CREATE A LINEAR FRACTURE. 
Q RIGHT. THEY ALSO—OKAY. WITH RESPECT THEN TO 
LINEAR FRACTURES THEY CONCLUDE THAT A FREE FALL OF SIX FEET 
WITH A HEAD WEIGHING TEN POUNDS GIVES ENOUGH AVAILABLE 
ENERGY TO CAUSE A LINEAR FRACTURE, DO THEY NOT? 
A THAT'S WHAT THEY SAY. AND I AGREE WITH THAT 
STATEMENT IN THAT I HAVE SEEN LINEAR SKULL FRACTURES FROM 
A FALL OF SIX FEET. 
Q WITH RESPECT—LET ME HAVE YOU LOOK AT PORTIONS 
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THAT'S UNDERLINED WITH RESPECT—WELL, IT BEGINS AFTER FOOT-
NOTE tf AND GOES ON TO THE NEXT PAGE. HAVE YOU REVIEWED 
THAT? 
A ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THIS PART YOU'VE UNDERLINED 
HERE? 
Q YEAH, IT IS UNDERLINED AND THEN GOES OVER. 
A OKAY. 
Q ALL RIGHT. THE AUTHORS CONCLUDE THERE THAT 3 3.3 
TO 75 FOOT POUNDS OF ENERGY IS WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO 
CAUSE A LINEAR FRACTURE OF THE SKULL STRIKING A SOLID OBJECT. 
A THAT IS THE CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY THAT THEY'RE 
CITING, YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. HAD YOU EVER SEEN STUDIES THAT REACH 
A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION? 
A I HAVEN'T LOOKED UP THE ACTUAL STUDY THEY'RE 
CITING TO KNOW WHAT THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS WERE THAT 
THEY WERE USING THERE. AND I—I HAVE NOT PERSONALLY COMPARED 
THAT WITH OTHER STUDIES IN THIS FIELD OF ENGINEERING. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO DISAGREE 
WITH THE STUDY? 
A NO. 
Q WHAT THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT THERE IS A RANGE OF 
ENERGY, THEY AREN'T SAYING AT THIS POINT OF ENERGY THE 33.3 
FOOT POUNDS IS ABSOLUTELY WHEN YOU'RE GOING TO GET A HEAD 
INJURY, OR A SKULL FRACTURE, THEY'RE SAYING IN THIS RANGE 
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IS WHEN WE'VE SEEN THEM. IS THAT THE WAY— 
A THAT IS MY INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THEY SAY THERE, 
YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE DID 
YOU—YOU TALKED ABOUT THE PHYSICS FORMULA OF MASS TIMES 
VELOCITY SQUARED AND THE REAL CRITICAL FACTOR HERE BEING 
THE VELOCITY OF THE FALL, IS THAT RIGHT, OR THE VELOCITY 
BEFORE IMPACT. 
A THE VELOCITY THAT THE HEAD HAS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE 
IMPACT, YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DID YOU DO ANY CALCULATIONS WITH 
RESPECT TO HEIGHT OF THIS BUNK BED INVOLVING THE HEIGHT 
OF GAVIN ADAMS USING THAT FORMULA? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q AND YOU DIDN'T DO ANY—YOU DIDN'T LOOK AT THE 
DEMAYO TEXT WITH RESPECT TO, OR THIS PORTION OF THE DEMAYO 
TEST WE JUST TALKED ABOUT WITH RESPECT TO THAT CASE UNTIL 
JUST NOW. 
A NO, THAT'S NOT TRUE. I HAVE READ THAT ENTIRE 
BOOK MORE THAN ONCE. 
Q NO, I SAID WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE AND YOUR 
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE. 
A YES, I DID REVIEW THAT TEXT. I ALSO REVIEWED 
THE FISHER * SPETTS BOOK, WHICH IS THE CLASSIC TESTBOOK 
IN FORENSIC PATHOLOGY, AND THE FORENSIC PATHOLOGY BY BERNARD 
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KNIGHT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. BUT WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE—WELL, 
WAIT A MINUTE. BACK UP. 
ONCE AGAIN, YOU HAD THE INFORMATION REGARDING 
THE HEIGHT OF THE BED. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU HAD THE INFORMATION REGARDING GAVIN'S HEIGHT. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU HAD THE INFORMATION REGARDING GAVIN'S WEIGHT, 
HIS MASS. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU HAD AVAILABLE THIS INFORMATION REGARDING 
THE RANGE OF ENERGY THAT MAY CALCULATE—WHERE YOU MAY CAL-
CULATE WHAT CAUSES A SKULL FRACTURE. 
A I HAVE AVAILABLE THOSE DATA WHICH ARE EXPERI-
MENTAL STUDIES. 
Q THAT'S WHAT I'M SAYING. YOU HAVE THAT DATA 
AVAILABLE. BUT IN THIS CASE YOU DIDN'T MAKE THOSE CALCU-
LATIONS. 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. WITH RESPECT TO THE NECK FRACTURE 
YOU INDICATED TO MS. HORNAK THAT THAT WAS LIKELY TO OCCUR 
IN THE SAME INCIDENT, AS I TAKE IT, AS THE SKULL FRACTURE. 
A THAT'S MY OPINION, YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. I GUESS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, I GUESS 
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1
 JUST USING MY HAND, IF MY HAND IS THE CHILD'S HEAD AND MY 
2 ARM IS THE BODY, IF THE HEAD IS MOVING DOWNWARD AND STRIKES 
3
 AN OBJECT THE BODY CONTINUES TO MOVE; IS THAT RIGHT? 
4
 A IF IT'S NOT ARRESTED THERE, YES. 
5
 I Q IF THE BODY IS NOT ARRESTED THAT WOULD BE CON-
SISTENT WITH A HEAD MAKING THE KIND OF MOTION—OR WAIT A 
MINUTE. NO. YOU SAID THAT THE HEAD SNAPS FORWARD IN RELA-
TION TO THE BODY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A I THINK THAT NECK WAS FLEXED FORWARD. 
10
 I Q FLEXED FORWARD. SO IF THE HEAD IS BENT FORWARD 
11
 AND STRIKES THE GROUND WITH THE BODY OVER IT AND THE BODY 
1* FALLS FORWARD THAT WOULD MOVE THE HEAD FORWARD AND CAUSE 
13
 THE BREAK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
14
 I A THAT'S ONE POTENTIAL MECHANISM, YES. 
Q SO IT WOULD BE THE HEAD STRIKING ON THE BACK. 
BASICALLY, WHAT YOU ARE SAYING HAD TO HAPPEN IS THE HEAD 
IS STRUCK ON THE BACK AND IT MOVES FORWARD IN RELATION TO 
THE BODY. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU CAN'T SAY WHAT POSITION THE BODY WAS IN, 
WHAT POSITION THE HEAD WAS IN AT THE TIME THE INJURY 
OCCURRED. 
A NO, I CANNOT. 
Q BUT YOU CAN SAY WHAT POSITION THE BODY AND HEAD 
WERE IN RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER IN TERMS OF WHAT CAUSED THE 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
21 
24 
2$ 
INJURY. 
A WHAT POSITION? YES, I DID FORM THAT OPINION. 
Q AND THAT OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH SOME OF THE 
OTHER OBSERVATIONS YOU MAKE, THAT IS, THE BRUISING ON THE 
FRONT OF THE BRAIN ITSELF, THE CONTRECOUP INJURY. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THAT'S CONSISTENT WITH, AS I UNDERSTAND, THE 
HEAD MOVING, STOPPING, AND THE BRAIN CONTINUING TO MOVE 
AFTER THE HEAD IS STOPPED BY BEING STRUCK ON THE BACK. 
10 I A THAT'S CORRECT. 
H Q AND WHEN THE BRAIN DOES THAT YOU SAID IT ALSO 
12 TEARS SOME OF THE VEINS IN, IS IT THE DURA OR THE—BETWEEN 
13 THE DURA AND THE SUBDURAL MEMBRANES. 
,4
 A THE VEINS THAT BRIDGE THAT SPACE BETWEEN THE 
15 I ARACHNOID AND THE DURA, THAT'S THE SUBDURAL SPACE, THOSE 
THINGS ARE TORN. 
17
 I Q SO WHAT HAPPENS IS YOU HAVE THESE VEINS GOING 
18
 I INTO, BETWEEN THE DURAL AND THE SUBDURAL SPACE. AS THE 
BRAIN AND DURAL SPACE MOVE THEY DON'T—THEY TEAR. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
19 
20 
21
 I Q AND THAT CAUSES BLEEDING. 
2 2
 • A THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 1
 | Q ARE THERE ALSO ARTERIES FROM THAT SPACE OR IS 
2 4
 ' IT JUST VEINS? 
2 5
 I A IT IS PRIMARILY VEINS. THERE ARE NO ARTERIES 
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OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE THAT I KNOW OF IN THAT SPACE. 
Q SO WHAT IT I ,„ ., - WHAT, VENAL BLEEDING? 
ED? 
A YES, IT'S VENOUS BLEEDING. 
Q -MEANING THERE'S HEART PUMPING - BLEEDING 
A WELL, THE HEART 1 DE F IN 
ITION IT'S A PART OF THE SYSTEM THAT IS DRIVEN BY THE 
PUMPING 01 THE HEART. 
Q ALL RIGHT. THE INJURY 
ELATION TO THE SKULL AND STRIKING SKULL. IS ALSO 
ITSELF, IS IT 
NOT? 
A THAT-b A REACTION Ui MIL BRAIN TO THAT INITIAL 
JRY. 
Q JUST AS SWELLING OF ANY PART OF YOUR BODY WOULD 
BE ONCE IT'S STRUCK OR BRUISED. 
A '? h V h R A I. M H i H I , HI'l SH» ' ' INI'-, Hi l"f R U i M M i< ,i, 
LITTLE DIFFERENT THAN SWELLING < THE REST I iODY 
IN THAT WHEN YOU DROP ANYTHING ON • • •' • - ^^ V0"R 
FINGER A LOT OF THAT I-1 NHI IMS 
ACCUMULATING THAT TISSUE. THE BRAI -ERENT. IT 
dr u s OWN RULES «ND THERE' v ^ TIGHT CONTROL 
OF THE AMOUNT OF FLUID -,SSt . BETWEEN 
BLOOD VESSELS AND THE FLUID THAT'S iN : SUBSTANCE 
llkii IN, All1! ONI OF IHH RF ATI IONS 10 JKT D I m c 
362 
000654 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BRAIN IS THAT THAT TIGHT CONTROL IS LOST AND SO FLUID, NOT 
NECESSARILY BLOOD, IN THAT WE THINK OF RED BLOOD CELLS, 
BUT THE FLUID PART OF THE BLOOD, CAN LEAK OUT AND, IN FACT, 
CAUSES THE BRAIN TO SWELL, BUT IT'S NOT HEMORRHAGING, IT'S 
NOT BLOODY. THE FORM OF THE RED CELL PART OF THE BLOOD 
ACCUMULATING IN THOSE TISSUES, IT'S THE FIBER PART. AND 
THIS CAN HAPPEN AWAY FROM THE AREA THAT IS DIRECTLY INJURED. 
Q SO YOU'RE SAYING IT IS NOT A LOCALIZED KIND OF 
A SWELLING AT THE POINT OF THE INJURY BUT IT CAN BE SWELLING 
AWAY FROM THE INJURY AND SOME OTHER PART OF THE BRAIN. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND THE ENTIRE BRAIN ITSELF MAY SWELL AS A RESULT 
OF THIS SORT OF INJURY. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THE EFFECT OF THAT IS ULTIMATELY TO CAUSE SOME 
PRESSURE 
A 
Q 
IT CUTS < 
A 
ON, IS 
THAT 
AND 1 
DFF THE 
IT THE BRAIN STEM OR RESPIRATION 
'S CORRECT. 
CONTROL? 
MEN THE PRESSURE IS PUT ON THE BRAIN STEM 
HEART 
ULTIMATELY 
HEART BEAT IS, I 
Q 
A 
Q 
PRESSURE 
OKAY 
THAT 
THE < 
ON THE 
CAN BE 
. BUT 
BEAT, BREATHING AND THINGS 
IT STOPS THE BREATHING, YES 
LIKE THAT. 
. THE 
VERY INDEPENDENT OF THE BRAIN. 
IT STOPS THE BREATHING? 
'S CORRECT. 
OTHER FACTORS THAT MAKE, PUT THAT 
BRAIN STEM WOULD BE THE HEMATOMAS 
SORT OF 
INSIDE 
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1 I THE SKULL; 1C T H A IGHT? 
2 | r-r-: wfRE HEMATOMAS IN THE SKULL THAT WOULD 
3 : - CHANISM. 
4 I MEAN, LIKE THE SUBDURAL SUBAh 'K HN<' I !' HIMAH'1"' 
5 THAT YOU DESCRIBED CASE. 
« A HEMORRHAGE OF QUANTITY 
' THAT IS A SPACE OCCUPYING MASS. THE SPACE 
• WHERE HE HAD HEMORRHAGE, THE SUBDURAL SPACE SUBARACHNOID 
9 " 'ACL, THE AMOUNT OF BLOOD THAT WAS IN THERE, inc LAYERS, 
10 WAS NOT MORE THAN THE NORMAL VOLUME OF THE SPINAL PI inn 
WOULD BE THERF '••-* AMOUNT OF BLOOD THAT WA-I- •• THERE 
WAS NOT US ' '- " ION 
13 OF T-l SHAPE OF >- BRAIN. 
14 Q SO IT WOULDN AVE BEEN HEMORRHAGES. WHAT 
15 YOU'RE SAYING T 5 THFRE WAS TNSUFFICI HI- MdRkHAGI S 10 PHI 
" THAT PRESSURE f! THE BRAIN STEM TO CAUSE THE RESPIRATION 
17
 I ' UT OFF. 
!- I A THAT'S CORRECT. HE D1H NO! HAVE WH«"1 WE I ALL 
19
 A SPACE OCCUPYING LESION. THAT IS SOMETHING EXTRA ADDED 
20
 I THE SKULL DUE TO THE HEMORRHAGE. 
21
 HAVE MAS' BECAUSE «IF 1 i-|fc. SWELLING OF THE 
22
 BRAIN ITSELF. 
*• I Q DATING THE BRUISES THE 
24
 I BRAIN AND DATING THE—NOT DATING BUT PUTTING 
25
 ' ON THOSE BRUISES, THE ONE TO THE BRAIN AND THE 
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BACK OF THE SCALP. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q I MAY, CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG, AS I UNDERSTAND 
WHAT YOU TOLD MS. HORNAK WAS THAT WHAT YOU'RE LOOKING FOR 
IS A FUNCTION OF A LOSS OF, OR INADEQUATE OXYGEN BEING 
PROVIDED TO THOSE AREAS. 
A INADEQUATE OXYGEN OR LACK OF THE NUTRIENTS. 
THEY BOTH COME TOGETHER UNDER THE LACK OF BLOOD FLOW. 
Q LACK OF BLOOD FLOW? 
10 I A CORRECT. 
H Q AND IT CAN BE EITHER AS YOU SAID, LACK OF NUTRI-
12 ENTS OR LACK OF OXYGEN, CORRECT? 
13 A CORRECT. 
!4
 Q IS THERE SOME SPECIFIC—FIRST OF ALL, DID YOU 
15 I PERFORM TESTS, MICROSCOPIC TESTS ON THESE CELLS? 
A YES, I DID EXAMINE THE TISSUES MYSELF. 
n
 I Q WHAT SORT OF THINGS DO YOU LOOK FOR WHEN YOU 
18
 I LOOK—WHY DON'T YOU DESCRIBE THAT PROCESS FIRST OF ALL THAT 
!9
 1 YOU HAVE TO DO. 
A THE PROCESS OF MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION? 
Q YEAH. 
A THE TISSUE THAT WE REMOVE AT AUTOPSY HAS TO BE 
PRESERVED IN ORDER FOR US TO BE ABLE TO USE IT UNDER THE 
MICROSCOPE. AND IN THE CASE OF THE BRAIN THAT REQUIRES 
THAT THAT BRAIN BE IMMERSED IN A FIXATIVE WHICH WE CALL 
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p CAN 
MICROSCOPE. 
AT ARE 
FORMALDEHYDE LEAST A WEEK. THAT INFILTRATES THROUGH 
inc /issue «*L/ PRESERVES IT SO THAT THEN IRMS UP 
TWP BRAIN. THE BRAIN T SOFT. -UT 
BRAIN, LOOC "-.• SURFACE ANATOM^ J - INTERNAL 
MTOMY -' -" '•'•' •"••' PORTIONS Or i n« i AND PROCESS 
MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION, WHICH TC A P 
REMOVING ALL WATER FROM REPLACING THAT WATER 
•in PARA-
.- [< WE CAM -- • ' • -" ' .ECTION5 OF 
TRANSMIT LIGHT THROUGH UNDER 
Q W' T TO 1 
YOU LOOKING FOR? 
A OOKING F~ SIGNS " WE'RE LOOKING 
GOING E LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT, SIGNS 
OF NATURAL DISEASE PROCESSES AND SIGNS INJURY RIGHT?] 
Q A1 ' RIGHT. SPLClf I LAI. 1,1 I 
GUESS, IN THIS CASE YOU'RE LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF INJURY; 
i THAT kltatil.' 
A i uftc LOOKING FOR DISEASE PROCESSES ALSO. 
Q YOU'RE LOOKING FOR ALL WITH RESPECT 
10 I.IGNS in INJURY IN i ru 5 use IUU DESCRIBED BEING ABLE 
TO REACH THESE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE INJURY OCCURRING SOME 
FOUR HOURS BEFORE. WHAT DO YOU LOOK FOR 10 REACH 
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A WHAT WE'RE LOOKING FOR IS WE LOOK AT THE NERVE 
CELL, THE CELL BODY WITH THE NERVE OF CELLS. WE ARE LOOKING 
FOR CHANGES IN THEIR APPEARANCE. WE KNOW WHAT NORMAL NERVE 
CELLS LOOK LIKE THAT LOOKED HEALTHY AT THE TIME THE PATIENT 
DIED AS WE HAVE THAT AS OUR STANDARD FOR WHAT IS THE NORMAL 
LOOKING CELL. 
Q DID YOU FIND HEALTHY CELLS IN THE BRAIN TO MAKE 
A COMPARISON WITH? 
A YES. 
Q SO DID YOU DO THIS COMPARISON? 
A YES. 
Q AND THEN YOU LOOK FOR CHANGES IN THE CELLS? 
A THEN WE LOOK FOR CHANGES FROM THE NORMAL. AND 
THIS IS VERY WELL DOCUMENTED. PEOPLE, PATHOLOGISTS HAVE 
SEEN LOOKING AT BRAINS FOR GENERATIONS AND DOCUMENTING WHEN 
THE CHANGES ARE, WHAT THE NERVE CELL CHANGES ARE OR WHEN, 
OR WHEN THE NERVE CELL IS DEPRIVED OF ITS OXYGEN OR BLOOD 
OR NUTRIENTS. AND THOSE CHANGES ARE WITHIN THE CYTOPLASM, 
THE BODY OF THE CELL, AND THE NUCLEUS, WHICH IS THE CONTROL 
CENTER. THE COLOR CHANGES, THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ORGAN 
CELLS WITHIN THAT BODY THAT AFFECT THE WAY THAT CELL LOOKS, 
THEY START TO CHANGE. 
WE ALSO—THERE ARE ALSO OTHER THINGS WE LOOK 
FOR. THOSE ARE THE VERY EARLIEST CHANGES. LATER ON, A 
DAY OR TWO, WE ARE GOING TO START SEEING THE CELLS INTEGRATE 
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1 PART OF THE BRAIN. THEY START " *'- • THEY GET-BIGGER. 
2 -<\-\V\ I'lAK : !• I V IDlN'v . CELL'. M < u n l M L 30D toiLL. si A"' ',OMING 
3 IN A I SIX K' EIGHT HOURS. INFLAMMA7 CELLS WILL START 
4
 COMING IN, IN REACTION . THE CELLS THAT ARE 
5 , • 
* THESE ARE VERY WELL DOCUMENTED EMPORAL SEQUENCE AS 
7
 TO WHEN THEY OCCUR AND HOW FAST THEY OCCUR. 
8 Q TEMPORAL 
9
 SEQUENCE ' CHANGES IN ELL NUCLEI? 
io A ~ r~. 
11 Q Slit OF IHfSt ARE OBSERVATIONS YOU MA! [: 
12 UNDER A.N ELECTRONIC MICROSCOPE? 
13 A NO, Ii la M ui MICROSCOPE. 
" " Q IT IS A ' TCWT . COPE. 
I5 I STUDIES, HAVE ANY OF THEM DIFFERENTIATED 
•; HF "MIHIWEW PERSON? 
A YOU MEAN THE AGE OF T"* \/TTTTM? 
Q YEAH. 
I9 | A GENERA KAIMULU-
GISTS, YOU KNOW, THE BACKGROUND FROM WHICH WE rftMF ™ 
K INDIVIDUAL VARIATION. NO TWO PEOPLE -*• GOING 
TEMPOR- EQUENCr E 
TO FACTOR THAT IN. 
2 4
 I Q OKAY SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF ANY OF THE 
CTUDIES DID ST 01 iH['iv «, 11.1 [\\ [ S THAT W'H"VK 
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16 
18 
22 
23 
1 REVIEWED REFLECT DIFFERENCES BASED ON AGE. IF YOU'RE NOT 
2 AWARE OF ANY THAT'S--
3 A I DON'T HAVE ANY IN MY FILE STUDIES THAT LOOK 
4 AT 20 YEAR OLDS VERSUS kO YEAR OLDS OR TWO YEAR OLDS VERSUS 
5 FIVE YEARS OLD. 
« Q ALL RIGHT. AND FROM WHAT YOU JUST SAID THERE 
f ARE INDIVIDUAL VARIANCES FROM PERSON TO PERSON. 
8 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 Q THE SAME AS INDIVIDUALS REACT TO ANY FORM OF 
10 INJURY. WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT IS THE BEGINNING OF THE 
11 BODY'S REACTION TO AN INJURY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
12 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 Q DIFFERENT PEOPLE REACT AT DIFFERENT RATES. 
14 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
15 Q AND WHAT YOU'RE BASING YOUR CONCLUSION IS ON 
1« THESE STUDIES AND SORT OF AN AVERAGE WHEN THIS THING, A 
17 RANGE, EXCUSE ME, WHEN THIS REACTION TAKES PLACE. 
18
 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
19 Q AND YOU HADTP7 DONE ANY PARTICULAR OR ANY SPECIFICJ 
20
 STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO GAVIN ADAMS TO DETERMINE WHEN THIS 
*' WOULD OCCUR WITH HIM. 
22
 A WELL, HE WAS DEAD WHEN HE CAME. 
23 Q I MEAN, THAT WOULD BE, UNLESS YOU SAW HIM BEFORE 
24
 I AND DID THE STUDY YOU COULDN'T SAY EX— 
A THAT'S RIGHT, WE WOULD HAVE TO SET UP A CONTROLLEq 
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25 
Ji"'',', lIMir.' INJUR1FS, BIOPSIES A I TIMED I N1 F K V AL '.< . WE 
DIDN'T DO THAT. 
Q AND AN EXPENSIVE A N D — 
A L. 
Q RIGH" T SOMETHING THAT'S NOT DONE IS 
WHAT YOU'RE SAYING 'OU DIDN'T DO II , IMS UNFTHKAI. 
A WELL, • 1HI fj| SOh P. (.1- Sll 
WERE DONE WITH PRISONER VOLUNTEERS AND STUDENT VOLUNTEERS. 
NOT BRAIN INJURIES BUT SKIN INJURIES AND THESE SORTS OF 
THINGS. TYPICALLY THOSE STUDIES NOW ARE DONE WITH EXPER-
IMENTAL ANIMALS. 
MR. METOS: MAY I HMi " Mi>MM'", YOUR HONOR? 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU LIKE TO TAKE A RECESS 
AT THIS TIME? WE WILL TAKE A RECESS. 
MR. METOS: WHY DON'T WE TAKE A SHORT RECESS. 
(RECESS). 
QUESTIONS ON CROSS? 
MR. METOS: YES, JUS I 10 CLARIFY A FEW THINGS. 
Q ) DV , M.'IKKF, YOU JALKED ABOUT 
THE BRUISES, OR CONTUSIONS YOU OBSERVED ON GAVIN ADAMS AS 
REFLECTED IN EXHIBITS 52 AND
 J9. 
A 
Q AND YOU TALKED ABOUT VARIOUS COLORS OF BRUISES. 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLOR CHANGES IN BRUISES IS THAT IT 
REFLECTS DIFFERENCE IN AGES OF BRUISES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q A RELATIVELY RECENT BRUISE HAS WHAT, A REDDISH 
COLOR? 
A CORRECT. 
Q IT THEN GOES TO, IS IT BLUE? 
A YEAH. YOU START SEEING SHADES OF BROWN, BLUE, 
GREEN AND YELLOW APPEARING. 
Q ALL RIGHT. UNLESS YOU'RE VERY FAMILIAR WITH 
THE INDIVIDUALS THAT RECEIVED THE BRUISE YOU CAN'T SAY WHEN 
THE BRUISE OCCURRED BUT SIMPLY WHERE IT IS IN THE HEALING 
PROCESS ESSENTIALLY. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q WITH RESPECT TO THE SKELETAL X-RAY, AS I UNDER-
STAND IT, OTHER THAN THE NECK FRACTURE AND THE SKULL FRAC-
TURE YOU DIDN'T OBSERVE ANY OTHER BROKEN BONES IN GAVIN 
ADAMS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID YOU OBSERVE ANY OTHER INDICATIONS THAT HE 
HAD SUFFERED BROKEN BONES IN THE PAST? 
A NO. 
Q ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTUSIONS ON THE BODY, 
OTHER THAN WHAT APPEAR TO BE A BITE MARK ON EXHIBIT, 
DEPICTED ON 32, EXHIBIT 32, YOU DIDN'T OBSERVE ANY CONTUSIONS] 
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'"-*' REFLECTED AN OBJECT THAT WOULD HAVE MADE THOSE INJURIES, 
LVJ YOU? 
A IHLR'I". W f- r? t N ' 1 AN i I OE N 1 1 F Y I NC, I E'» TUI-IFS fir THESE 
OTHER CONTUSIONS THAT WOULD ALLOW ME TO DRAW ANY CONCLU-
SION AS TO HOW THEY WERE INFLICTED. 
Q FOR INSTANCE, YOU'VE, IN YOUR WORK, YOU'VE PRO-
BABLY SEEN MARKS THAT APPEAR TO BE LEFT BY BELT BUCKLES. 
A I'VE SEEN PATTERNED INJURIES, YES. 
Q YES, THE PATTERN REFLECTS THE OB 3K 
THE BODY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAI ORRECT. 
Q WITH CHILDREN IN THE PAST HAVE YOU OBSERVED 
PATTERNS THAT APPEAR TO BE BELTS OR BELT BUCKLES? 
A N ~ 
Q PICTURES OF THOSE TYPES OF INJURIES? 
A YES, I AM FAMILIAR WITH THOSE. 
Q OR COAT HANGERS, • . 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THERE WERE NONE OF THOSE TYPES OF INJURIES PRE-
IT? 
A IDENTIFY ANY PATTERN INJURIES ON I"' 
SKIN EXCEPT THE BITE MARK. 
Q THERE WER 
OTHER THAN WHAT YOU'VE DESCRIBED HERE TODAY. 
A h: INSIDE OF HIS LEFT ANKLE 
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10 
11 
THAT IS A HEALING BRUISE. IT COULD BE A HEALING BURN. 
I CAN'T DIFFERENTIATE THEM BASED ON WHAT I SAW. 
Q ALL RIGHT. YOU TALKED WITH MS. HORNAK ABOUT 
CERTAIN STUDIES THAT YOU HAD REVIEWED AND THE RESULTS OF, 
REFLECTING THE RESULTS OF INJURIES FROM FALLS; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VARIABLES THAT AFFECT WHAT 
A PERSON, WHAT HAPPENS TO A PERSON AFTER HE STRIKES THE 
GROUND OR FALLS; IS THAT CORRECT? ONE OF WHICH—WELL, LET 
ME PUT IT THIS WAY. ONE VARIABLE OF WHAT TYPE OF INJURIES 
12 I A PERSON WILL RECEIVE IS WHAT PART OF HIS BODY STRIKES THE 
13
 GROUND FIRST. 
14
 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
15
 Q ANOTHER VARIABLE MAY BE WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING 
16
 BETWEEN THE HARD GROUND AND—WELL, ANYTHING THAT BREAKS 
17
 I THE FALL, SUCH AS A MATTRESS, PILLOW, SOMETHING OF THAT 
NATURE. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q LIKEWISE, IF A PERSON LANDS ON HIS TORSO, HIS 
21
 I BACK OR HIS STOMACH, THE FORCES ABSORBED IN THAT, THE FORCE 
22
 I FROM THE FALL IS ABSORBED IN THAT PART OF HIS BODY; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IT'S VERY UNLIKELY A FALL WHERE A PERSON LANDS 
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18 
19 
20 
23 
24 
25 
1 I ON THAT PART OF HIS BODY IS GOING TO RESULT IN A HEAD INJURY 
2 | OR A FRACTURE OF THE SKULL. 
A NO, I HAVE SEEN SIMULTANEOUS FATAL HEAD AND TORSO 
HJJUhl II: !.  
5
 Q OKAY. WHERE THE HEAD AND THE TORSO ESSENTIALLY 
6 
8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
LAND AT THE SAME TIME' 
* I A I HEY INCURRED FAT/ INJURJLS. 
DIDN'T OBSERVE THE FALL DON'T KNOW WHERE THE FIRST 
IMPACT WAS. 
Q ALL RIGHT. BUT NONETHELESS, THE A R E A — G E N E R A L L Y , 
-E AREA OF THE BODY THAT STRIKES FIRST IS THE AREA WHERE 
U'RE GOING TO SEE AN INJURY. 
A YES. 
Q DEPENDING ON WHAT IS STRUCK. WHAT OBJECT IS 
5N IT FALLS. 
A I THINK THAT'S ONE OF THE IMPORTANT VARIABLES, 
I L J . 
MR. MET OS: ALL. iVIdHI. THAT'S ALL. Wl! HAVE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. PRIOR TO REDIRECT— 
YOU MAY COME FORWARD ON YOUR REDIRECT, BUT THE DOCTOR HAS 
SPOKEN EVERAL EXHIBITS 
THAT ARE ILLUSTRATIVE OF HER TESTIMONY. DO THESE EXHIBITS 
BEAR A LEGEND IN RELATION TO in COLOR CODING 'HAi SHI HAS 
REFERRED TO? 
MS. HORNAK: YES, THEY DO, YOUR HONOR. 
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MR. METOS: YES, THEY DO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HORNAK; 
Q I BELIEVE YOU INDICATED TO MR. METOS THAT YOU 
DID NOT GO TO THE SCENE; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS IT YOUR USUAL PRACTICE TO GO TO THE SCENE? 
A WE GO TO THE SCENE WHEN THE BODY IS STILL THERE. 
WHEN DEATH IS DECLARED AT THE SCENE AND THE BODY IS LEFT 
IN AN UNDISTURBED STATE. 
Q SO WHEN A BODY IS BROUGHT TO YOU AS GAVIN'S WAS 
IT WOULD NOT BE YOUR USUAL PRACTICE TO GO TO THE SCENE. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q WHY IS THAT? 
A BECAUSE HIS BODY WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL, 
RESUSCITATION EFFORTS WERE TAKEN THERE. OUR REASON FOR 
GOING TO A DEATH SCENE IS TO SEE THE BODY IN RELATIONSHIP 
TO THE POSITION IN WHICH IT IS FOUND AND THE SURROUNDING 
CIRCUMSTANCES. ONCE THAT SCENE HAS BEEN DISRUPTED BY MEDICAL| 
PERSONNEL, OR WHOEVER ELSE MAY BE THERE, IT LOSES A GREAT 
DEAL OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR US. 
Q YOU ALSO INDICATED THAT YOU HAD BEEN SHOWN A 
PHOTOGRAPH OF, PRIOR TO THE TIME OR AT THE TIME THAT YOU 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
DID AN AUTOPSY, THAT I BELIEVE YOU STATED WAS DARK.AND BROWN. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q M N 'nil! KH.AL.L. WhA I 111' I f-nfi 1 i U T R A F M WA OF? 
A IT WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS DARK AND BROWN AND 
NOT VERY FOCUSEC AND MY RECOLLECTION 
Q uiu 
N YDIIP A. 
A 
Q 
GAVIN'S HEAD 
A MEASURED 
MEAN A GREAT DEAL 
INFLUENCE YOUR OPINION OR YOUR EXAMIN-
Ai ALL.'1 
A i tu inMi IUU u I\J rx 
,tfe COMC MEASUREMENT ~Vz . 
OCCIPITAL FRONTAL CIRCUMFERENCE, 
15 
16 
:1E HEAD, AS AN ASSESSMENT OF GROWTH. 
IS THAT YOUR USUAL PRACTICE TO TAKE THOSE MEASURE-
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A YES, "- -". 
Q WOULD x. ou. .OUR USUAL PRACTICE TO WEIGH A 
A J HAVE NEVER DONE THAT. 
Q AND HE USUAL PRACTICE ACCEPTED 
HEAD? 
THAT ORRECT inAT'S THE STANDARD MEDICAL 
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PRACTICE IS TO--THERE ARE STANDARD MEASUREMENTS OF GROWTH 
THAT WE TAKE AND ONE OF THOSE IS THE OCCIPITAL FRONTAL CIR-
CUMFERENCE. 
Q MR. METOS ALSO ASKED YOU IF HAIR ON A SCALP WOULD 
PLAY A ROLE IN CUSHIONING A BLOW. AND YOU INDICATED THAT 
THAT WAS CORRECT. 
A IT CAN, YES. 
Q WOULD IT ALSO BE FAIR TO SAY THAT CARPETING WOULD 
CUSHION A FALL? 
A YES, IT WILL. 
Q MR. METOS ASKED YOU A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT 
FRACTURES. DID GAVIN DIE IN THIS CASE FROM HIS SKULL FRAC-
TURE ALONE? 
A NO. 
Q WHAT ELSE DID HE DIE FROM? 
A GAVIN DIED BECAUSE HIS BRAIN WAS INJURED. 
Q YOU AGREED WITH MR. METOS WHEN HE ASKED YOU THAT 
IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE A SKULL FRACTURE FROM A FALL OF 
SIX FEET. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS THAT RIGHT? AND AGREEING WITH HIM ON THAT 
IS THAT INCONSISTENT WITH YOUR OPINION THAT GAVIN DID NOT 
DIE FROM A FALL FROM A BUNK BED? 
A IT IS CONSISTENT. 
Q OKAY. WHY IS IT CONSISTENT? 
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A SKULL FRACTURES DON'T KILL PEOPLE, IT'S THE INJURY 
TO THE BRAIN THAT KILLS PEOPLE. ONE CAN INCUR SKULL FRAC-
TURES WITHOUT INJURING THE UNDERLYING BRAIN. AND THE SKULL 
FRACTURE DOES NOT KILL YOU. IT'S THE INJURY THAT IS IN-
FLICTED ON THE BRAIN UNDERNEATH THE SKULL THAT DETERMINES 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT INJURY. ONE CAN HAVE FATAL INJURIES 
TO THE BRAIN WITHOUT SKULL FRACTURES AND FATAL INJURIES 
TO THE BRAIN WITH SKULL FRACTURES. ALL THE FRACTURE DOES 
IS INDICATE TO US THAT FORCE WAS APPLIED. IT HELPS US, 
GIVES US SOME INDICATION AS TO WHERE THAT FORCE WAS APPLIED 
AND IN A GENERIC SENSE GIVES US SOME IDEA OF THE MECHANISM 
OF INJURY. THE SKULL FRACTURE ITSELF IS NOT THE FATAL 
INJURY. 
Q DR. FRIKKE, MR. METOS ASKED YOU SEVERAL QUESTIONS 
ABOUT A BOOK BY DEMAYO. IS THAT THE CORRECT PRONUNCIATION? 
A CORRECT. 
Q AND A STUDY THAT HE REFERRED TO IN THERE ABOUT 
33 TO 75 POUNDS OF ENERGY AND THAT BEING CONSISTENT WITH 
OR CORRELATING OR CAUSING A SKULL FRACTURE. IS THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, HE DID POINT OUT THAT PARAGRAPH IN THE 
CHAPTER ON TRAUMA TO THE SKULL IN THE BOOK. 
Q ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE METHODOLOGY USED IN THAT 
STUDY OR WHAT WAS USED IN THAT STUDY? 
A AT THE TIME HE WAS QUESTIONING ME ABOUT THAT 
I DID NOT KNOW THE SOURCE FROM WHICH THIS CITATION WAS 
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DERIVED. 
Q DURING THE BREAK DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO REVIEW THE SOURCE OF THAT STUDY? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q WHAT WAS USED IN THAT STUDY IN OBTAINING THOSE 
RESULTS? 
A THIS IS A STUDY THAT IS CONDUCTED BY SEVERAL 
ENGINEERS AND THEY, THE PORTION OF THE STUDY WHICH IS MOST 
RELEVANT TO THE MECHANISM OF INJURY, WHICH GAVIN HAS, WHICH 
10 I IS AN IMPACT OF A MOVING HEAD AGAINST A RELATIVELY FLAT 
11 AND IMMOVABLE OBJECT SO THAT THE FORCE IS ADMINISTERED OVER 
12 A BROAD SURFACE AREA, WHAT THEY STUDIED WAS DRIED, EMPTY, 
13 DEFLESHED ADULT SKULLS. 
14 Q FROM CADAVERS? 
15 A BY DEFINITION THEY'RE DEAD. 
1* Q ALL RIGHT. AND WHEN YOU SAY "DEFLESHED SKULLS" 
17
 THEY HAD NO HAIR OR SCALP? 
18
 A THEY HAD NO HAIR, NO SCALP, NO BRAINS, NO BLOOD 
19
 VESSELS, NO MENINGES. 
2 0
 Q SO I GUESS YOU COULD ASSUME ALL THEY COULD DO 
21
 I TO TEST SKULL FRACTURES, BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF VESSELS 
AND ARTERIES, THEY COULDN'T TEST WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD 
BE ANY HEMORRHAGES OR CONTUSIONS IN THOSE HEADS. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q WERE THE BODIES ATTACHED TO THOSE HEADS? 
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A NO. 
Q SO IT WAS SIMPLY DROPPING AN ADULT HEAD ONTO 
A SURFACE? IS THAT THE MECHANISM THAT WAS USED IN THOSE 
TESTS? 
A THAT'S MY INTERPRETATION OF THIS STUDY. 
Q WOULD THE ATTACHMENT OF A BODY ONTO THE HEAD, 
REPLETE WITH ALL OF THE OTHER PARTS OF THE BODY, THE SCALP 
AND THE FLESH, AFFECT THAT STUDY OR THOSE RESULTS? 
A IT CERTAINLY AFFECTS THE WAY THE WHOLE LIVING 
BODY ACTS. 
Q MR. METOS ASKED YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
PROCESS THAT YOU USED IN DATING THE INJURIES THAT YOU DIS-
CUSSED IN GAVIN. AND I BELIEVE YOU INDICATED TO HIM THAT 
YOU USED A MICROSCOPE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q HOW LONG, DR. FRIKKE, HAVE YOU BEEN USING A MICRO-j 
SCOPE TO EXAMINE HUMAN TISSUE? 
A I'VE BEEN AN M.D. PATHOLOGIST SINCE THE BEGINNING 
OF MY PATHOLOGY TRAINING WHICH WAS IN 1986. BEFORE I WAS 
A PATHOLOGIST I WAS A BASIC RESEARCH SCIENTIST AND THERE 
I USED A MICROSCOPE EVERY DAY FOR THE TEN YEARS THAT I WORKEEf 
IN MY RESEARCH LAB. 
Q AND THE WAY THAT YOU USE TO DATE INJURIES IN 
GAVIN, IS THAT THE COMMON METHOD USED AMONG THOSE IN YOUR 
AREA OF EXPERTISE? 
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A YES, IT IS. 
Q THE DIAGRAMS THAT YOU USED EARLIER TO TESTIFY 
OF GAVIN'S HEAD, AND I BELIEVE THEY'RE 34 AND 35, THOSE 
ARE NOT DRAWN TO SCALE TO GAVIN'S HEAD, ARE THEY? 
A NO, THEY'RE NOT. 
Q THEY'RE MERELY FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND ALSO, DR. FRIKKE, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK GAVIN 
WOULD HAVE LIVED AFTER INCURRING THESE INJURIES? 
10 I A MY OPINION IS THAT BASED ON MY STUDIES OF HIS 
11 BRAIN, THAT I WENT INTO IN SOME DETAIL DISCUSSING WHAT IT 
12 I IS THAT WE LOOK FOR AND HOW WE LOOK FOR IT, THOSE CHANGES 
13 THAT WE LOOK FOR HAVE TO BE PRESENT AT THE TIME OF DEATH, 
14 AND THEN BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS 
15 WE KNOW THAT IF THEY'RE PRESENT AT THE TIME OF DEATH THE 
!« CHANGES STOP AT THAT TIME. THE MICROSCOPIC OR THE CELLULAR 
17 PROCESS OF DYING, THAT WE OBSERVE WITH THE MICROSCOPE, STOPS 
18
 I AT THE TIME OF DEATH. SO I DID THE EXAMINATION 18 HOURS 
AFTER HE DIED. IT'S MY BELIEF, BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE, 
2 0
 I THAT WHAT I SAW AT THE TIME OF HIS AUTOPSY IS REFLECTIVE 
21
 I OF THE CONDITION HE WAS AT WITH RESPECT TO HIS BRAIN CHANGES 
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH AND IT'S MY CONCLUSION THAT HIS 
2J
 I INJURIES, THE INJURIES TO THE FRONTAL LOBE OF HIS BRAIN 
2 4
 I WERE INCURRED FIVE TO SIX HOURS BEFORE HE DIED. 
Q SO HE WOULD HAVE LIVED FOR ABOUT FIVE TO SIX 
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HOURS WITH THESE INJURIES BEFORE HE DIED? 
A THAT'S MY OPINION. 
MS. HORNAK: THANK YOU. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY RECROSS, MR. METOS? 
MR. METOS: A FEW QUESTIONS. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Q YOU TALKED ABOUT THE OCCIPITAL FRONTAL CIRCUM-
10 I FERENCE, WHICH IS THE WAY YOU MEASURED GAVIN'S HEAD. 
1! A THAT'S CORRECT. 
12 Q WHERE DOES THAT GO FROM? IS IT THE ENTIRE C1R-
13 CUMFERENCE OF THE HEAD? 
14 A YEAH. WE WRAP A TAPE MEASURE AROUND THE FOREHEAD 
15 AND AROUND THE OCCIPITAL AND MEASURE THAT CIRCUMFERENCE. 
16 Q SO IT'S THE ENTIRE HEAD NOT JUST THE FRONTAL. 
" A WELL, THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE HEAD. 
18 Q YOU INDICATED THAT GAVIN DIED BECAUSE HIS BRAIN 
1* WAS INJURED; IS THAT RIGHT? 
*0 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 Q THE BRAIN WAS INJURED AS IT MOVED IN THE SKULL 
22
 RELATIVE TO THE SKULL— 
li A THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 4
 J Q — I S THAT CORRECT? AND IT STRUCK. AND BECAUSE 
IT STRUCK THE FRONT OF THE SKULL THERE WAS BRUISING OF THE 
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25 
BRAIN CAUSING—WELL, CAUSING THE BRUISES IN THE FRONT; IS 
THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND ALSO CAUSING, I BELIEVE YOU DESCRIBED IT-
DID YOU DESCRIBE IT AS A BRAIN EDEMA OR SOMETHING OF THAT 
NATURE? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. THE BRAIN BECOMES EDEMOUS AND 
FLUIDS ACCUMULATE IN THE TISSUE OF THE BRAIN. 
Q WITH RESPECT TO GAVIN WAS THAT THROUGHOUT THE 
10 I BRAIN? 
11 A YES, IT WAS. 
12 Q MEANING IT WAS THE ENTIRE BRAIN SWCLL UP. 
13 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
14 Q TO PUT IT IN LAYMAN'S TERMS. 
15 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
16 Q THE STUDY THAT WAS DONE SY ENGINEERS, BASICALLY, 
17 WHAT THEY DID IS THEY WEIGHED THE SKULLS, DROPPED THEM A 
18 KNOWN DISTANCE AND OBTAINED A KNOWN FORCE THAT RESULTED 
19 IN A FRACTURE; IS THAT RIGHT? 
20 A WELL, THEY HAD A NUMBER OF HUMAN SKULLS THAT 
21 VARIED IN WEIGHT AND THEN THEY WOULD IMPACT THEM—WELL, 
2 2
 THEY ACTUALLY HAVE DONE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTS 
2J HERE. SOME OF THEM WERE LOOKING AT IMPACT ON A BROAD SUR-
2 4
 I FACE, OTHERS WERE POINT IMPACTS, DROPPING METAL BALLS AND 
HITTING THEM. 
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1 Q WHAT I'M GETTING AT IS THEY WEIGH THE SKULLS, 
2 DROP THEM A KNOWN DISTANCE TO COME UP WITH AN AMOUNT OF 
3 FORCE IN A RANGE THAT CAUSES THE FRACTURE. 
4
 A YEAH, THEY DO A LOT OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENTS. 
5 Q AND IT DOESN'T PURPORT TO SAY ANYTHING OTHER 
• THAN THIS IS THE RANGE AT WHICH THE SKULLS WERE FRACTURED. 
7
 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
• Q IN TERMS OF ENERGY— 
• A I MEAN, THIS IS VALUABLE INFORMATION IN LEARNING 
10 ABOUT THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES CF DRIED BONES THAT HAPPEN 
11
 TO BE IN THE HUMAN SKULL. 
12 Q ALL RIGHT. AND THESE WERE ADULT SKULLS? 
13 ] A YES. 
Q THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, THICKER 
THAN GAVIN ADAMS' SKULL? 
A ADULT SKULLS ARE THICKER. THEY ARE LESS FLEXIBLE 
THAN ADULTS. DRIED BONE IS LESS FLEXIBLE THAN IS LIVING 
BONE. THERE ARE A LOT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A DRIED SKULL 
AND A LIVING SKULL AND A CHILD'S SKULL AND AN ADULT SKULL. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND THE CELLULAR PROCESS THAT YOU 
21
 TALKED WITH MS. HORNAK ABOUT, AGAIN, AND I DON'T MEAN TO 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
21 
24 
25 
BEAT THIS TO DEATH, BUT EVERY INDIVIDUAL REACTS INDIVIDUALLYj| 
IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THE BEST YOU CAN DO IS GIVE US A RANGE BASED 
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10 
19 
20 
21 
22 
21 
24 
25 
ON STUDIES THAT YOU'VE REVIEWED. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. METOSt I BELIEVE THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. METOS. 
THANK YOU, DR. FRIKKE. YOU MAY STEP DOWN AND 
YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
YOUR NEXT WITNESS? 
MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE CALLS MANFRED 
LASSIG. 
MR. METOS: OH, WAIT A MINUTE, YOUR HONOR. I 
DID FORGET TO COVER ONE AREA. 
JUDGE YOUNG: JUST A MOMENT, PLEASE, DR. FRIKKE. 
Q CBY MPs. METOS) YOU TALKED ABOUT GAVIN'S —YOU 
REVIEWED GAVIN'S MEDICAL RECORDS WITH RESPECT TO HIS HAIR 
PROBLEM. 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q HE WAS TAKEN TO THE DOCTOR, WAS IT SOME TIME 
MID-FEBRUARY, LATE FEBRUARY REGARDING THAT PROBLEM WITH 
HIS HAIR FALLING OUT? 
A I HAVE TO TAKE THE RECORD OUT AND ACTUALLY REVIEW 
IT. I DON'T REMEMBER THE DATE HE WAS EXAMINED. 
Q BUT FEBRUARY 19TH SOUNDS LIKE THE CORRECT DATE? 
A SOUNDS REASONABLE TO ME WITHOUT REVIEWING THE 
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RECORD. 
Q LET ME SEE IF I MAY HAVE SOMETHING INDICATING 
A DATE. 
MR. COPE: COUNSEL? 
MR. METOS: MR. COPE IS WILLING TO STIPULATE 
THAT HE WAS, GAVIN WAS SEEN ON THE 19TH OF FEBRUARY REGARDING] 
THE HAIR LOSS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. METOS: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, MAY I ASK ONE VERY BRIEF 
QUESTION? 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. COPE: AND I APOLOGIZE FOR ENTERING INTO 
THAT STIPULATION WHEN IT'S COUNSEL'S WITNESS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I UNDERSTAND. YOU DON'T HAVE ANY 
OBJECTION TO THE STIPULATION, MS. HORNAK? 
MS. HORNAK: NO, I DON'T. 
RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HORNAK: 
Q DR. FRIKKE, THE STUDY MR. METOS DISCUSSED WITH 
YOU, THE DEMAYO BOOK, IS THAT INCONSISTENT WITH THE STUDY 
YOU RELIED UPON IN YOUR DIRECT EXAMINATION? 
A NO, IT'S NOT. 
Q WHY NOT? 
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A BECAUSE THEY'RE LOOKING AT TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT 
PHENOMENA. THE ENGINEERING STUDIES ARE BASIC RESEARCH, 
LOOKING AT THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF DRIED BONE. THE 
CLINICAL STUDIES THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED, WHICH ARE THE 
CHILDREN FALLING OFF BEDS AND THE CHILDREN WHO FALL OUT 
OF WINDOWS IN HARLEM, ARE CLINICAL STUDIES, THESE ARE REAL 
LIFE PROCESSES, OBSERVATIONS THAT ARE DONE THAT INVOLVE 
REAL LIVE CHILDREN. 
MS. HORNAK: THANK YOU. 
10 I JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, DR. FRIKKE. 
11 I YOU MAY STEP DOWN. 
MR. METOS: I MIGHT-
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. METOS, I'M SORRY. WE CAN'T 
JUST CONTINUE TO GO BACK AND FORTH. IS YOUR QUESTION IN 
RELATION TO WHAT SHE'S JUST BEEN DISCUSSING? 
MR. METOS: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. IT MUST BE WITHIN THE 
SCOPE. 
MR. METOS: IT IS WITHIN THE SCOPE. 
20 
21 I RE-RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 2
 BY MR. METOS: 
*• Q THOSE STUDIES DIDN'T INVOLVE CONTROLLED DROPS 
2 4
 OF CHILDREN. THAT WOULD BE UNETHICAL AND A TERRIBLE THING 
2 5
 J TO DO, WOULDN'T THEY? 
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A 
ARE BROUGHT 
THAT'S RIGHT. THEY ARE STUDIES OF CHILDREN WHO 
" TO REAL HOSPITALS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED REAL 
FALLS BASED ON A VARIETY OF INFLUENCES. 
Q AND THOSE WOULD INCLUDE LANDING IN DIFFERENT 
AREAS OF THEIR BODY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
IN HARLEM. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
BE EXCUSED 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
LANDING ON DIFFERENT SURFACES. 
THAT IS CORRECT. 
FALLING FROM DIFFERENT HEIGHTS. 
THERE'S PROBABLY NOT MUCH VARIATION OF SURFACE 
I'VE NEVER BEEN THERE. 
WELL, IT'S AN EXPERIENCE. 
BUT FALLING FROM DIFFERENT HEIGHTS ALSO. 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. METOS: ALL RIGHT. THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, DR. FRIKKE. YOU MAY 
• 
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